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Abstract
Theories of well-being give an account of what it is for persons to fare well
or to live prudentially valuable lives. I divide the theoretical landscape based on
the position that theories accord to schedules of concerns. A schedule of
concerns is the loose program that specifies the objects that engage the
subject’s active interest, attention, and care. Objective theories hold that the
objects of one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Subjective theories
hold that one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. I assess each set of
theories for descriptive adequacy and find that each runs into difficulty.
Subjective theories confront the problem of worth. They imply that one can
fare well despite the fact that the objects of one’s concerns are not objectively
valuable. Critics object that the latter claim does not cohere well with some preanalytic beliefs about well-being. Not all the objects in one’s schedule of
concerns are on equal axiological footing. Meanwhile, objective theories confront
the problem of authority. They imply that, provided the objects to which one
relates are independently valuable, one can fare well despite the fact that one
does not endorse the conditions of one’s life. This alienates welfare subjects from
their well-being. Finally, each set of theories imply that objective goods and
schedules of concerns on their own do not contribute to well-being. I argue that
this claim is counter-intuitive. I call this the double bind problem.
My research shows that we can address the problem of authority, the
problem of worth, and the double bind problem by defending an accommodating
view of well-being as endorsing worthy goods. This is a hybrid account of wellii

being that tries to take seriously the intuition that well-being has both a subjective
and an objective part. The endorsement condition captures the subjective part of
well-being; the worth condition captures the objective part of well-being. My
considered view is that, in central cases, one fares well at a time when one
endorses worthy goods.

Keywords
Ethics, Well-Being, Authority, Worth, Subjectivism, Objectivism, Sumner, Parfit,
Darwall, Dworkin.
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Executive Summary
The Standard View
Theories of well-being give an account of what it is for persons to fare well
or to live prudentially valuable lives. I divide the theoretical landscape based on
the position that theories accord to schedules of concerns. A schedule of
concerns is the loose program that specifies the objects that engage the
subject’s active interest, attention, and care. Objective theories hold that the
objects of one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Subjective theories
hold that one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Several theories
mean to tell us what it is for a person to fare well and we must decide which is
best.

Analytic Criteria
The best theories of well-being should meet four tests. They should meet
the criteria for descriptive adequacy; they should address the problem of
authority; they should address the problem of worth; and they should escape the
double bind problem.

Descriptive adequacy
In chapter one, I argue with Sumner that theories of well-being should be
descriptively adequate. Descriptive adequacy can be understood in terms of four
criteria: fidelity, generality, formality, and neutrality. I explain the four criteria and
argue that we should temper our acceptance of them. The extent to which a
viii

theory of well-being brings together disparate subjects and judgments typically
counts toward its acceptance. However, placing too much emphasis on some of
the criteria leaves us prone to three mistakes. First, it inclines us to ignore
relevant differences amongst core welfare subjects; second, it conceals the role
that communities play in their development and their welfare judgments; and,
third, it rules out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts of well-being.
Sumner is not committed to these mistakes. Still, we can avoid this outcome by
ensuring that the character, decisions, and behavior that theories of well-being
describe are possible for the kind of welfare subject under consideration.

Authority and Worth
In chapter two, I argue that two theses about the structure of theories of
well-being are particularly important: the agent sovereignty thesis and the
endorsement thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis holds that one's schedule of
concerns alone determines one’s well-being. The endorsement thesis holds that
the possession of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if one endorses
it under suitable conditions. What a theory entails about the truth of these two
claims generates two problems: the problem of authority and the problem of
worth.
In section 2.2, I argue that objective theories hold that the objects of one’s
concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Objective theories reject both the
agent sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis. On this view, endorsing
the goods in one’s life is at best an additional good alongside other goods. Such
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theories confront the problem of authority. They imply that, provided the objects
to which one relates are independently valuable, one can fare well despite the
fact that one does not endorse the conditions of one’s life. This alienates welfare
subjects from their well-being.
In section 2.3, I argue that subjective theories hold that one’s concerns
alone determine one’s well-being. Subjective theories accept both the agent
sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis. Such theories confront the
problem of worth. They imply that one can fare well despite the fact that the
objects of one’s concerns are not independently valuable. Critics object that the
latter claim does not cohere well with some pre-analytic beliefs about well-being.
Not all the objects in one’s schedule of concerns are on equal axiological footing.

The Double Bind Problem
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, I argue that existing solutions to the problem of
authority and the problem of worth each imply that a part of well-being does not
contribute to well-being on its own, and that this inference is counter-intuitive.
Call this the double bind problem. I appeal to two imaginary cases to illustrate the
problem: John the grass counter, and Richard the artist. I argue that we should
formulate an account of well-being that recognizes that each part of well-being on
its own contributes to well-being at least to some extent.

x

An Alternate Account
In chapters three and four, I construct a hybrid account of well-being that
meets the analytic criteria I outline in chapters one and two. We can address the
problem of authority, the problem of worth, and the double bind problem by
defending an accommodating view of well-being as endorsing worthy goods. The
solution requires that we accept the endorsement thesis but reject the agent
sovereignty thesis. This is a hybrid account of well-being that tries to take
seriously the intuition that well-being has both a subjective and an objective part.
The endorsement condition captures the subjective part of well-being; the worth
condition captures the objective part of well-being. My considered view is that, in
central cases, one fares well at a time when one endorses worthy goods.

Endorsement
In chapter three, I argue that addressing the problem of authority requires
that we accept the endorsement thesis. In central cases, endorsement is
necessary for well-being. This principle says that, in most cases, the possession
of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if one endorses it under
suitable conditions. I then argue that we should reject the agent sovereignty
thesis. One’s schedule of concerns alone does not always determine one’s wellbeing. The modal qualifier is necessary to escape the double bind problem. In
some cases, endorsement alone contributes to one’s welfare, though that
contribution is small. Call the welfare contribution that endorsement makes in the
absence of worthy goods “low fare.” My considered view is that there are
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discontinuities between low fare and the welfare contribution one gets from
endorsing worthy goods. Call the latter “full fare.”
In section 3.2, I formulate a pluralistic model of endorsement that captures
the diversity of subjective evaluative states that welfare subjects experience. Call
this view endorsement as favouring. I argue that our practices surrounding
endorsement and the negative implications of denying its importance lend
credibility to the claim that endorsement matters to well-being, and that such
endorsement meets an experience requirement for theories of well-being.
In section 3.3, I argue that subjective theories seem intuitive largely
because of a more general agreement concerning the intrinsic importance of
such endorsement. What best explains this agreement is that endorsement is
constituted in part by a distinctive evaluative attitude that captures the intrinsic
importance of endorsement experiences to one’s well-being. This is consistent
with the agent-relativity of welfare claims.
In section 3.4, I then consider three objections to my view. The first two
objections are related. First, one might object to making value conditional on
endorsement. On this view, the value of a state of affairs does not depend on the
subject’s endorsement. Second, one might object that subjects sometimes fail to
endorse a state of affairs for superficial reasons. On this view, a state of affairs
may be valuable even if the subject fails to endorse it. I argue that we can
address either by restricting the scope of the endorsement thesis to welfare
value, or by insisting that the endorsement in question occur under suitable
conditions. The third objection targets the stipulation that endorsement is only
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necessary for well-being in central cases. I argue that the qualification is
necessary to escape the double bind problem, and that we can address this
concern of subjectivists by recognizing a discontinuity in welfare value. A
discontinuity in value is a sharp break between the welfare contributions of
different kinds of welfare goods such that no amount of one good can ever be
more valuable than some finite amount of another good. In the central case,
faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great contribution that
endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true that endorsement
on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less than the unity. Call
the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own “low fare.” The
discontinuity in welfare value between low fare and full fare is necessary to deal
with the double bind problem without abandoning the endorsement thesis.

Worth
In chapter four, I argue that we can explain the sense in which objects are
independently valuable without rejecting the endorsement thesis, but it requires
that we abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. I then argue that this result is
consistent with the previous chapter’s conclusions.
In section 4.2, I analyse the welfare judgments that we make from the firstperson and the third-person standpoint. I argue that some welfare judgments
presuppose that some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects,
and that we have good reason to accept this characterisation of welfare
judgments. Endorsement figures prominently in welfare judgments, but so do
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questions concerning the worth of the objects one endorses. We should reject
the agent sovereignty thesis.
In section 4.3, I argue that we can explain the sense in which certain
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without denying the
endorsement thesis. The skillful pursuit of welfare is an expertise that one
acquires and develops over time. The endorsements that subjects make under
suitable conditions situate them as epistemic authorities in a community of
knowers who share an interest in faring well. On this view, judgments of worth
are intersubjective ideals that play a crucial role in developing expertise in the
pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare value. Specifically,
judgments of worth guide welfare subjects toward authentic standards of selfassessment and reliable sources of well-being. Faring well over time consists in
endorsing objects worthy in this sense.
In section 4.4, I consider objections to this characterization of worth. First,
I suggest that judgments of worth do not figure to the same extent in all welfare
judgments. I then argue that judgments concerning the worth of an object are
defeasible. I grant that the resulting account of worth is not the kind of
independent value requirement that an objectivist about well-being would
endorse. Worth remains tied to schedules of concerns in an intersubjective
sense. However, I suggest that this feature is an asset rather than a liability.
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Endorsing Worthy Goods
In chapter five, I survey three of the most important extant hybrid theories
of well-being. I argue that these are important accounts in their own right, but that
they do not meet the formality criterion and only weakly satisfy the generality
criterion. I then summarize my own view and assess how well it meets the criteria
for descriptive adequacy I describe in the first two chapters. Well-being as
endorsing worthy goods is not a view of the highest well-being, or an account of
what counts as a successful life. It is a hybrid account of what faring well-consists
in at a time and over a period. On my view, one fares well at a time if one
endorses worthy goods. I conclude by considering puzzles and problems that I
leave unresolved.

xv

Chapter 1: Well-Being and Descriptive Adequacy
1.1 Breaking Ground
Despite a surge of interdisciplinary research, there is a regrettable lack of
consensus concerning what well-being consists in.1 Theories of well-being give
an account of what it is for persons to fare well or to live prudentially valuable
lives. A prudentially valuable life is one that is good for the person who lives it.
Theories of well-being serve three functions in practical reasoning: they are the
foundation for rational decisions in which only the interests of the individual are
concerned; they capture what we have reason to promote for others; and they
are the basis for the consideration of a person’s interests in moral argument.2 A
common view is that the first function has pride of place: well-being matters to
benefactors and disputants because of its importance to welfare subjects. 3 A
successful account of well-being does not necessarily add to the protean list of
what human beings find prudentially valuable or worthwhile. Rather, it clarifies
the intension of the concept, and grants a clearer basis for the measurement and
interpersonal comparisons of well-being.

I use the terms “well-being,” “welfare,” and “prudential value” synonymously. Though some write
as if “the good life” also denoted a life that is good for the person who lives that life, the phrase
sometimes denotes a morally good life. To avoid ambiguity, I limit my usage to the first two terms.
2 The term “person” denotes the welfare subject, but the set of persons in this context is not
limited to humans or even to individuals. For instance, some accounts of well-being might entail
that ecosystems are welfare subjects – that is, that some things are good and bad in themselves
for ecosystems – but we need an additional premise to establish the moral standing of
ecosystems.
3 See Thomas Scanlon. “The Status of Well-Being.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,
1996: 93-143.
1

1

Several theories mean to tell us what it is for a person to fare well and we
must decide which is best. We do not have an entirely free hand in choosing
among alternative theories, however. In this chapter, I describe the broadly
coherentist approach to normative questions that characterises the rest of the
work. I then situate L.W. Sumner’s test for descriptive adequacy for the selection
of theories of well-being, and assess the criteria that compose it. I argue that we
have reason to accept the fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy, which
ensures that theories of well-being cohere reasonably well with our beliefs of
well-being. A well-defined test for descriptive adequacy acts as a kind of creative
constraint on our deliberations. However, we should temper our acceptance of
the other criteria. Placing too much emphasis on generality, formality, and
neutrality leaves us prone to three mistakes. It inclines us to ignore relevant
differences amongst core welfare subjects; it conceals the role that communities
play in the development of welfare subjects and the practice of welfare
judgments; and it rules out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts of wellbeing. I propose revisions to the test for descriptive adequacy to avoid these
mistakes.

1.2 Reflective Equilibrium
The broadly coherentist approach I propose to follow is consistent with the
method of reflective equilibrium, a theory of justification first formulated by Nelson
Goodman and given prominence in ethics by John Rawls. 4 According to this

4

See Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1955; John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. For a
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account, a belief’s justification cannot hinge on its relation to more foundational
beliefs. Instead, a belief is justified if it coheres well with other considered
judgments. As Rawls puts it, a belief is justified if it would survive a process that
brought it into “reflective equilibrium” with all of one’s normative and descriptive
beliefs.5 Bringing a belief into reflective equilibrium involves resolving conflicts
between considered moral judgments and considered moral principles, though
Rawls says little about how to resolve conflicts between them. A considered
moral judgment is one made with confidence in light of the relevant non-moral
facts, when one is calm and even-tempered, and when one does not stand to
gain or lose based on the answer given. Thus, there is a sense in which
considered moral judgments are self-evident. Although they remain open to
revision, they are likely to be more stable over time than their less considered
cousins.
The outcome of reflective equilibrium involves more than simple
consistency. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes, “moral philosophy is Socratic:
we may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative
principles are brought to light. And we may want to do this even though these
principles are a perfect fit.”6 For instance, we might require that moral principles
possess explanatory virtues that reach beyond their mere consistency with
considered moral judgments, virtues such as simplicity or explanatory power.

useful survey of reflective equilibrium in ethics, see Jeff McMahan, “Moral Intuition.” Blackwell
Guide to Ethical Theory. Edited by H. LaFollette. Oxford: Blackwell, 92-110.
5 See John Rawls, “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,” Philosophical Review 60 (1951),
177-97 and “The Independence of Moral Theory,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 47 (1974-5): 5-22.
6 Rawls (1971): 49.

3

Since Norman Daniels’ accepted reformulation of reflective equilibrium, Rawls’s
model has evolved from a theory of justification to a full-blown method for
conducting inquiries in normative ethics. On Daniels’ view, the function of
reflective equilibrium is to produce coherence in an ordered triple of a set of
beliefs held by a particular person, namely, a set of considered moral judgments,
a set of moral principles, and a set of relevant background theories.7 As far as we
focus on particular cases and the principles that relate to them, we are seeking
only narrow reflective equilibrium. Conversely, wide reflective equilibrium tests
our beliefs against developed moral and non-moral theories of various kinds,
some of which contain moral beliefs of their own. These might include theories
about the nature of persons, the interface between self-interest and morality, and
the social function of morality.
The present investigation seeks to produce a narrow reflective equilibrium
between a set of considered welfare judgments, and a set of relevant
background theories about the nature of well-being. The equilibrium sought is
narrow rather than wide because it does not consider how well the view coheres
with various moral principles. It is typical for investigations into the nature of wellbeing to hold matters concerning the right in abeyance until matters concerning
the good are nearly settled. In his seminal work on the nature of well-being,
Sumner draws a helpful distinction between the normative and descriptive
adequacy of a theory. A theory is normatively adequate if it plays its designated

7

The exact scope of the relevant background theories is a matter of debate. See Norman
Daniels. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.” Journal of Philosophy 76
(1979): 256–82; reprinted in Daniels, N., 1996, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in
Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21–46.

4

role within a given framework; it is descriptively adequate if it fits with our
ordinary beliefs and judgments about well-being.8 For Sumner, descriptive
adequacy precedes normative adequacy. We cannot simply find an account that
best serves our favorite theory of distributive justice, for instance, and assert that
it best defines what well-being consists in. Our deliberations must first take into
account our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, and the coarse understanding
of the concept and its cognates we presuppose in practical reasoning and
common sense psychological explanations. We must then formulate a model that
fits best with these convictions. Definitions of well-being that fail to prioritize
descriptive adequacy risk failing as descriptions of what faring well consists in,
however well they cohere with other theoretical commitments.
The idea, then, is to suspend judgment on the question of how well an
account of well-being fits within a favoured normative framework until we get a
sense of how well it coheres with our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being. There
is no guarantee that we can assess theories for descriptive adequacy while
holding open questions about their normative adequacy, but we cannot answer
this question in advance of our inquiry. A well-defined test for the descriptive
adequacy of a theory of well-being should act as a kind of creative constraint on
our deliberations. It should help us recognize and ground relevant considerations
without situating the analysis in favour of a given account. As we assess an
account’s degree of fit with our considered welfare judgments, the decision to

8

Sumner (1996): 9.
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favour one account of well-being over another should be the outcome of an
impartial test.
A particular test for descriptive adequacy may prove too restrictive,
however. If a test precludes relevant information, or if it excludes intuitive
accounts of well-being from consideration, then we have good reason to revise it.
In the next section, I argue that we have good reason to revise Sumner’s test for
descriptive adequacy. Specifically, we have reason to accept the fidelity criterion
for descriptive adequacy, but we should temper our acceptance of its other
criteria.

1.3 Descriptive Adequacy
Sumner parses descriptive adequacy in terms of fidelity, generality,
formality, and neutrality.9 Fidelity is perhaps the most important criterion. It
requires that a theory of well-being cohere with our pre-analytic beliefs about
well-being, and that it explain why beliefs are unreliable in cases in which it does
not. The relevant beliefs consist in the intuitive assessments we make about our
own well-being and the well-being of others in light of our pre-reflective beliefs
about well-being. We make plain the data candidate theories must fit when we
judge, for instance, that a life is going well or poorly, that someone has benefitted
from good fortune, that a policy is in the best interest of a community, or that one
group is enjoying a higher quality of life than another group. Fidelity needs only
two assumptions. First, it assumes that there exists a network of pre-analytic
concepts and welfare judgments stable enough to support a high degree of

9

Sumner (1996): 8-10.
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agreement concerning when an object is good for a person and when it is not.
Sumner explains this assumption by analogy: just as answers to the question
‘what is it for one event to cause another?’ presuppose a shared network of
causal concepts and judgments, so do answers to the question ‘what is it to fare
well?’ Second, it assumes that we use the concept of well-being either implicitly
or explicitly in common-sense psychological explanations, and in judgments
concerning a person’s well-being.10 Importantly, claims concerning the fidelity of
a given concept of well-being assume nothing about the moral implications of
that concept. The notion of well-being may have moral implications, but wellbeing is not a moral notion.
Generality, the next criterion, has two parts. The first part requires that a
theory of well-being capture the range of welfare judgments we make. For
instance, it requires that a theory tell us what it is for a person to fare well or
poorly at a time and over a period, and for a person to gain or lose well-being
over time. The second part requires that a theory of well-being fit all core
subjects of welfare assessments. This requirement is more challenging than it
may seem at first glance, for the term “well-being” and its cognates apply to a
wide-variety of subjects. We speak of the well-being of children and adults, plants
and animals, communities and nations, and even species and ecosystems. A
perfectly general theory of well-being will not only explain the various welfare
judgments we make, but also capture what faring well consists in for the variety
of subjects we deem capable of faring well.

For a dissenting view, see Thomas Scanlon. “The Status of Well-Being.” The Tanner Lectures
on Human Values (1996): 93-143.
10
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Next, formality requires that theories explain the nature of well-being
rather than describe its typical sources. Specifically, theories should name the
properties that make something good for a subject, that is, the features of a state
of affairs that make an object good or bad for the entity it harms or benefits.
Moreover, they should explain how these combine to inform judgments of how
well a subject fares at a given moment and over time. Together, generality and
formality require that an account of well-being explain at least two things. Where
S is the welfare subject and x is the object affording the harm or benefit, an
account of well-being W must explain the property that makes x good or bad for
S at a time or interval t, and how the particular contributions of a given object
determines the overall level of well-being of S over time. Thus, a credible
explanation of well-being should complete the formula “x benefits S at t iff x
stands in relation W to S at t.” The idea is that, while subjects may require
satisfying vastly different conditions in order to fare well, a theory of well-being
must abstract from the accidental features of subjects and their context to answer
questions such as ‘what is it for an entity to fare well?’ and ‘what is for an object
to benefit an entity?’ Unless we have reasons to believe otherwise, we should
guide our inquiry with the assumption that the nature of well-being is separate
from its sources.
Neutrality is the fourth and final criterion of descriptive adequacy. Sumner
suggests that prior concerns for generality and formality should move us to
accept the neutrality criterion, which calls for us to avoid bias toward a preferred

8

form of life.11 If a theory is to apply to a wide range of cases involving creatures
of diverse natures and tastes, if a theory is to consist of more than a list one’s
favorite sources of well-being, then it must not have built into it a bias toward
concrete forms of life. Indeed, concerns over neutrality seem to arise naturally
from previous commitments to generality and formality. We may deem that
certain natures flourish better under some conditions than others, but as Sumner
suggests, the judgment “must fall out as a confirming implication of a formally
neutral theory.”12 Where fidelity ensures a given account of well-being coheres
with our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, generality, formality, and neutrality
combine to exclude narrow, biased or otherwise confused accounts of well-being
from consideration.
We have good reason to accept the fidelity criterion since it ensures that
theories of well-being cohere reasonably well with our pre-reflective beliefs about
well-being. Consider the two assumptions that underwrite it. Common welfare
judgments evince our shared grasp of the concept of well-being, as well as the
role these beliefs play in practical reasoning and in common sense psychological
explanations. When we muse on the kind of life we want for ourselves and
others, when we consider whether we would gain from taking up a project, when
we reflect on whether a procedure is in the best interest of a patient, we reveal a
rough grasp of what faring well consists in, how to measure it, and how to weigh
the gain of one against the loss of another. Granted, the nature of well-being is
contested, yet such disagreement is possible only in light of a broad, more basic

11
12

Sumner (1996): 18.
Ibid.
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agreement about what counts as a sensible description of well-being and its
cognate concepts. This basic agreement need not be deeply philosophical to be
useful. For instance, discussions of well-being tend to converge on a plausible
list of goods that contribute to well-being, though accounts of why these goods
deserve to be on the list diverge widely. 13 Most would likely grant that wealth is
merely a means to an end, that meaningful work and healthy relationships are
important sources of well-being, and that poor physical and mental health tend to
compromise one’s well-being. These judgments about typical sources of wellbeing are much too coarse and provisional to constitute a suitable account of
well-being on their own. However, they are typically stable and reliable enough to
provide us with grist for the mill. We should be prepared to specify these
judgments as we go, especially where they conflict with theoretical
considerations that bear on their acceptance. Thus, the fidelity criterion fixes
coherence as a creative constraint on our deliberations about well-being. We
must choose among theories by seeing which one coheres better with our
considered welfare judgments. If a theory has counterintuitive implications, then
this evidence counts against it. In such cases, we must be willing to make a
diagnosis and decide whether to reject our considered judgments or revise the
theory of well-being under consideration.
Moreover, we have good reason to mind the aspects of the formality that
prevent us from confusing the nature of well-being with an enumeration of

13

On convergence in theories of well-being, see Fred Feldman. Pleasure and the Good Life.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 160.
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common sources of well-being.14 Most theorists concede that a wide variety of
objects confer harms and benefits, and will index the list of welfare goods in
some way to the welfare subject. On most accounts, the nature of well-being will
not reduce to a list of welfare goods. The formality requirement ferrets out
confusion by insisting that we separate the nature of well-being from the objects
from which we derive welfare value. For instance, my son Jarrod might be
tempted to define well-being as playing computer games on a cold autumn
morning. However, the activity is a source of well-being rather than an account of
its nature. Playing computer games on a cold autumn morning benefits Jarrod if
and only if the activity figures in an account that captures what it is for Jarrod to
fare well.
However, we should temper our acceptance of the generality, formality,
and neutrality criteria for descriptive adequacy. Placing too great an emphasis on
these three criteria leaves us prone to three mistakes. It inclines us to ignore
relevant differences amongst core welfare subjects; it conceals the role that
communities play in the development of welfare subjects and the practice of
welfare judgments; and it rules out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts
of well-being.
Consider how insisting on generality inclines us to ignore relevant
differences amongst core welfare subjects. Sensory hedonists offer perhaps the
most general theory of well-being, suggesting that faring well consists in

Sumner warns against this confusion. See Sumner, “Two Conceptions of the Good.” In The
Good Life and the Human Good. Ellen Frankel Paul, et. al, eds. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992, pp. 1-15; Sumner (1996): 16-17.
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experiencing surplus sensory pleasure.15 Their account situates all the different
welfare judgments we make along a single scale, and defines the set of core
welfare subjects clearly as the set of entities capable of sensory pain and
pleasure. Unfortunately, the claim that well-being consists only in experiencing
surplus sensory pleasure is not faithful to our pre-analytic beliefs about wellbeing. The problem is that it seems incredible to suggest that faring well consists
merely in securing surplus sensory pleasure. A life spent hooked up to an
experience machine that ensures a surplus of sensory pleasure is not one in
which welfare subjects fare well.16 Where does the account go wrong?
One way to diagnose the mistake is to notice that sensory hedonists
achieve generality at the cost of what we know empirically about human beings.
They capture all core subjects of welfare assessments, from the fetus to the
senior, only by prescribing a program that reduces the practice of welfare
judgments to simple hedonistic terms. On this view, the only relevant features of
welfare subjects are their capacity to feel sensory pleasure and to reason how to
secure pleasure over time. The formality criterion does nothing to prevent the
exclusion. The upshot is the imposition of an informational constraint on accounts
of well-being, one that excludes much of what we know about the development
and behavior of creatures like us, and precludes otherwise relevant information
from consideration. Specifically, sensory hedonism focuses on the type of
welfare judgments that are attainable in solitude, privileging first-person reports
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of sensory pain and pleasure. On this view, what matters is determining the
property that makes a state of affairs good for a subject, the conditions under
which the subject correctly perceives those properties, and how best to relate to
the property over time. No other feature of the welfare subject is directly relevant
to the nature of well-being or the practice of welfare judgments. We might think
that sensory hedonism errs in excluding too much information from its account of
what faring well consists in, particularly in its account of the welfare subject.
We should inform our account of the welfare subject with the sum of what
we know empirically about human psychology and the communities in which they
grow and live. Conversely, we should reconsider or reject theories that clash with
such knowledge. This suggests that theories of well-being should meet a minimal
sort of psychological realism. When constructing a theory of well-being, we
should ensure that the character, decisions, and behavior described are possible
for the kind of welfare subject under consideration. The condition seems to be an
implication of the fidelity criterion, an insistence that theories of well-being be
faithful to our considered judgments of what we know about human beings and
the communities in which they live.
We have good reason to accept this new constraint. First, placing too
much emphasis on generality inclines us to ignore relevant differences amongst
core welfare subjects. If we tailor the nature of well-being to the exercise of
rational and perceptual capacities for the sake of generality, much will escape
our notice. For instance, we will fail to notice that human faculties develop and
deteriorate gradually through one’s childhood, adulthood, and senescence, and
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that reason and perception mature and decline at different rates. Next, it inclines
us to construct welfare subjects in a way that conceals the role that communities
play in their development and their practice of welfare judgments. Welfare
subjects are not atomistic valuers who perceive, judge, and value in solitude.
They are individuals who are born and grow in communities that influence and
inform their considered judgments about what faring well consists in and which
goods are worthy of pursuit. Consider children as welfare subjects. Unlike adults,
children have few settled dispositions, and the choices of caregivers, whether
implicit or explicit, have a large part to play in settling their future character. This
process of education is necessary and appropriate, for the dispositions they
would have in the absence of such influence would satisfy only the most basic
theories of well-being. In fact, few theorists would take the dispositions human
beings are born with as necessary and sufficient for well-being. Even sensory
hedonists will want to shape the dispositions of the children in their care to impart
them with the capacity to defer gratification, and desires theorists, the capacity to
correct mistaken desires.
An account that modeled welfare subjects exclusively in terms of
perceptual and rational capacities might downplay the role communities play in
the development of those faculties, and describe the well-being of children
entirely in terms of future goods. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance,
Aristotle argues that human well-being consists in the exercise of one’s rational
faculties in accordance with excellence. Since they are unable to share in
excellent activity owing to the immaturity of their rational faculties, Aristotle
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estimates that children cannot fare well, and those “who are called happy are
being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them.”17 Yet children are
not merely virtuous-agents-in-waiting; they are welfare subjects in their own right,
with the capacity to enjoy present as well as future goods. All things being equal,
a child who is enjoying a day at the beach on warm summer day is faring well at
a time, whatever future goods may be just over the horizon. Hence, a
descriptively adequate account of well-being must construct subjects in terms
that capture their growth from dependence to relative self-sufficiency without
compromising the ability to assess their well-being at different stages of life.
Imposing an informational constraint on welfare judgments for the sake of
generality runs the risk of excluding contextually relevant features of states of
affairs, including the role of communities in enabling and informing welfare
judgments, and of barring legitimate welfare subjects from full consideration. We
should insist, then, that adequate theories of well-being commit to a minimal sort
of psychological realism, which includes what we know about the social setting of
welfare subjects. In effect, we might insist that fidelity take precedence not only in
the construction of theories of well-being but also in the construction of welfare
subjects.
It is important to note that contemporary accounts of well-being need not
commit to an atomistic construction of the welfare subject or the exclusion of
communal influences on moral development. Sumner’s criteria for descriptive
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adequacy are not wedded to either of these assumptions. For instance, he
recommends that a reasonably general theory of well-being can be attentive to
the variety of subjects for whom we make welfare judgments, though our account
is bound to exclude some things from the set of welfare subjects. “A theory of
well-being would clearly be incomplete were it to exclude children or cats,” he
writes, “but it would not clearly be incomplete were it to exclude paramecia or
plants.”18 This complicates the task of finding a general account of well-being.
One challenge is that different welfare subjects have very different capacities and
characteristics: some manifest a form of mental life, others are insensate; some
are individuals, still others, collectivities. Sumner proposes that we distinguish
between our core beliefs about well-being, those we hold with the highest degree
of confidence, and peripheral beliefs less likely to survive critical reflection.
“Whereas a theory must fit the core of our concept, it cannot avoid some degree
of stipulation in its periphery,” he writes, “yielding determinate results where the
application of that concept is vague and taking sides where it is in dispute.”19 We
may legitimately strive to preserve the considered intuitions, beliefs, and
practices surrounding our concept of well-being, even if we do so at the expense
of a more general account. Hence, there is no reason to believe that Sumner is
committed to either rigid atomism or individualism. In this sense, the discussion
highlights elements of descriptive adequacy that bear consideration rather than a
censure of Sumner’s position.
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We should be attentive to the possibility of extending the core-periphery
distinction to beliefs about the welfare subject. Just as we can distinguish
between core and peripheral beliefs about well-being, so too can we distinguish
between core and peripheral beliefs about the welfare subject. Applying
Sumner’s distinction in this direction creates a logical space for a more subtle
construction that recognizes relational aspects of the subject that might otherwise
escape our notice. To borrow Sumner’s turn of phrase, our account of the welfare
subjects would be incomplete if it excluded the relevant characteristics of welfare
subjects at different stages of life, or the role that communities play in developing
the capacities of welfare subjects, a claim I defend in the fourth chapter.
However, our account would not be clearly incomplete were it to exclude more
idiosyncratic characteristics, such as height, weight or eye color.
This suggests a refinement to an earlier claim concerning the generality of
accounts of well-being: we should expect accounts of well-being not only to
exhibit a degree of unity, but also to accommodate relevant distinctions between
welfare subjects. While generalisations in our construction of the welfare subject
are inevitable, we should be prepared to justify the theoretical choices we make,
appreciate the distortions they impose on accounts of well-being, and realize
when generality comes at too great a cost. It is possible that conflicts between
generality and fidelity are irrevocable, in which case we might abandon attempts
to produce a unified theory of well-being, and accept that a theory may be narrow
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but true for the beings to which it applies.20 As always, the burden of proof rests
with those who would advance a more complex account of well-being.
Julia Annas constructs an account of well-being that exhibits this kind of
refinement. Annas suggests that questions about the quality of life should be
attentive to the complication that individuals come already grouped in families
and communities, and that gender influences the details of one’s life at least to
some extent. In most societies, the fact of being a man or a woman determines
both one’s life choices and how one perceives them. She suggests that societal
norms governing the gendered division of labor are bad for women, and she
wonders whether we can best explain the injustice through an appeal to human
nature. “There are everywhere two actual norms for human life,” she writes, “in
no society is it indifferent to the shape of your life and what you can make of it,
whether you are a man or a woman.”21 However, she is unsure whether the two
norms are parts of a single account of human florishing, or whether each belongs
to a distinct account. Her point seems to be that there might be two different
accounts of flourishing, one for women and one for men, based on the
assumption that men and women have distinct natures. She contents herself with
pointing out the harms that gender and social location can impose on welfare
subjects. For instance, women who live in traditional societies in which gender
strongly determines suitable ways of life will have difficulty conceiving of
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alternatives that violate these conservative social norms. As a result, they may
adjust their desires to their circumstances as an adaptive strategy to achieve a
measure of contentment.22
Just as we should temper our acceptance of the generality and formality
criteria for descriptive adequacy, so too should we temper our acceptance of
neutrality. Neutrality requires that our theories of well-being be impartial toward
rival forms of life. The claim is open to interpretation, however, and some
readings rule out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts of well-being that
deserve consideration.
Strong neutrality disqualifies accounts of well-being that violate the welfare
subject’s evaluative perspective. On this view, descriptively adequate theories of
well-being should be indifferent to the choices of welfare subjects, since the
evaluation of welfare goods squarely rests on a welfare subject’s concerns. For
better or worse, well-being is a function of choice. Conversely, weak neutrality
disqualifies accounts of well-being that advance unfounded substantive critiques
of a welfare subject’s concerns. On this view, accounts that advance more than a
procedural critique require justification, though we need not disqualify them on
principle. Well-being is still a function of choice, but not every choice counts
toward one’s well-being.
Some theories of well-being satisfy strong neutrality. Unrestricted desire
theories satisfy strong neutrality since they identify faring well with the
satisfaction of the welfare subject’s actual desires. The evaluation of a good rests

On adaptive preferences, see J. Elster, “Sour Grapes,” in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.),
Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 219-238.
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squarely with the welfare subject’s concerns. It is worth noting that abbreviating
the set of desires to those formed under suitable conditions, as informed desire
theories do, need not violate strong neutrality. The recommendations of informed
desire theories do conflict, at times, with the agent’s present concerns. However,
informed desire theories accept the subject’s concerns as normative for their
well-being, and only impose procedural conditions to deal with problems with its
implementation. Like simpler unrestricted account, informed desire theories rest
the evaluation of a good squarely on the welfare subject’s concerns, though they
insist that the set manifest a rational structure. Therefore, both unrestricted and
informed desire accounts satisfy the strong neutrality criterion for descriptive
adequacy. Likewise, hedonistic theories satisfy strong neutrality, but only if
psychological hedonism is true. The latter is the view that welfare subjects in fact
desire only pleasure.23 If psychological hedonism were true, the
recommendations of hedonistic theories would always align with one’s concerns,
since experiencing pleasure would be one’s only concern. Psychological
hedonism is false however: most welfare subjects desire things other than
pleasure. Thus, the recommendations of hedonistic theories do at times conflict
with the concerns of welfare subjects. For the hedonist, faring well consists in
experiencing surplus pleasure whatever the subject’s concerns. As such,
hedonists run afoul the strong neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy.
Nonetheless, strong neutrality is an overly demanding criterion for
descriptive adequacy. An account satisfies strong neutrality only if the evaluative

On psychological hedonism, R.B. Brandt, “Happiness,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
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perspective of the welfare subject alone determines the nature of well-being. This
condition limits the set of plausible accounts of well-being to only a few theories.
Suppose a theory of well-being defines faring well in terms of a list of
independently valuable goods whose status as welfare goods does not depend
on the concerns of welfare subjects. The best such a theory can do to account
for one’s concerns is to allow one to decide the manner and the extent to which
one instantiates specific goods in one’s life. Since the evaluative perspective of
welfare subjects does not determine which goods deserve the status of welfare
goods, these theories run afoul strong neutrality. Surely, this condition is too
strong. The Euthyphro dilemma is compelling because each of its horns makes
sense of different welfare judgments.24 Some welfare judgments seem consistent
with the claim that the nature of well-being is not entirely up to the welfare
subject; others, with the claim that the evaluative perspective of welfare subjects
determines the nature of well-being.25 We cannot rule against accounts of wellbeing that make a place for independently valuable goods before we set out on
our inquiry, especially since we do not yet have reason to believe that the
concerns of welfare subjects alone determine the nature of well-being. We
should reject strong neutrality as a criterion for descriptive adequacy.
Still, it is worth noticing that both horns of the Euthyphro dilemma are
consistent with the claim that one can be mistaken about what well-being
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consists in. On both accounts, we believe that some states of affairs have
welfare value, and we disagree about the nature of well-being. We seek evidence
for our opinions and act as if there is something to discover. We act as if there is
a fact of the matter, and talk about welfare value claims as being true or false,
and of people knowing the better even while doing the worse. What is at stake in
this debate is not the realism of welfare value but the nature of well-being itself.
Weak neutrality is a more promising criterion for descriptive adequacy. It
holds that accounts of well-being advancing substantive critiques of schedules of
concerns should justify their violation of the evaluative perspective of the welfare
subject. The intent of weak neutrality is to avoid partial, idiosyncratic accounts of
well-being that reveal more about the biases of welfare theorists than the nature
of well-being itself. Concerns over neutrality about the good arise most often in
political philosophy, where anxieties over the unjustified encroachment of the
state on individual conceptions of the good loom large. For instance, Rawls
suggests that his conception of justice does not “try to evaluate the relative
merits of different conceptions of the good.” Rather, it assures the individual
access to primary goods, those necessary for any rational plan of life, and
guarantees “an equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of life [one] pleases as long
as it does not violate what justice demands.”26 We may have practical reasons to
endorse neutrality in the design of our institutions. Perhaps principles of justice
that do not themselves presuppose a particular conception of the good do a
better job of governing social and political institutions in pluralistic societies.
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Perhaps we have reason to believe that individuals know best which states of
affairs are the most promising sources of well-being, or that individuals derive
greater welfare value from states of affairs if they choose freely among a variety
of forms of life, so that interfering with their evaluative perspective is selfdefeating.27
These concerns justify following a policy of respect for the evaluative
perspective of welfare subjects; however, they imply very little about the nature of
well-being itself, or the underlying agreement concerning what counts as a
sensible description of well-being. Its role in political philosophy notwithstanding,
weak neutrality might seem out of place in discussions concerning the nature of
well-being. What reason do we have to believe that the most descriptively
adequate concept of well-being is one that satisfies the weak neutrality criterion
for descriptive adequacy?
Neutralism arises from a healthy skepticism concerning substantive
accounts of well-being. Note that such doubt cannot extend to all welfare claims.
Radical skepticism would undermine both objective and subjective accounts of
well-being. It would undermine not only the substantive claim that some ends
have greater intrinsic welfare value than others; it would also undermine the
formal claim that the normative evaluation of choices rest on the subject’s
concerns. Few theorists, regardless of creed, can afford to endorse such radical
doubt. However, selective skepticism about our ability to know the good seems to
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motivate at least some claims surrounding weak neutrality. For instance, an
important proponent of liberal neutrality, D.A. Lloyd-Thomas grants that while
“some of our beliefs about what is of intrinsic value are very probably true… it is
not the case that we already know (everything) that is of intrinsic value” or that
we are certain beyond reasonable doubt which things have intrinsic value. 28
Similar doubts underscore Sumner’s own concern for neutrality. “A [substantive]
value requirement… presupposes that there is an evaluative analogue to
empirical truth or reality: a right answer to every question about value.”29 Whether
substantive accounts of well-being must demonstrate such completeness is an
open question. The point here is only that the claim that substantive accounts
can propose even a modest analogue to the evaluative standpoint from which
welfare subjects are to make welfare judgments is open to reasonable doubt. If
proponents of substantive accounts are unable to allay these concerns, then we
have good reason to reject their account.
Typically, this selective skepticism targets claims about a value
requirement beyond the responses of the subject. In fairness, accounts that
respect the evaluative standpoint of the welfare subject seem less susceptible to
the skeptic’s complaint. Such accounts rely on the presumption of truth we grant
to a person’s self-reports for their appeal. Since Descartes, most philosophers
have thought either that self-knowledge is epistemically distinctive or that
pronouncements about one’s mental states bear a special presumption of truth.30
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When I report on my propositional attitudes, I am not tracking the facts at issue
so much as I am establishing them, and others tend to construe the report as
authoritative unless they have good reason to be skeptical about it. Hence, the
conclusion that well-being must depend on the evaluative perspective of the
welfare subject. If welfare judgments are reports of inner perceptual states, then I
am the final authority on whether my life is going well for me. The initial
plausibility of such subjective accounts does not imply that we should equate
welfare value with all but the most direct description of a welfare subject’s
concerns. Most accounts of well-being do not. Instead, such subjective accounts
strive to reveal procedural flaws that undercut the rationality of welfare subjects,
or that point to social and cultural factors that constrain their autonomy.
Whether theories of well-being provide a procedural or a substantive
critique of a subject’s concerns, it is fair to insist that theories that stray from a
straightforward ratification of subjectivity provide an account of exactly how far
they stray from the subjective measure and why. Unlike strong neutrality,
however, weak neutrality does not dismiss substantive theories without due
consideration, but only insists that they justify critiques of the welfare subject’s
evaluative perspective.

1.4 Conclusion
Several theories mean to tell us what it is for a person to fare well and we
must decide which is best. I argued that the best theories of well-being should
pass a test for descriptive adequacy. Sumner parses his own test in terms of
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fidelity, generality, formality, and neutrality. On his view, the best theories of wellbeing should be faithful to our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, and their use
in practical reasoning and common-sense psychological explanations. Next, they
should capture the range of welfare judgements we make, and apply to all core
subjects to whom these judgements apply. Finally, they should explain the nature
of well-being rather than list common sources of well-being, and they should
strive to remain neutral between different concrete forms of life. I argued that we
should accept the fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy.
However, we should temper our acceptance of the other criteria. The
extent to which a theory of well-being brings together disparate subjects and
judgments typically counts toward its acceptance. Yet, placing too much
emphasis on generality, formality, and neutrality leaves us prone to three
mistakes. First, it inclines us to ignore relevant differences amongst core welfare
subjects; second, it conceals the role that communities play in their development
and their welfare judgments; and, third, it rules out weakly partial but otherwise
intuitive accounts of well-being. We can avoid this outcome by ensuring that the
character, decisions, and behavior that theories of well-being describe are
possible for the kind of welfare subject under consideration. In effect, the
principle reminds us that the fidelity criterion applies to both well-being and the
welfare subject. Both should be faithful to our considered judgments of what we
know about well-being, welfare subjects, and the communities in which they live.
Over the course of the next four chapters, I argue that rival accounts of
well-being confront problems that should encourage us to investigate

26

alternatives, namely, the problem of authority, the problem of worth, and the
double bind problem. In the second chapter, I situate the problems in the context
of the story of well-being, and I investigate strategies to address them in the third
and fourth chapters. In the fifth chapter, I bring together the lessons of my
investigation into my considered view. I argue that we can address the problems
of authority and the problem of worth by defending an accommodating view of
well-being according to which one fares well at a time when one endorses goods
worthy of concern. This is a hybrid account of well-being that tries to take
seriously the intuition that well-being has both a subjective and an objective
component.
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Chapter 2: Authority, Worth, and the Double Bind
2.1 The Story of Well-Being
The story of well-being groups theories of well-being into three sets.
Hedonistic theories claim that well-being consists in experiencing surplus
pleasure. Desire theories claim that well-being consists in getting a subset of
what one wants, or in having more of one’s (ideal) desires satisfied than
frustrated. Finally, objective list theories claim that well-being consists in the
possession of a greater number of independently valuable objects than worthless
ones.
We can divide the theoretical landscape into subjective and objective
accounts of well-being. It is worth borrowing from L.W. Sumner’s seminal work
on the subjectivity of well-being to get the conflict between subjective and
objective accounts right. “The defining feature of all subjective theories,” he
writes, “is that they make your well-being depend on your own concerns,”
whereas objective theories “exclude all reference to attitudes or concerns.”31
Given their exclusion of subjectivity, objective accounts must find another
approach to capture the intuition that a person’s life is prudentially valuable only if
it is going well for them. Hence, the key difference between subjective and
objective accounts is the necessity of the reference to one’s schedule of
concerns, the loose program that specifies the objects that engage one’s active
interest, attention, and care. Such a program need not be particularly organized
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or forward-looking to constitute a schedule of concerns, though some programs
certainly can be.
In this chapter, I examine the structure of different theories of well-being.
Specifically, I examine the place of the concerns of welfare subjects in this
structure and the value of the objects of their concerns. I argue that two theses
about the structure of theories of well-being are particularly important: the agent
sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis
holds that one's schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-being. The
endorsement thesis holds that the possession of some good contributes to one’s
well-being only if one endorses it under suitable conditions. What a theory entails
about the truth of these two claims generates two problems.
First, objective theories hold that the objects of one’s concerns alone
determine one’s well-being. Objective theories reject both the agent sovereignty
thesis and the endorsement thesis. Such theories confront the problem of
authority. They imply that, provided the objects to which one relates are
independently valuable, one can fare well despite the fact that one does not
endorse the conditions of one’s life. This alienates welfare subjects from their
well-being. Second, subjective theories hold that one’s concerns alone determine
one’s well-being. Subjective theories accept both the agent sovereignty thesis
and the endorsement thesis. Such theories confront the problem of worth. They
imply that one can fare well despite the fact that the objects of one’s concerns do
not have independent value. Critics object that this claim does not cohere well
with some pre-analytic beliefs about well-being. Not all the objects in one’s
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schedule of concerns are on equal axiological footing. The longevity of the
Euthyphro dilemma and the ease with which each side constructs a general case
against the other speaks to the salience of the subjective-objective distinction in
value theory.

2.2 Authority
Not long ago, subjectivists could omit objective theories from their
discussions of well-being. In arguing for a happiness theory of well-being, for
example, R.B. Brandt dismisses objective theories as obsolescent and proposes
to ignore them.32 Even so, objective theories have undergone a revival in recent
decades, and they provide a legitimate counterpoint to subjective theories.
Generally, objectivists believe that faring well consists in suitably relating
to independently valuable objects. Characteristically, they strive to provide a
complete list of the goods that constitute a life that is good for the person who
lives it. In most cases, the list includes more than experiencing surplus pleasure
or getting what one wants. The items on the list are intrinsically good rather than
good as a means to some further end, and what is good for a person is to relate
suitably to the items on a correct and complete list of goods. Accordingly, the
properties that make a given object intrinsically good for a person at a time are
having independent value. Likewise, the properties that make a given object
intrinsically bad for a person at a time are lacking independent value. How one
relates to independently valuable objects also has an impact on one’s well-being.

32

Richard Brandt. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1979, 246.

30

For instance, insofar as knowledge has independent value, one benefits at a time
not only when one instantiates it in one’s life, but also when one pursues it in a
suitable way and directs it toward suitable objects.33 Conversely, one suffers at a
time not only when one remains ignorant, but also when one pursues knowledge
in an unsuitable way, pursues knowledge of unsuitable objects, or applies
knowledge to unsuitable ends.
Beyond this rudimentary description, objective theories are structurally
complex. Some proposals specify one list for all welfare subjects, or a distinct list
for relevant subsets of subjects. For instance, the proposal to index the nature of
well-being to gender is consistent with an approach that sports two distinct lists of
objective goods.34 Other proposals specify that some objects produce a greater
amount of well-being than other objects. One might hold, for instance, that
pleasure contributes to one’s well-being but that goods that engage one’s rational
faculties make greater contributions to one’s well-being. Others specify that the
welfare contributions of some objects plateaus or even decreases after they
reach a certain magnitude.35 For instance, it is commonplace that successive
episodes of pleasure provide a diminishing marginal return such that
contributions become negligible beyond a given magnitude. Still others stipulate
that some goods are necessary to a person’s well-being while others merely
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enhance it, or that some goods are such that welfare subjects must appreciate
the properties that make them good in order to benefit from them.
Despite this diversity, all objective theories are committed to renouncing
the agent sovereignty thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis holds that one's
schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-being. Subjectivity is both
necessary and sufficient for well-being. Since objectivists believe the axiological
status of the objects of one’s concerns does not depend on their inclusion in
one’s schedule of concerns, they must reject the claim that one’s schedule of
concerns alone determines one’s well-being. Subjectivity is not sufficient for wellbeing: an object can have welfare value even if it does not figure on one’s
schedule of concerns. As Finnis puts it, “a [person] who is well-informed…simply
is better off…than a [person] who is…ignorant, that the state of the one is better
than the state of the other, not just in this particular case or that, but in all cases,
as such, universally, and whether I like it or not.”36
Objectivists may accept that one’s schedule of concerns is an important
source of objective goods. This is consistent with the additive thesis, the claim
that the pursuit of the loose program that specifies the objects that engage one’s
active interest, attention, and care contributes to one’s well-being along with
other welfare goods. However, the axiological status of the objective goods in
one’s life does not depend on whether they figure on one’s schedules of
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concerns. In section 1.3, we saw how to construe hedonism as an objective
theory of well-being that lists only a single welfare good. If psychological
hedonism were true, the recommendations of hedonistic theories would always
align with the welfare subject’s concerns, but psychological hedonism is false.
Therefore, the recommendations of hedonistic theories do at times conflict with
the concerns of welfare subjects. Experiencing surplus pleasure contributes to
one’s well-being whatever one’s concerns. Such a view implies that pleasure by
itself is good for the welfare subject, but it conflicts with the strong neutrality
criterion for descriptive adequacy. Pleasure and pain affect one’s well-being
whatever one’s schedule of concerns.
Griffin’s ideal desire account of well-being strives to strike a similar
balance between subjectivity and objectivity. On his view, ideal desires include
desires for objects that tend to figure on schedules of concerns. For instance,
one might claim that enjoyment and suffering are objects that one would desire if
one appreciated their nature. Suppose that, fully informed and thinking clearly, all
welfare subjects would desire both enjoyment and autonomy. It follows that all
welfare subjects would benefit from instantiating these two goods in their life.
However, it is possible that, in some cases, autonomous pursuits would produce
such anxieties for a particular welfare subject that instantiating it would not to be
worth the trouble.37 “That is not to deny autonomy its objectivity,” writes Griffin,
“[or] that it is a universal value. It still allows that autonomy would, other things
being equal, make his life better.”38 The enjoyment and suffering of this particular
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welfare subject do not change the welfare value of autonomy itself, but they
figure with it on a list of objective goods. We must consider them along with the
others. Provided they allow for such cases, objectivists can construct accounts of
well-being that incorporate objects normally found on schedules of concerns as a
reliable source of well-being without compromising the objectivity of well-being
itself.
One might doubt whether objectivists provide a legitimate alternative to
subjective theories of well-being. In constructing their accounts, objectivists
cannot avoid making normative judgments about what is valuable, suitable, or
appropriate because formal, descriptive claims about the concerns of welfare
subjects do not settle matters. As such, their prescriptions run the risk of
conflicting with the neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy. The conflict will
be a matter of degree. We need not dismiss as hopelessly biased accounts of
well-being that are only weakly partial to a given form of life, but considerations of
neutrality will disqualify more obviously biased accounts of well-being from
consideration. Moreover, objectivists seem prone to confusing the nature of wellbeing with its typical sources, which violates the formality criterion for descriptive
adequacy. Providing a list of objective goods is not yet to provide an account of
the nature of well-being. These worries are premature, however. If objectivists
can justify the limited place they accord to schedules of concerns, and if they can
provide an account of what unifies the objects on their list, then we may yet have
good reason to give them serious consideration.
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Accounts born from a re-examination of the natural law tradition strive to
do just that. Over the course of several works, Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis develop
a teleological account of well-being according to which faring well consists in
relating suitably to basic human goods.39 The concept of a basic good is broadly
consistent with the concept of intrinsic value, according to which an object has
value “as such,” “in itself,” or “for its own sake.” Like intrinsic goods, the basic
goods we pursue for their own sake differ from instrumental goods, which we
pursue for the sake of something else. One or more of these basic goods
underlie any purpose for acting, at least when our goals are “specifically
human.”40 On this view, a person fares well if they instantiate basic goods in their
lives, though the particular goods instantiated will depend on the particular life.
The most direct way to uncover basic goods is by reflecting on the purpose of a
given action until one reaches reasons for acting which need no further reason,
objects one pursues for their own sake. Grisez et al provide different lists of basic
goods in various works, but settle as a rule on life, health, safety, knowledge and
aesthetic experience, excellence in work and play, as well as personal and
communal harmony.41
This reconsideration of the natural law tradition rejects agent sovereignty.
The welfare value of the basic goods that characterise distinctively human lives is
a function of object-given properties. For Grisez et al, a distinctly human life is a
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rational life, and a life is rational only when intentionally grounded in a set of
basic goods that humans discover through observation and reflection. While
schedules of concerns alone do not determine one’s well-being, they still figure
prominently in the account.
Schedules of concerns play an important part in the discovery of welfare
value but not in its justification. The welfare value of basic goods is self-evident;
we know the propositions stating their contributions to a distinctly human life just
by grasping the meaning of their terms. Our knowledge of welfare value is not
intuitive but direct and empirical, at least when we are fully informed and thinking
clearly. We can deepen our insight into their welfare contributions by studying the
natural inclinations of human beings and noticing that humans tend to recognize
certain objects as basic reasons for action in distinctively human lives. Grisez et
al are eager to address concerns that their view conflicts with the naturalistic
fallacy. Crucially, they insist, we do not infer the value of these objects from the
observation that we tend to pursue them. Instead, we weigh our tendency to
pursue a given object as evidence for the claim that it is in fact good as such, an
insight we then deepen through study, reflection, and further observation. For
instance, we notice our own tendency to question, analyze, classify; we see
curiosity bloom in others; we consider Aristotle’s claim that “all men by nature
desire to know”; finally, we appreciate the basic value of knowledge.42 This
process of intuitive induction implies that the basic goods tend to figure among
the objects that engage one’s active interest, attention, and care.
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In passing, it is noteworthy that the view is consistent with the additive
thesis, though Finnis et al. do not defend the latter view. The additive thesis
captures the welfare contributions of suitable concerns by counting them along
with other objective goods. The pursuit of the loose program that specifies the
objects that engage our active interest, attention, and care contributes to our
well-being, at least when those objects are suitable for creatures like us.
The features of this reconsideration of the natural law tradition provide an
initial response to worries concerning the formality and neutrality of the account.
The judgment that certain objects are more suitable than others does not rest on
mere bias. Nor does it confuse common sources of well-being with the nature of
well-being. Rather, it rests on a robust, teleological conception of human beings
as subjects whose fulfillment hinges on the exercise of their rational faculties.
“Any creature which acts is one whose reality is not fully given at the outset,” they
write. “It has possibilities which can be realized only through its acting.”43 Human
beings fulfill their nature when basic goods motivate their actions. Such goods
are not merely a source of well-being but “aspects of the fulfillment of persons”
and parts of well-being itself.44 Of course, we may fail to act in accordance with
basic goods. Perhaps we fail to reflect sufficiently on our choices, so that we do
not yet see how to instantiate basic goods in our lives. Perhaps we see how to
instantiate basic goods, but we fail to follow through or succeed only in acting
against our better judgment. In such cases, our lives will suffer from a dearth of
goods. When we choose rationally, our actions instantiate basic goods, we fulfill
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our nature, and we benefit. When we choose irrationally, we fail to instantiate
basic goods, we fall short of the ideal, and we suffer harm. The resulting account
is weakly partial to the rational life, perhaps, but its justification rests on a
metaphysically complex account of human nature rather than on mere bias.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the most pointed objections to the natural law
account target this metaphysical apparatus. Even if we grant natural law theorists
the explanation of how we come to know basic goods, the claim that some goods
correlate with a normative account of human nature that uniquely determines
what is good for a person is difficult to accept. Grisez et al postulate that the
capacity to act in accordance with reason is what makes human lives distinctly
human, a time-honoured view rooted in the Aristotelian corpus.45 Still, it is
unclear why we should accept the claim that humans have a single function, or
that the exercise of reason is more distinctly human than, say, the qualified
pursuit of pleasure or desire satisfaction. Crucially, the authors explicitly discount
pleasure as an intelligible good, one that we can think of as providing a reason
for acting, because its pursuit does not lead to the fulfillment of the person as a
whole.46 However, this consideration is unlikely to sway a committed subjectivist
since the notion of fulfillment at play presupposes an answer to the very question
at issue, namely, whether it is best to conceive of well-being independently of
schedules of concerns. It is not clear why it would be illegitimate for skeptics to
weigh the human tendency to pursue pleasure or satisfy desires as evidence for

See, for instance, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (1098a5-10): “…the human function is the
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the claim that well-being consists in subjective rather than objective
considerations. Without a further argument to privilege one form of life over the
other as distinctly human, the natural law account runs the risk of begging the
question against others who would instead ground well-being directly in
schedules of concerns. Moreover, without the account’s rational constraint on
human nature, it is not clear that simply choosing the objects we tend to pursue
by nature contributes to our well-being.
Doubts concerning the metaphysical apparatus of the natural law account
make it vulnerable to objections from formality and neutrality. Although there is
some evidence for the claim that human beings tend to pursue certain goods, the
lacuna opens the account to charges that it is confusing the sources of well-being
with its nature, and flirting with elitism and paternalism. For their part,
subjectivists can grant that the goods that Grisez et al identify as independently
valuable are reliable sources of well-being. As a rule, for instance, human beings
desire to know and enjoy satisfying their curiosity. Where the natural law account
falters, however, subjectivists can give an account of the properties that make
knowledge valuable in terms of well-being – namely, its presence on the
schedule of concerns of most welfare subjects.
A second, related objection is that the natural law account seems too
narrow. The importance the account accords to the intentional willing of a
coherent program of action weakens its generality, that is, its capacity to unify the
different welfare judgments we make and the welfare subjects about whom we
make them. Surely, some goods contribute to one’s well-being despite the fact
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that they do not figure on a detailed program of action. This objection holds even
if we limit, unrealistically, the set of welfare subjects to human beings. As it
stands, the account that Grisez et al construct seems most relevant to welfare
assessments involving complete human lives or the lives of human adults at the
height of their faculties. This is consistent with their Aristotelian inclinations.
Famously, Aristotle ties well-being to the exercise of one’s rational capacities,
and suggests that well-being assessments are most reliable when considering
complete lives. “For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day,” he
writes, “nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make us blessed and
happy.”47
However, not all welfare subjects who lack this kind of rationality and
coherence are obviously faring poorly, nor is it realistic to insist that we restrict
well-being judgments to complete lives.48 It is revealing that Aristotle denies that
children can fare well at all. Since they cannot share in rational activity, “boys
who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have
for them.”49 Surely, we sometimes want to claim that healthy toddlers with a
sunny disposition are faring well at a time. This is true despite their inability to
plan and pursue a complex axiological program, and our ignorance of the future
goods fate has in store for them. Likewise, we sometimes want to claim that
satisfied seniors whose retirement involves nothing more elaborate than enjoying
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good company and playing an occasional game of shuffleboard are faring well at
a time. This is true despite the fact that they might be unwilling or unable to
reflect on their lives or make plans for the future. Granted, in both cases, shifting
our evaluative focal point from moments to periods or lives may inform the
welfare judgments that we make when we deny that the welfare subjects in these
cases fare well. We might bemoan the fate of healthy toddlers who live in
contexts that are likely to limit their access to future goods. Likewise, we might
bemoan the fate of satisfied seniors who are content to play shuffleboard
because they have reluctantly lost a battle with a debilitating mental illness. Still,
we cannot neglect to provide an account of how well they fare at a time, however
well we believe they fare over time.
These judgments are hardly peripheral cases that a coherent account of
well-being can afford to discount unless we are willing to accept that an account
that fully applies to only a handful of core human cases is the best we can do.
One of the strengths of competing subjective accounts is the resources they can
marshal in the service of a balanced account of faring well at a time, over a
period, or over a life. For instance, subjectivists can claim that human beings
tend to fare well if they manage a program of pleasure maximization or desire
satisfaction over a life, but can deny that such a program is necessary for happy
toddlers or satisfied seniors to fare well at a time. All that assessments of wellbeing at a time require are loose schedules of concerns of the kind captured by
the formula, “Jarrod enjoys, desires, or has a pro-attitude to strawberry ice cream
at time t.” Subjectivists can also bemoan the future fate of underprivileged
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toddlers, who are likely to find it difficult to pursue successfully even modest
schedules of concern in the future, or the fate of satisfied seniors, who have lost
the capacity to regret their cognitive decline and would have wanted their lives to
turn out differently.
A descriptively adequate account of well-being cannot focus exclusively
on adult capacities or concerns. It should be attentive to the variety of both
welfare subjects and welfare judgments. It should capture what faring well
consists in at different stages of a human life, be it childhood, adulthood, or
senescence, and describe welfare judgments at a time, over a period, and over a
life. Natural Law theorists might suggest that their account is perhaps narrower
than they thought, but that this does not make it false for the entities to which it
applies. However, this reply is available only if they are willing to limit the
generality of their account, and apply it only to adult human beings at the height
of their rational faculties. The move to weaken the importance of generality may
be difficult in light of the normative account of human nature they rely on.
Objectivists might reply by weakening the requirement to express wellbeing in terms of a distinctive human function. For instance, Martha Nussbaum
argues with Amartya Sen that faring well is a matter of capabilities and
functionings. 50 Functionings are various states of human beings and activities
that a person can undertake. Examples of states of beings are being well-
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nourished, being housed, being educated, being part of a supportive social
network, and being happy. Examples of activities are travelling, caring for
children, voting in an election, taking part in a debate, and donating money to
charity. At a glance, the examples I cite are positive, but it is important to note
that the notion of functionings is neutral in itself. In a sense, the goodness or
badness of various functionings depend on the context which one endorses. For
instance, a conservative, communitarian normative theory would likely identify
the work of a mother who is caring for children and elderly parents as a valuable
functioning, while a feminist theory might do so only if the functioning is the result
of an autonomous choice made under suitable conditions. Conversely,
capabilities are a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings.
For instance, travelling is a functioning, and the real opportunity to travel is the
capability. Functionings are to capabilities what the realized is to the possible.
That is, the distinction is between achievements on one hand and opportunities
on the other.
On this view, a person or group fares well when they are effectively able to
perform valuable actions and achieve valuable states of being. The focus of the
capabilities approach is on removing obstacles so that they have more freedom
to live the kind of life which, upon consideration, they find valuable. The
persuasiveness of this collaborative program hinges in part on identifying
valuable actions and states of affairs that constitute human well-being, a step
that is a matter of some controversy. Whether the capabilities approach counts
as an objective or a subjective theory depends on how one identifies the valuable
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functionings that constitute the basics of the theory. In some moods, Sen is
willing to let schedules of concerns determine the decisive ranking of valuable
functionings, which would make the capabilities approach a subjective theory.51
Nussbaum consistently prefers a more objective reading of functions, and tends
to ground them in a normative account of human nature. When pressed,
however, even Nussbaum allows that settling on a single, distinctively human
function is not essential to the program of finding a coherent account of human
well-being.52 While we may be unable or unwilling to describe a characteristic
human function, we have little trouble gauging when humans are functioning well
by standards appropriate to their kind.
Others writers go as far as to abandon appeals to normative accounts of
human functioning altogether. They insist on the independent value of the goods
on their favored list, but deny that an account of the property that unifies them is
necessary or even possible. In his substantive good theory of well-being, for
instance, Thomas Scanlon admits that certain goods make a life better, and that
we are sometimes prepared to defend this claim with reasons. Yet Scanlon
muses that a unified account of what makes things good for welfare subjects may
be impossible. “It seems unlikely that there are any good-making properties
which are common to all good things,” he writes, “If this is correct, there will be
no general theory of goodness… [beyond] diverse arguments about why various
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properties of particular objects make those objects good.”53 However,
abandoning the project of providing an account that unifies welfare goods
threatens the very detachment from subjectivity objectivists are trying to achieve.
To be fair, objective theories can take some comfort in the fact that list theories
tend to converge on a classic triad of objects, namely, truth, virtue, and beauty.
We might hope that this convergence is evidence of truth, but it is difficult to
imagine what might count as support for this claim. One possible strategy is to
attempt to bring the arguments about various good-making properties into wide
reflective equilibrium with the relevant moral and non-moral theories. If this is
correct, then projects like the one undertaken here are a step in the right
direction.54
Objectivists might reply by substituting a normative account of human
function with a descriptive account of the basic needs essential to living a normal
life. On this view, faring well consists in having basic needs like nourishment,
exercise, rest, companionship, and personal security satisfied. This account is
objective since the status of the needs in question is not conditional on the
welfare subject’s schedule of concerns.55 However, the proposal violates the
formality criterion. Identifying as objectively good the elements needed to live
normal human lives runs the risk of confusing intrinsic welfare goods with the
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merely instrumental, and the nature of well-being with its likely sources. What
nourishment, exercise, and rest have in common is not that we value them as
constitutive parts of human well-being but that they enable its pursuit and are, at
times, important sources of well-being. To see this, we need only consider the
value of each element independently of its causes or consequences. When I
consider nourishment on its own, I find that I value it instrumentally rather than
intrinsically. It matters only because it allows me to pursue other things that
matter intrinsically, be it pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, achievement
and so on. I eat because I enjoy a good meal, because it sates my appetite,
because I need energy to live, work and play, but I do not eat merely for the sake
of eating. We can make a similar case against accounts that equate faring well in
part with securing items on a list of primary goods or with having others respect
one’s human rights.56 As Aristotle recognized, some measure of external goods
is naturally useful in pursuing well-being “since we cannot or cannot easily, do
fine actions if we lack the resources.”57 However, we value these external goods
as the means to pursue what really matters. A person’s access to external goods
can provide a proxy measurement of well-being, but it does not provide an
account of its nature.
These thoughts on the general structure of objective theories do not
comprise a decisive argument against the latter. Objectivists can reply to the
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narrowness of their account by limiting its generality, applying the account only to
entities whose well-being it captures fairly well. Likewise, they can reply to the
lack of a justification of the goods that belong on a correct and complete list by
assigning list membership tentatively and revising it when they have reason to do
so. However, the most serious indictment of objective theories is not the claims
they advance but those they deny. Suppose objective theories can produce a
suitable metaphysical apparatus to justify the normative judgments they make.
The mark of such theories remains the denial of agent sovereignty, which
commits them to the denial that one’s schedule of concerns alone determines
one’s well-being. To some extent, it also commits them to the substitution of that
schedule of concerns with an independent standard of value. Goods have
welfare value, not because subjects value them, but because they are
independently good for subjects. In trying to place well-being assessments on
secure footing, objectivists break the connection between its nature and the
person whose well-being is in question. It is no longer strictly necessary for the
objects in one’s life to engage one’s active interest, attention, and care in order
for one to fare well. If this is right, then a person can fare well despite the fact that
he does not endorse the conditions of his life provided they relate suitably to
independently valuable objects. The implication is controversial enough to
challenge the acceptance of objective accounts. Call this the problem of
authority.
Objectivists may respond by seeking common ground. They might grant
that schedules of concern are often a reliable source of well-being, and that one’s
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experience and desires matter, even if they are not the only things that matter.
Thus, they might concede that the subjective elements of rival theories are also
objectively valuable, and argue for their inclusion on their list of favoured goods.
On this view, subjective theories identify one important respect in which we can
fare well: hedonists single out pleasant experiences; and desire theorists, getting
what you (rationally) want. The mistake subjectivists make is building an account
of well-being around a single basic good. Enjoyable experiences and desire
satisfaction have welfare value, but they are only a few among many goods that
share this status. For instance, Richard Arneson adds enjoyment and desire
satisfaction to an objective list account in order to give them at least some role to
play in well-being. However, he denies that one must either enjoy or desire the
objects in one’s life in order to fare well.58 Thus, one fares well if one’s life
contains objectively valuable objects, including, among others, knowledge,
achievement, desire satisfaction, and experiences of pleasure. This strategy can
accommodate a diversity of good lives since what matters is not which basic
good one chooses to instantiate but that one responds fully to those one does
instantiate.
The reply fails to address the problem of authority, however. On the
revised account, schedules of concerns do not yet restrict the sort of lives that
count as good for the person who lives that life. Since there is no constraint on
the goods one’s life instantiates, it is still possible to assess that one fares well
though one remains subjectively alienated from the goods in one’s life. What
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matters is only that one’s life relate to valuable objects. One need not like, want,
or respond positively to the goods one relates to in order to benefit from them.
Moreover, one can fare well even if one’s life is devoid of pleasure or desire
satisfaction provided one relate suitably to other basic goods. Simply insisting
that one’s life contain at least some pleasure or desire satisfaction does not go
far enough.
This response to objective theories is not bad as far as it goes. However, it
implies that objective goods by themselves do not count towards well-being. This
is difficult to accept. In effect, the problem of authority puts us in a double bind: if
we accept the agent sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis, we seem
committed to the claim that unendorsed objective goods are worthless in welfare
terms. They might not count for much, but why not think objective goods count
for a bit? Suppose Richard’s life relates suitably to independently valuable
objects but is otherwise devoid of pleasure or desire satisfaction. A depressed
artist, he spends his days working at the Smithsonian cleaning and stabilizing
works of art, a calling arguably of great value but one that he no longer enjoys or
desires. The problem of authority implies that we do not suddenly rescue him
from desolation by plugging him into a pleasure machine for an hour at the end of
each day. Richard’s case is tragic precisely because he is not faring well despite
the fact that his life contains much in it that is independently valuable, a judgment
that objective theories do not capture. However, it seems unreasonable to claim
that objective goods by themselves fail to count towards well-being. Given the
choice of two lives, each of which Richard equally fails to endorse, it must be the
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case that Richard fares better in the life that contains objective goods than in the
one that does not.
The problem of authority challenges us to move beyond the additive
thesis. It arises when theories deny the structural role that one’s concerns play in
defining what faring well consists in. Given that schedules of concerns can be
more or less structured, the problem is especially important in cases where one
has a firm and steady schedule of concerns. If this is correct, then the problem of
authority will have a scalar dimension, making trouble for some cases more than
for others. However, even cases involving relatively loose and variable schedules
will confront the problem to some extent. Objective theories fail to recognize that
the engagement of one’s active interest, attention, and care has a role to play in
delineating one’s well-being. What is needed is an account in which schedules of
concerns restrict what counts as good for a person, one that assesses that
Richard fares well only if he enjoys or desires the very goods that he is fortunate
enough to have in his life. At the same time, it is difficult to accept that one part of
well-being has no welfare value in the absence of the other. In the case of the
depressed artist, for instance, it seems unreasonable that objective goods by
themselves fail to count towards Richard’s well-being. Plausible solutions to the
problem of authority must take into consideration both concerns.

2.3 Worth
Subjective theories are perhaps the most venerable accounts of wellbeing. Subjectivists claim that a person’s well-being depends only on his
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concerns, and deny that the objects of these concerns have further value that
bears on well-being. Where objectivists deny the agent sovereignty thesis,
subjectivists affirm it: one’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s wellbeing. As Sumner puts it, over his well-being, the adult subject is sovereign, at
least under suitable conditions.59
Traditional taxonomies divide the general class of subjective theories into
two kinds: hedonistic and desire theories. Hedonists claim that well-being
consists in experiencing surplus pleasure. On this first view, the property that
makes a state of affairs intrinsically good for a person at a time is being an
episode of pleasure. The property that makes a state of affairs intrinsically bad
for a person at a time is being an episode of pain. Internalists about pleasure
define faring well in terms of a distinctive feeling that all pleasant experiences
share. Unfortunately, describing the exact nature of this feeling is difficult.60
Externalists about pleasure define faring well in terms of a feeling that is wanted
or desired by the individual who experiences it.61 Conversely, desire theorists
claim that well-being consists in getting what we want. On this second view, the
properties that make a state of affairs intrinsically good for a person at a time are
being a satisfied object of desire. The only properties that make a state of affairs
intrinsically bad for a person at a time are being a frustrated object of desire.
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Hedonists and desire theorists can combine their account of faring well at a time
with any view of aggregation they like, which will produce an account of faring
well over a period or on the whole. Typically, hedonists sum episodes of pleasure
over time, with more intense episodes of greater duration counting for more than
shorter, less intense ones. Likewise, desire theorists sum the satisfaction of
discrete desires, with more intense desires counting for more than less intense
ones.
To situate the problem of worth, it might be helpful to rehearse some
alternative accounts of each kind of subjective theory, along with some familiar
claims about their shortcomings. Suppose we start with hedonism. As I
mentioned, hedonists satisfy both the generality and the strong neutrality criteria
for descriptive adequacy.62 Since the capacity to feel pleasure and pain is
ubiquitous, hedonists capture all core subjects of welfare assessments, from the
animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. Moreover, their recommendations
always align with the welfare subject’s concerns, but only if psychological
hedonism is true.
I argued that hedonists achieve these results only by violating the fidelity
criterion for descriptive adequacy. It seems incredible to suppose that, for any
welfare subject, the capacity to feel and forecast pain and pleasure are the only
features relevant to one’s well-being, or to suppose that one can always reduce
one’s various concerns to the pursuit of pleasure. The hedonist’s claim may be
true of foetuses or the family dog, but it is less clearly true of high-functioning
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adult humans. Likewise, insisting that experiencing surplus pleasure contributes
to one’s well-being whatever one’s concerns violates strong neutrality and the
agent sovereignty thesis. It is no longer the case that one’s schedule of concerns
alone determines one’s well-being. This objection effectively marks hedonism as
an objective-list theory of well-being with a single good on its list. Hedonists can
respond to these objections by limiting the generality of their account, applying it
only to entities whose well-being it captures fairly well. For instance, the claim
that well-being consists in surplus pleasure is most plausible in the case of the
happy toddler or the satisfied senior, where the objects of one’s pleasure matters
less to how well one fares at a time. However, hedonists can reach for this
response only by yielding tacitly to rival theories of well-being in cases where
their own approach violates fidelity.
Now, the claim that well-being consists in experiencing surplus pleasure
raises at least two questions: What is pleasure? Does well-being consist uniquely
in experiencing surplus pleasure? An adequate account of the nature of pleasure
is essential since pleasure is likely to play at least some role in our conception of
well-being, whatever view we defend. However, the anti-hedonist arguments
hinge chiefly on the second question. Suppose hedonists can specify a
descriptively adequate account of pleasure, one that coheres well with our
various pre-analytic beliefs about pleasure. Can hedonists make good on the
central claim that well-being consists uniquely in experiencing pleasure? A
powerful objection to hedonism is the claim that they cannot.
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We can reach this conclusion by noticing first that all hedonistic theories
essentially place an experience requirement on well-being. If hedonism is true,
then welfare subjects must experience pleasure in some sense in order to
benefit. Now, imagine Tom, an executive who dies content, thinking that his
family loves him, and that his colleagues respect him; in fact, his family secretly
despised him, and his colleagues only pretended to like him for their benefit,
though he never knew the truth of it.63 In thinking about his life, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that mental states are not all that matter to our well-being.
If mental states are all that matter, then what we do not know cannot harm or
benefit us. However, it seems that what we do not know can harm or benefit us.
Therefore, mental states are not all that matter. Since hedonistic theories impose
an experience requirement on well-being, they fail to recognize that things other
than our experiences matter to our well-being.
Hedonists might reply that the assessment that Tom is not faring well rests
in part on the suspicion that he will likely find out the truth and be devastated, or
that the deception would otherwise color the relationships that are important to
him. On this view, we are letting the allegedly poor quality of his personal
relationships, or the pain we imagine he will experience when he finds out,
undermine our judgment of how well he is faring now. This reply will not assuage
critics, however. They insist that we can imagine a case where Tom does not find
out about the deception and, we are assuming, the deception does not color his
experience. He thought his partner was faithful, but she was not. Even if he never
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learns the truth, the deception diminishes his well-being because a facet of his
life about which he cared deeply failed to work out the way he wanted. For
hedonists, the external state of affairs cannot make Tom’s experience less
valuable because it does not affect his mental states, but mental states are not
all that matter. The best explanation of this is that hedonism cannot be the whole
story.
The case of Tom might move us to accept a desire theory of well-being.
The reason poor Tom is not faring well is that he is not getting what he really
wants. What Tom wanted was the love of his family and the respect of his
colleagues, and while it seemed that he had their esteem, he was mistaken.
Desire theories differ from their hedonistic counterparts in two important
respects. First, they are concerned not only with mental states but also with the
obtaining of external states of affairs beyond the mind. Desire theorists assert
that faring well consists in getting what we want, and what we want is not limited
to experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain. On this account, a life spent hooked
up to an experience machine that replicated the mental states associated with
enjoying what we most desired would be a life low in well-being.64 Whether we
want to meet interesting people, have intimate relationships, or attain complex
goals, we want more than the pleasant mental states that come with the belief
that these states of affairs obtain. We actually want them to obtain. Second,
desire theorists break the connection between experience and well-being. A
desire is satisfied much like the clause in a contract is satisfied. In both cases,
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satisfaction occurs if the relevant state of affairs obtains.65 This implies that a
person can benefit from a state of affairs even if he does not experience
gratification or know it obtains. In some cases, we may prefer that states of
affairs obtain even if we never know they do or we never experience the mental
states associated with their obtaining. Given the choice, for instance, parents
may prefer that their child have a successful life even if, for some reason, they
never learn of their child’s success.66
The simplest desire theories are unrestricted accounts, which claim that
getting what one wants always makes an intrinsic contribution to one’s wellbeing. As we have seen, unrestricted desire theories satisfy the generality
criterion and the strong neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy.67 In the case
of generality, the argument is similar in structure to the argument for the
generality of hedonism. Since appetition is ubiquitous, unrestricted desire
theories capture all core subjects of welfare assessments, from the animal to the
human, the fetus to the senior. Likewise, since they identify faring well with the
satisfaction of the welfare subject’s desires, the evaluation of a good rests
squarely with the welfare subject’s concerns, which implies the truth of the agent
sovereignty thesis: one’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s wellbeing.68 However, unrestricted accounts must contend with two problems of their
own: the problem of scope and the problem of mistaken desires.
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Consider the problem of scope. Suppose that Derek desires that a
stranger he met briefly fare well.69 Though the stranger fares well, Derek never
thinks of him again and never knows his fate. It seems incredible that the
unwitting satisfaction of this desire should benefit Derek, but if we accept the
unrestricted account, we are committed to the view that the satisfaction of even
this desire contributes to his well-being. The problem of scope arises because of
the intentionality of desires and the notion of satisfaction at work.70 Desires are
directed at contingent states of affairs, which may not be contiguous to the
subject in time and space, and some states of affairs obtain without a noticeable
effect on the subject. These two features of desire theories explain what goes
wrong in the case of Tom: in so far as he was deceived, the object of his desire
failed to obtain and he did not fare as well as he thought, even if he never
learned of the deception or experienced the truth of it. As the case of Derek
illustrates, however, many other states of affairs obtain without a noticeable
effect on subjects, and at least some of them seem immaterial to their well-being.
The problem of scope implies a violation of the fidelity criterion of descriptive
adequacy. The deliverances of unrestricted desire theories do not cohere well
with our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being.
Desire theorists might reply by admitting that the set of desires whose
satisfaction is relevant to well-being on the unrestricted account is too broad. On
this view, desire theorists need a principled way to identify the set of desires
whose satisfaction bears on a person’s well-being. In effect, this response
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narrows desire accounts to a set of cases in which subjects satisfy a subset of
desires that ostensibly bear on well-being. One strategy involves giving
prominence to desires that have a more central place in a person’s life. For
instance, we can stress the importance of long-standing, identity-conferring
desires, desires that unify a greater number of minor desires, or desires that are
explicitly about one’s own life. A full discussion of the implications of the scope
problem would take us far afield, but note that proposals point to the role the
structural features of a state of affairs play in determining its bearing on a
person’s well-being. Identifying the set of relevant desires is a matter of
determining not only whether a desired outcome obtains but also whether it
relates suitably to other aspects of a person’s life.
Next, consider the problem of mistaken desires. Even when their content
is “about us” in some sense, our actual desires can themselves be impulsive or
misinformed. Simply put, what one actually wants does not reliably track one’s
well-being. The literature is replete with grisly cases: I want to drink a glass of
poison mistakenly thinking it is orange juice; I want to drive home drunk; I want to
end my life during a depressive spell; I want a treatment I falsely believe will cure
my illness; I want to smoke cigarettes though I know they are addictive and
cause cancer. In these cases, merely getting what I want does not make my life
intrinsically better. Desire theorists might reply that the satisfaction of each desire
is good in itself but not overall. Each desire frustrates other desires, perhaps, like
the desire not to be addicted to smoking. However, it simply seems incredible to
claim that the satisfaction of these desires contributes to a person’s well-being at
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all. Once again, desire theories seem to breach the fidelity criterion of descriptive
adequacy: their deliverances simply do not cohere well with our pre-analytic
beliefs about well-being.
Instead of counting the satisfaction of our actual desires – which might be
wrong-headed – desire theorists suggest that perhaps we should pursue the
satisfaction of the subset of desires we would have if we were fully informed and
thinking clearly. The idea is to analyze actual desires from a counterfactual
standpoint that uniquely captures in formal terms what is good for a person.
Peter Railton suggests that
an individual’s good consists in what he would want himself to want, or to
pursue were he to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully
and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free
of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality.71
The desires of these ideal advisors, our cognitively ideal counterparts, fix the set
of desires the satisfaction of which constitutes our well-being. Well-being might
then consist in the satisfaction of what we might call “ideal desires.”
At a glance, we can make two initial observations on ideal desire theories.
First, abbreviating the set of desires to those formed under suitable conditions
need not violate strong neutrality.72 The recommendations of informed desire
theories do conflict, at times, with the agent’s present concerns. However,
informed desire theories accept the subject’s concerns as normative for their
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well-being, and only impose procedural conditions to deal with problems with its
implementation. Although they insist that a subject’s concerns manifest a rational
structure, the evaluation of a good rests on those concerns alone. Second,
insisting on reducing well-being to the satisfaction of ideal desires seems to
violate generality. Not all welfare subjects are able to form or approximate ideal
desires. It makes little sense to speak of my border collie’s well-being in terms of
the satisfaction of the set of desires he would form under suitable conditions
since there is no possible world in which he is able to perform this complex
cognitive feat. Again, ideal desire theorists might grant the narrowness of their
account by limiting its generality, applying the account only to entities whose
well-being it captures fairly well.
The times have not been kind to ideal desire theories. A first set of worries
question whether the outcome of the idealization process is predictable enough
to yield reliable advice.73 Perhaps running the gauntlet would sow in my ideal
advisor a deep aversion to my personality type so that his advice would be
hostile. Perhaps it would alter his personality so deeply that I would no longer
hold the desires of this very different person as normatively relevant to my own
well-being. A second set of worries questions the coherence of the process. It
seems unlikely that one could even become as fully informed as the ideal advisor
account requires.74 Ideal desire theorists generally reply to these worries by
striving to find a principled way to specify the idealization process. Griffin’s own
contextual account stipulates that a desire “be formed by appreciation of the
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nature of its object, and it includes anything necessary to achieve it.” 75 Griffin
admits that the proposal is at once less determinate and less ambitious than
Railton’s seminal account. Achieving an appreciation of the object may require
much less than full information and perfect rationality, a feature of his view that
Griffin deems advantageous.76
Once we move to an ideal desire theory, however, the appeal to desires
seems either insufficient for well-being or redundant. First, there is no guarantee
that even ideal desires would track well-being, since it might simply be a
psychological fact about a given subject that their ideal desires fail to track
objective goodness.77 Consider John, a brilliant mathematician who is as rational
and informed as ideal desire theorists would like. He could contribute to
important problems in his field but instead develops a strong desire to count
blades of grass on the lawns of his local university, and devotes his life to the
enterprise, from which he derives great pleasure.78 Ideal desire theorists are
committed to the view that John is faring well provided he formed his desire
under suitable conditions. This is difficult to accept. They might reply that the
idealization process would rule out grass counting as a defective desire, but it is
not clear what procedural mistake John is making. In such cases, the appeal to
ideal desires seems insufficient. Even ideal desire theories, it seems, violate the
fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy.
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Second, even if we grant that ideal desires track well-being, what matters
now is not that a given object is wanted but that it is worth wanting. In such
cases, the appeal to desires seems redundant. Since ideal desires track
independent value, it is trivially true to say something is good for us only if we
would prefer it under ideal circumstances. Where ideal desire theories go wrong
is in assuming that it is the fact that we want those things under ideal
circumstances that makes them good for us to have. What matters is not the fact
that John desires the object but that his desire reflects an appreciation of the
nature of its object, that is, recognition of its good qualities, value, or significance.
In effect, ideal desire theorists violate the formality criterion, confusing the nature
of well-being with the objects that reliably produce it. We may benefit from having
objects we would want under suitable conditions, yet wanting itself has no part in
the nature of well-being.
For some, this is enough to tip the scales toward objective theories.
However, instead of returning to theories that explain well-being uniquely in
terms of the value of objects, we might opt to construct a subjective account from
the salvage of hedonistic and desire theories. Theories that pursue this middle
way are committed to addressing the difficult cases that subjective theories face
without moving to an objective view that would appeal to the value of objects.
Like their subjective counterparts, theories in this set affirm the agent sovereignty
thesis, the claim that a person’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s
well-being, and they reject the claim that the objects of those concerns have
further value that bears on well-being.
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The chief weakness of subjective theories is that they violate the formality
criterion of descriptive adequacy. Each picks out an important source of wellbeing, and gives a lucid account of the sector of our lives in which it best applies.
I have tried to show that this weakness is the same in each case: each account
violates the fidelity criterion in the sector of our lives covered by its rivals, and
salvages its credibility only by limiting the generality of the account. Sumner’s
theory of authentic happiness is a good example of theories of well-being that
pursue a conciliatory argumentative strategy. He proposes a hybrid approach
that explains the property that these goods have in common that makes them
reliable sources of well-being.
Authentic happiness draws on different parts of competing subjective
theories to formulate something in between hedonism and desire theories. Like
hedonism, authentic happiness ties the nature of well-being to psychological
responses; like desire theories, it imposes procedural constraints to eliminate
those responses that do not track well-being. Happiness has an affective and a
cognitive component. “The cognitive aspect of happiness,” writes Sumner, “is a
positive evaluation of the conditions of your life, a judgment that, at least on
balance, it measures up favourably against your standards or expectations.” 79
This evaluation constitutes an affirmation of the conditions of one’s life according
to criteria of one’s own devising, a judgment that, on the whole and taking
everything in consideration, life is going well. Meanwhile, “the affective side of
happiness,” he writes, “consists in what we commonly call a sense of well-being:
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finding your life enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it.”80 The
affective side of Sumner’s account of happiness incorporates an experience
requirement, which he recommends as “the important insight in classical
hedonism.”81 One benefits from a state of affairs only if it positively affects the
quality of one’s experience.
The cognitive and affective components of happiness together constitute
endorsement, which is only part of the story of what faring well consists in.
Whatever else is true, one fares well only if one’s endorsement is authentic; that
is, only if one’s endorsement accurately reflects one’s point of view. If welfare
subjects are poorly informed about their circumstances, or if their standards are a
function of external manipulation, then they are not faring well even if they
endorse the conditions of their life.82 Endorsements are sufficiently informed
when more information would not make a difference to the welfare subjects’
response to their life given their ideals and concerns.83 Endorsements are
autonomous when there is no reason to believe that they have been influenced
by mechanisms that erode the welfare subjects’ capacity to reflect critically on
their values, standards, and expectations.84 Only when endorsements are
authentic – when they are informed and autonomous – do they count towards
well-being.
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Sumner’s middle way, then, meets the two conditions that a theory must
satisfy to count as a subjective theory. First, it affirms the agent sovereignty
thesis. One’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-being provided
one’s endorsements are authentic. Second, it denies that the object of these
concerns have further value. The constraints he proposes for authentic
happiness offer no substantive critique of the endorsements in play, nor do they
suggest that one’s ends have independent value that bears on one’s well-being.
In fact, the procedural constraints empower rather than impede agent
sovereignty, allowing third-party judgments to override one’s endorsements only
when there is reason to believe that they do not truly represent one’s point of
view.
The resulting account has plausible implications for tests cases. First,
authentic happiness entails that mental states are not the only thing that matters.
Schedules of concerns range over both states of the mind and state of the world.
If knowing that his worldly successes are beholden to an experience machine
would change Robert’s endorsement of the conditions of his life, then Robert is
not faring well after all. He does not benefit from his endorsement of the
experiences the machine constructs because his endorsement does not
accurately reflect his concern that his experiences connect with reality in the right
way. With the necessary changes, the same goes for the case of Tom. If learning
that his partner and colleagues are insincere would change his endorsement of
the conditions of his life, then he is not faring well however pleasant his mental
states. Then again, if knowing the relevant information would not change the
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relevant endorsements in these two cases, then the two men fare well, whatever
else critics of subjective theories might claim. Hence, authentic happiness
complies fairly well with the fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy.
However, even this most plausible subjective view is susceptible to the
problem of worth. Whatever subjective theory we choose to pursue will affirm the
agent sovereignty thesis and deny the independent value of one’s concerns.
Persons do not value welfare goods because they are good for them; welfare
goods are good for persons because they value them. In describing welfare
value exclusively in terms of psychological facts, subjectivists are committed to
the view that all objects of concerns are on equal axiological footing. All
pleasures are equally valuable as such, no desire is better in itself than another
is; no standard is more worthy of concern than another is. If this is right, then one
can fare well despite the fact that one takes pleasure in worthless pleasures and
desires, and one’s standards miss the mark. The implication is controversial
enough to challenge the acceptance of subjective accounts of well-being.
The problem arises in part because it is difficult to shake the intuition that
there is more to well-being than bare psychological facts. The worth of the
objects of one’s concerns also matter. Yet procedural constraints alone do not
ensure that a person’s pleasures, desires, or standards track the worth of the
objects of one’s concerns. What is missing from the subjectivist’s assessment of
John’s rational desire to count blades of grass is an appraisal of the object of his
desire. The trouble is not that his response is poorly informed, unreasonable, or
unduly quirky, but that it fails to take into account the assessment that blade
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counting is nearly worthless. In raising the problem of worth, it is important to
hold in abeyance judgments concerning the normative adequacy of subjective
theories. The trouble is not that subjective theories of well-being conflict with a
favored account of the right. Rather, they fail to provide a descriptively adequate
account of the nature of well-being. Simply put, there is more to well-being than
is captured in schedules of concerns. Still, it is possible to overstate the case for
worth. Like the problem of authority, the problem of worth will have a scalar
dimension, making more trouble for cases in which the worth of the objects of
one’s concerns is salient. We might assess, for instance, that worth has little
bearing on how well the happy toddler or the contented senior fares at a time, yet
insist that the grass counter does not fare well given the worth of the objects of
their concerns.
Subjectivists might reply that we are letting our concerns about John’s
sanity cloud our assessment of the welfare value of his activities. When we place
these concerns aside, we can see that such activities are not intrinsically harmful
for the people who choose to engage in them. In fact, to the extent that subjects
liked or want them, they are beneficial. We may have justified moral qualms
about leading these lives. We may think that those who live them could do
something more useful for others, but these reasons do not impugn their welfare
value for those who live them. There is room for reasonable doubt, however.
Recall that well-being is not only the foundation for rational decisions in which
only personal interests are concerned; it also captures what we have reason to
promote for the sake of others. Even if we grant that the subjectivists’ replies
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address the kinds of welfare judgments we make in the first instance, it is not
obvious that they address those we make in the second. It is difficult to imagine
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others because of a nagging sense
that the grass-counter does not fare as well as he could fare. Our concerns are
not all that matters to our well-being. In some cases, the worth of the object of
those concerns also matters.
Elements of this problem are almost as old as subjective theories
themselves, and motivate, among others views, John Stuart Mill’s distinction
between higher and lower pleasures. “It is quite compatible with the principle of
utility,” Mill famously writes, “that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and
more valuable than others.” If all or almost all of those who are competently
acquainted with two pleasures agree in preferring one to another, then “we are
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment superiority in quality, so far
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”85 Mill’s
distinction is replete with conceptual problems, not the least of which involves
trying to formulate a concept of pleasure that makes sense of the claim that
higher pleasures are more valuable to those who experience them. Nothing in
the problem of worth itself commits us to Mill’s account of qualitative pleasures,
however. All that is wanted is the recognition that, in some cases, a descriptively
adequate conception of well-being must account for the intuition that the worth of
the objects that subjects pursue matters.
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Ironically, where subjective theories of well-being err is in a well-meaning
but diffident respect for the autonomy of persons. As we have seen, the
subjectivity of well-being can seem to be a matter of self-ownership: over himself,
over his well-being, the individual is sovereign. In this sense, self-interested
choices and the normative assessment of outcomes rest squarely on the
person’s schedule of concerns. No other reference group is more relevant, no
other norm more authoritative, provided the schedule of concerns is formed
under suitable conditions. In effect, the subjectivist imposes an information
constraint on welfare judgments: information about the axiological status of the
object of a person’s concerns is (directly) irrelevant to whether he is faring well.
To brook an independent value requirement is to impose alien values on
individuals, and to compromise the main strength of subjective theories, namely,
that they treat individuals as the final authorities on their well-being under
suitable conditions.86
Certainly, addressing the problem of worth involves formulating an
independent value requirement that makes sense of the notion that some objects
are more worthy of concern than other objects without succumbing to the
problem of authority. A successful response should not collapse into an objective
account; that is, it should not alienate the welfare subject from his own well-being
or reduce welfare value to a rival dimension of value. Moreover, it should address
concerns over perceived violations of weak neutrality. As daunting as formulating
such an account may seem, it is worth remembering that subjectivity alone is, in
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some cases, an insufficient metric for well-being. Specifically, it cannot
adequately deal with cases in which subjects seem not to fare as well as they
could despite the fact that their responses are formed under suitable conditions.
In trying to respect unusual but worthy forms of life, subjectivists seem to capture
common but worthless ones.
However, the problem of worth puts us in a double bind of its own: if we
reject the agent sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis, we seem
committed to the claim that concerns alone do not count towards well-being. This
too is difficult to accept. Subjects may fare best when worthy goods figure on
their schedule of concerns, but why not think their concerns alone counts at least
to some extent? The problem of worth implies that John does not fare as well as
he might if he concerned himself with a more worthy object. However, it seems
unreasonable to claim that his concerns by themselves fail to count towards wellbeing at all. Given the choice of two lives in which John fails to concern himself
with worthy objects, it must be the case that John fares better in the life in which
he endorses the conditions of his life than the one in which he does not.
The problem of worth arises when subjective theories deny the role that
the worth of a person’s concerns plays in defining what faring well consists in.
Any account that discounts information concerning whether the ends a person
pursues are worthwhile fails to capture an important dimension of the welfare
judgments we actually make. At the same time, it is difficult to accept that one
part of well-being has no welfare value in the absence of the other. In the case of
the grass-counter, for instance, it seems unreasonable that endorsement by itself

70

fails to count towards John’s well-being. Plausible solutions to the problem of
worth must take into consideration both concerns.

2.4 Conclusion
One might worry that the problem of authority and the problem of worth
are no more than products of our description of the central conflict between
subjective and objective theories of well-being. Surely, everyone appreciates that
schedules of concerns have an important place in well-being, and that we tend to
want and enjoy the objects on typical lists of independently valuable goods. This
worry misconstrues the issue. The longevity of the Euthyphro dilemma and the
ease with which each side constructs a general case against the other speaks to
the salience of the subjective-objective distinction. What matters to disputants on
each side of the divide is not that the best account of well-being finds some role
for these elements but that these elements play a central role in well-being.
One recurring theme in the story of well-being is that we are often tempted
to sacrifice fidelity to generality. As objections persuade theorists to refine and
clarify their view, each can reply that their favored theory of well-being gives a
lucid account of what faring well consists in for the entities whose well-being it
best captures, even if it fails to capture what faring well consists in for all core
subjects. Generality gives way to fidelity. We must take care lest the solution we
propose sacrifice fidelity for generality in the same way. We should strive to
formulate a formal theory flexible enough to satisfy both criteria.
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Another recurring theme is that it is difficult to accept that the subjective
and objective parts of well-being have no welfare value. In the case of the
depressed artist, it seems unreasonable that objective goods by themselves fail
to count towards Richard’s well-being at least to some extent. They might not
count for much in the absence of Richard’s endorsement, but why not think
objective goods count for something? Similarly, in the case of the grass-counter,
it seems unreasonable that desire satisfaction by itself fails to count towards
John’s well-being. He might fare better if he desired a more worthy object, but
why not think his desire satisfaction counts for something? In suggesting
solutions to the problem of authority and the problem of worth, we must bear
these themes in mind.

72

Chapter 3: Well-Being and Endorsement
3.1 Introduction
We now turn to the problem of authority. The greatest obstacle for
objectivists is their reluctance to grant that endorsing an object is necessary for
that object to confer a benefit on the subject. This reluctance alienates subjects
from their own well-being. The case of Richard is tragic precisely because he is
not faring very well despite the fact that his life contains much that is
independently valuable. We must take the risk of alienation seriously. To deal
with the problem of authority, we need an account that affirms the importance of
relating to objects that engage one’s active interest, attention, and care without
denying the possible bearing of the worth of those objects on one’s well-being.
The account must address the problem of authority without sacrificing fidelity to
generality, and it must accommodate the intuition that objective goods count
toward well-being to some extent even in the absence of endorsement.87
In this chapter, I argue that addressing the problem of authority requires
that we recognize that, in central cases, endorsement is necessary for wellbeing. A descriptively adequate theory of well-being should incorporate the
endorsement thesis: that is, it should grant that, in the central case, the
possession of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if one endorses it
under suitable conditions. As we shall see at the end of the chapter, the caveat is
necessary to deal with the double bind problem. Specifically, it is necessary to
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build a theory of well-being in a way that escapes the conclusion that either the
subjective or the objective parts of well-being do not contribute to well-being on
their own.
In section 3.2, I formulate a pluralistic model of endorsement. I argue that
subjective theories seem intuitive largely because of a more general agreement
concerning the intrinsic importance of such endorsement.
In section 3.3, I discuss what best explains this agreement. An experience
of endorsement is constituted in part by a distinctive evaluative attitude that
captures the intrinsic importance of such experiences to one’s well-being. This
evaluative attitude is consistent with the agent-relativity of welfare claims.
In section 3.4, I consider objections to making welfare value depend on
the subject’s endorsement. I argue that, in central cases, endorsement is
necessary for welfare, and that objectively good states of affairs one does not
endorse contribute at least to some extent to one’s welfare. I suggest that the two
claims together commit us to a discontinuity in welfare value between what I call
“full fare” and “low fare.” A discontinuity in value is a sharp break between the
welfare contributions of different kinds of welfare goods such that no amount of
one good can ever be more valuable than some finite amount of another good. In
the central case, faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great
contribution that endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true
that endorsement on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less
than the unity. Call the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own
“low fare.” The discontinuity in welfare value between low fare and full fare is
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necessary to deal with the double bind problem without abandoning the
endorsement thesis.
3.2 Endorsement
The problem of authority arises from the denial of the agent sovereignty
thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis holds that one's schedule of concerns alone
determines one’s well-being. Since objectivists believe that the axiological status
of the objects of one’s concerns does not depend on their inclusion in one’s
schedule of concerns, they must reject the claim that one’s schedule of concerns
alone determines one’s well-being. The rejection of the agent sovereignty thesis
in turn suggests the denial of the endorsement thesis. The endorsement thesis
holds that, in central cases, one must endorse a good in order for that good to
contribute to one’s well-being. If one’s schedule of concerns alone does not
determine one’s well-being, then perhaps one need not endorse a good in order
for that good to contribute to one’s well-being. Once one rejects the endorsement
thesis, the spectre of alienation is not far behind.
One possible response to the problem of authority is to hold the agent
sovereignty thesis in abeyance and mount a defence of the endorsement thesis.
One can hold that endorsement is necessary for well-being in central cases
without conceding that schedules of concerns alone determine one’s well-being.
One might insist that the concerns of welfare subjects are not merely additional
welfare goods that contribute to how well one fares overall, but also a condition
for objects to contribute to one’s well-being, at least in most cases. The first
move in this argumentative strategy is to describe the nature of endorsement.
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Unfortunately, the precise nature of endorsement is contentious. Most welfare
theorists agree that endorsement matters, but they disagree on what it consists
in, whether it is a necessary condition for well-being, or whether it is merely a
reliable source of well-being.
Endorsement captures the subjective part of well-being. It is tempting to
define endorsement in terms of a single dimension, and argue for the most fitting
description of this dimension.88 This approach has not produced a conclusive
account of endorsement. The literature contains three broad characterisations of
the subjective dimension of well-being. The first two are hedonistic accounts of
well-being; the third is an informed desire account. Internalists about pleasure
define faring well in terms of a distinctive feeling that all pleasant experiences
share. Unfortunately, describing the exact nature of this feeling is difficult.89
Externalists about pleasure define faring well in terms of a feeling that is wanted
or desired by the individual who experiences it.90 Finally, desire theorists define
faring well as a function of satisfied desire only to falter on the description of the
set of desires whose satisfaction matters to one’s well-being. None of the
descriptions of the subjective dimension of well-being captures what faring well
consists in for all core subjects, though each gives a lucid account of what faring
well consists in for the entities whose well-being it best captures.91
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Perhaps we should resist this reductive impulse. There is no reason to
take as fact the claim that the many evaluative states that subjects experience
necessarily reduce to a single shared property. Suppose we set out to construct
an account of endorsement at a time that acknowledges the diversity of
subjective evaluative states. One might say that one endorses an object when
one favours it, a term chosen deliberately to capture the wide range of possible
evaluative states that subjects experience. The favouring relation situates the
subject’s orientation toward a state of affairs along an evaluative dimension. If
the subject favours a state of affairs, then he or she is positively oriented towards
that states of affairs. If the subject holds a state of affairs in disfavour, then he or
she is negatively oriented towards that state of affairs. Finally, if the subject
neither favours a state of affairs nor holds it in disfavour, then he or she is
neutrally oriented toward that state of affairs. What might the favouring relation
include?
The hedonic quality of experience at a time is a natural first candidate.
The great lesson of classical hedonism is that sensory pains and pleasures
matter to one’s well-being. Sensory pains and pleasures capture one’s
orientation toward eating strawberry ice cream or stepping barefoot on a child’s
toy. One fares well at a time to the extent that one experiences surplus sensory
pleasure. However, the hedonic quality of experience at a time on its own is not
an adequate account of favouring in all cases. There is more to favoring than
experiencing sensory pleasure and avoiding sensory pain.
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In some cases, one’s orientation toward states of affairs that do not affect
one’s immediate sensory experience also matters. For instance, attitudinal
pleasures differ in quality from sensory ones, yet their physiological and
behavioral manifestations are no less important to well-being.92 One can
experience attitudinal pain and pleasure in anticipating or remembering a holiday,
satisfying one’s curiosity, performing a skilled task with virtuosity, or believing
that a friend in a distant city is faring reasonably well. What these experiences
share is not a common sensory quality but an attitudinal response on the part of
the subject to a state of affairs that does not necessarily affect his or her sensory
experience. One believes a state of affairs has occurred, is occurring, or will
occur, and one is pleased or displeased that this is the case.93 One fares well at
a time to the extent that one is pleased with a given state of affairs. Just as the
sensory quality of experience must figure in an adequate account of favouring, so
too must the attitudinal responses to states of affairs that go beyond one’s
immediate experience.
Again, one’s attitudinal responses at a time are not an adequate account
of favouring on their own. This is the case for two reasons. First, the concept of
attitudinal pleasures fails to explain simpler cases in which one’s orientation
toward an immediate state of affairs has a merely sensory quality. We might
follow Feldman in claiming that all cases of sensory pleasure are also cases of
Michael Kubovy, “On the pleasures of the mind,” Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic
Psychology. D. Kahneman et al. (eds). New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, chapter 7;
J. Elster and G. Lowenstein, “Utility from memory and anticipation,” in J. Elster and G. Lowenstein
(eds.), Choice over time. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993, 213-24.
93 Fred Feldman defines these experiences as attitudinal pleasures. “Two questions about
pleasure,” Philosophical Analysis (1988): 59-81. See also Pleasure and the Good Life. London:
Oxford University Press, 2004.
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attitudinal pleasure.94 However, the move does not seem to do justice to our
experience of sensory pleasures. My orientation toward eating strawberry ice
cream or stepping barefoot on a child’s toy has a subjective feel that goes
beyond an attitudinal response. Second, the concept of attitudinal pleasures fails
to capture cases in which one favours a state of affairs toward which one is not
consciously oriented. For instance, subjects report being positively oriented (in
hindsight) toward states of “flow,” experiences in which both the sensory quality
of experience and one’s sense of self fade as one becomes engrossed in an
activity.95 The states of mind one experiences when engaged in engrossing
athletic or creative activities, like long distance running or playing a musical
instrument, are paradigmatic flow states. Such experiences involve an
effacement of the self and a suspension of conscious experience. Unlike mere
states of intense enjoyment, flow states tend to be enjoyed consciously only in
hindsight. In the moment, flow states obtain without the sensory qualities of
sensory pleasures or the complex evaluative and epistemic states typical of
attitudinal pleasures. In order to favour a state of affairs in the latter sense, one
must believe that the state of affairs obtains and assess it (at least tacitly) against
criteria of one’s own devising. Flow states are evidence that the evaluation of
some stimuli can occur outside awareness, only to become accessible once the
stimulus ends. An adequate account of favouring must capture these states as
well.
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Dispositional accounts of pleasure can inform the sense in which subjects
endorse states of affairs that occur outside of one’s awareness.96 In such cases,
we can characterise one’s positive orientation toward a state of affairs at a time
not as a mental state or as a property of mental states, but as an observable
disposition to continue or maintain a state of affairs. For instance, we can say
that marathoners straining to the finish line favour the experience if they
persevere despite the presence of distressing physical pain, if they become
frustrated with race interruptions, and if they resist attempts to impede their
progress. This dispositional account of favouring is not adequate in every case.
For instance, one might favour the subtle trace of a fragrance but find its
persistence cloying. In such cases, it seems more fitting to describe favouring in
terms of sensory pleasure.97 In other cases, it seems more fitting to describe
favouring in terms of an attitudinal response to a state of affairs. My partner and I
favoured her giving birth, but it would be odd to describe the favouring in sensory
or dispositional terms. Neither of us favored the experience for its sensory
qualities, nor were we disposed for her labor to continue longer than necessary.
We set out to explore the subjective evaluative states that a pluralistic
account of endorsement might include. The diversity is intimidating. We can
characterise a subject’s orientation toward a state of affairs at different times as a
quality of his or her sensory experience, an attitudinal response to a state of
affairs, and a disposition to continue or maintain a state of affairs. We must
suppress the reductionist impulse and accept the complexity of subjective
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evaluative states that subjects experience. The dimension one emphasizes in a
given case will depend on the state of affairs under consideration, and the
purpose for which one is conducting the analysis. In some cases, endorsement
will involve the sensory quality of an experience; in others, an attitudinal
response; in still others, a disposition to continue or maintain a state of affairs.98
In complex cases, two or more subjective evaluative states may come to bear in
a single analysis of endorsement.
A natural way to describe endorsement at a time is to reach for a
pluralistic account that can accommodate this diversity. Call this view
endorsement as favouring. We can say that one endorses an object when one
favours it under suitable conditions; that is, when one is positively oriented
towards it in feeling, thought, and action; or when one anticipates it
enthusiastically and is disposed to pursue it; or when one is pleased when it
obtains and one is disposed to continue the experience or maintain the state of
affairs; or when one has pleasant thoughts about it after it obtains.99 This implies
that the favouring need not take place at the same time as you experience a
good, which is necessary to deal with cases such as flow states, where the
endorsement occurs only in hindsight. This account of endorsement at a time
identifies two significant evaluative dimensions: an attribute of subjective
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experience, and an observable tendency to continue an experience or maintain a
state of affairs. The first dimension captures endorsements that involve a sensory
or attitudinal orientation to a state of affairs; the second dimension captures
endorsements that involve a disposition to continue an experience or maintain a
state of affairs.100
The considered view I defend in the fifth chapter is that we can address
the problem of authority, the problem of worth, and the double bind problem by
defending an accommodating view of well-being according to which one fares
well at a time when one endorses worthy goods. This is a hybrid theory of wellbeing that joins endorsement as favouring with an account of worth. On my
considered view, endorsement is necessary for well-being at a time, and welfare
subjects fare better over time when they endorse worthy objects. As we shall see
at the end of this chapter, the caveat that endorsement is only necessary for wellbeing in central cases is necessary to deal the double bind problem. While a full
assessment of the descriptive adequacy of my considered view must wait for the
fifth chapter, we can appreciate the impact of endorsement as favouring on the
generality of the subjective part of the account.
Endorsement as favouring is not a conjunctive account of the subjective
part of well-being, though its elements can interact in various ways. Insisting on
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describing favouring as a single distinctive evaluative state or a necessary
conjunction of such states would be misleading. In some cases, the obtaining of
a single dimension will be sufficient to warrant the claim that a subject favours a
state of affairs; in most cases, several conditions will be jointly sufficient. The
upshot is a descriptively adequate account of endorsement that can capture the
wide range of evaluative states characteristic of different welfare subjects from
the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior.
For instance, human adults who endorse eating strawberry ice cream are
likely to be positively oriented toward the activity along a number of dimensions.
They will be positively oriented toward eating strawberry ice cream in feeling,
thought, and action, they will be disposed to pursue it for a time, and they will
have pleasant thoughts about it after the state of affairs obtains. Experiences
such as those of straining marathoners may also call for a multi-faceted
description, one that includes not only their disposition to continue the race, but
also the hedonic quality of their experience, their attitudes about the race, and
their expectations about their performance. In other cases, endorsement will
consist of a more modest combination of evaluative states, or involve only
unconscious evaluative states. The endorsement of a toddler nestled in a warm
blanket is no less significant for lacking the sophistication of adults, who are more
likely to anticipate, savor, and remember the states of affairs they endorse.
Likewise, the endorsement of autotelic agents immersed in flow states is no less
significant for its unconscious character.101 Flow states make important
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contributions to well-being despite the fact that we cannot characterise subjects
at the time as positively oriented towards them in feeling and thought. Still, they
may well anticipate them, be disposed to continue them, and have pleasant
thoughts about them after they obtain.
The requirement that favouring occur under suitable conditions concedes
that some favourings are susceptible to procedural mistakes. On this account,
some kinds of favourings involve a perception of a qualitative feature of a state of
affairs, such as its sensory profile. Others involve a judgment assessing some
feature of a state of affairs against criteria of one’s devising, such as its attitudinal
profile. Following Sumner, we might insist that one’s attitudinal responses be
informed and autonomous. If more information would change one’s grasp of a
state of affairs or change one’s evaluative criteria, or if there is reason to believe
that mechanisms have eroded one’s capacity to reflect critically on one’s values,
standards, and expectations, then one’s favouring is suspect. Hence, Tom, the
deceived executive who falsely believes his life a success, may not fare well
despite the fact that he is positively oriented toward his experiences. The
deception may not affect his experience ex hypothesi, but it is reasonable to
suspect that more information would change his attitudinal response to the
conditions of his life.102 In the possible world where more information would not
affect his judgment, then Tom fares well despite the deception.
Notice that perceptions and judgments are not equally susceptible to
procedural mistakes. Suppose a toddler favours resting under a warm blanket in
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the sense that he or she experiences surplus sensory pleasure when the state of
affairs obtains. It is difficult to imagine how such favouring could be mistaken.
This is an important epistemic difference between the sensory and attitudinal
components of endorsement as favouring. Note that the different dimensions of
well-being may conflict as well. I may take sensory pleasure in something that
later displeases me in an attitudinal sense. In such cases, we must weigh the
intensity of one kind of endorsement against the other and determine the
intensity of the endorsement overall. It would certainly be simpler to abandon the
pluralistic account in favor of another that reduces endorsement to a single
dimension. However, the pluralistic account is consistent with how we make
welfare judgments in practice. The subjective part of well-being does not reduce
to a single dimension. Rather, we reach for the kind of endorsement that is most
compelling in a given case. In some cases, as when I am considering the impact
of eating strawberry ice cream on my well-being, it will make most sense to draw
on the sensory part of endorsement. In other cases, as when I am considering
the impact of anticipating a vacation on my well-being, it will make most sense to
draw on the attitudinal part of endorsement. In central cases, one kind of
endorsement will likely be dominant.
Is endorsement in this sense necessary for well-being under suitable
conditions? Perhaps the weaker claim that such endorsement matters is not a
bad place to start searching for an answer. What reasons do we have to believe
that this less controversial claim is true? Our practices surrounding endorsement
provide at least some initial reasons for believing that it matters to our well-being.
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We capture endorsements in schedules of concerns; we act as if they matter; we
believe that they give direction to our actions; and we believe that they constrain
the actions of others. In cases where morality requires that we modify our
schedules of concerns for the sake of others, we experience the change as a
loss, though we may adopt it willingly and we may ultimately benefit from it later.
Conversely, the claim that endorsement as such and on its own has no value,
that what one cares about lacks intrinsic importance, has unattractive
consequences. It implies that projects and relationships for which we care deeply
do not matter as such, and that involuntary pleasures, like the comfort we take in
a warm blanket, make no intrinsic contributions to our well-being. We may insist
with Sumner that endorsement be authentic, i.e. informed, and autonomous, but
once we do so, it is difficult to deny its intrinsic importance.
The consequences of denying the intrinsic importance of endorsement are
even more unattractive in cases involving negative endorsements. This is the
case particularly if one maintains a symmetrical view of the importance of welfare
and illfare, that is, if one assumes that faring well and faring poorly are equally
important.103 We can say that one rejects an object when one holds it in disfavour
under suitable conditions: that is, when one is negatively oriented towards it in
feeling, thought, and action; one anticipates it unenthusiastically and is disposed
to avoid bringing it into being; one is displeased when it obtains, and one is
disposed to discontinue the experience or bring the state of affairs to an end; and
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one has unpleasant thoughts about it after it obtains. Denying the intrinsic
importance of negative endorsements implies that rejecting a state of affairs also
lacks intrinsic importance; that physical injuries, headaches, and mental anguish
have no disvalue as such and on their own; and that poor Richard’s depression
in itself does not bear on his well-being. These claims will strike all but the most
ascetic observer as seriously implausible.
Still, the endorsement thesis, the claim that endorsement is necessary for
well-being, must turn on something more than broad agreement with the weaker
claim that endorsement matters, if only to address suspicions that the judgment
is premature, and the endorsement thesis, too ambitious. Even if endorsement
matters, it may not matter in every case; that is, it may not be necessary for wellbeing.
Recognizing the intrinsic importance of endorsement requires that we
grasp the relation between well-being and experience. We must preserve what
Griffin calls the experience requirement.104 Placing an experience requirement on
well-being commits us to the view that the explanation or justification of the
welfare value of a state of affairs derives in part from its effect, actual or possible,
on human experience and its quality. The modal conditions embedded in this
description of experience requirement are necessary to account for cases in
which the welfare subject’s endorsement is inauthentic. If more information about
one’s circumstances would make a difference to one’s judgment about how well
one is faring, or if one’s standards are a function of external manipulation, then
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one does not fare well despite the state of affairs’ actual effect on one’s
experience and its quality. More simply, in most cases, welfare subjects benefit
from a given state of affairs only if that state of affairs has an effect on them.
Endorsement as favouring meets the experience requirement in its most
general sense. On this view, one cannot be positively oriented towards a state of
affairs that does not have an effect on one’s mind or experience. The
phenomenology of well-being that emerges from endorsement as favouring is
familiar. The environment affects welfare subjects; their brain evaluates the
relevant states of affairs and generates an orientation to them; those orientations
are fairly stable and reliable under suitable conditions; and welfare subjects have
access to some orientations and can communicate them to others. In some
cases, such as flow states, the evaluation of a state of affairs will be below the
threshold of awareness. In others, it will have a merely sensory quality, and lack
the complex beliefs and attitudes about its occurrence or its welfare value that
attitudinal orientations have. However, in all cases, endorsement as favouring
implies that states of affairs that confer harm or benefit on a welfare subject must
affect the experience of subjects. This claim seems to have controversial
implications. For instance, it seemingly implies that the deceived executive who
falsely believes his life a success fares well despite the deception. This
conclusion is less controversial than it may seem at first glance.
As we have seen, desire theorists argue that preserving the connection
between experience and well-being entails that mental states are all that
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matter.105 This commits us to the view that Tom, the deceived executive who
falsely believes his life a success, fares well to the extent that he endorses the
conditions of his life, since the deception does not affect his experience ex
hypothesi. As Griffin describes it, “if the delusion is complete, one believes that
one has the truth; the mental states involved in believing something that really is
true and believing a successful deception are the same.”106 The intimate relation
between well-being and experience implies that Tom fares well ‘on the inside’
despite what his life may seem like to observers ‘from the outside.’ Desire
theorists insist that what we do not know can harm or benefit us. If Tom wants his
children to fare well and unbeknownst to him they do not, Tom does not fare well
despite the fact that his mental states are indistinguishable from someone whose
children do fare well. Therefore, the experience requirement is false: mental
states are not all that matters.
Other writers have suggested ways to lessen the sting of the experience
requirement. We can do so in two ways. First, we can insist with Sumner that
Tom endorse the state of affairs under suitable conditions. This seems right. If
Tom is poorly informed or if his standards are a function of external manipulation,
that is, if they are not authentic, then he is not faring well at a time despite his
endorsement.107 The concession does not threaten the intrinsic importance of
endorsement to well-being since it merely imposes procedural constraints on
welfare value, a constraint that sustains rather that impedes agent sovereignty.
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Second, we can explain our reluctance to grant that Tom fares well
despite the deception. As Feldman points out, when considering Tom’s case, it is
tempting to project ourselves into the thought-experiment.108 This too seems
right. Perhaps knowing what we know of Tom’s life, we would not want to be in
his shoes. Of course, the projection violates the conditions of the thoughtexperiment: we are assuming that the deception will never affect Tom’s
experience. If we hold the conditions of the thought-experiment constant, the
claim that Tom fares well despite the deception is more plausible.
It is unfortunate that the case of Tom anchors discussions of the
soundness of the experience requirement. Certainly, we can explain the harm in
Tom’s case by appealing to the claim that things other than mental states matter
to well-being. However, the experience requirement is not a claim about the
kinds of objects that have welfare value, but a claim about the kind of relation
that must hold between the subject and a state of affairs for that state of affairs to
have welfare value. Specifically, the experience requirement establishes that a
state of affairs must affect a subject in order to confer a harm or benefit. It is
perhaps no surprise that the insistence of desire theorists to abandon the
experience requirement generates the scope problem.109 On one view, the
reason that I do not benefit from the satisfaction of my desire that a stranger met
briefly fare well is that it does not affect my experience. In a limited sense,
experience delineates the boundaries of well-being.110
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This claim is far less controversial than the claim that only mental states
matter, since it is consistent with the claim that things other than mental states
matter to one’s well-being. We have good reason to believe that experience is
necessary for well-being at a time. Following Kagan, we can observe that, since
Tom’s well-being is a state of his person, changes in his well-being must involve
changes in his mind or his body. Since the deception does not involve changes in
Tom’s mind or body, it does not have an impact on his well-being.111 Kagan
thinks that this entails that our experiences alone ground our well-being, but we
need not accept this stronger claim, nor do we need to conclude that only actual
and occurrent mental states matter to one’s well-being.112 For instance,
unconscious mental states (such as flow states) and the very specific
counterfactual mental states implied by Sumner’s authenticity conditions also
matter.
We may be tempted to judge that Tom fares well, but that in light of the
deception, he does not fare as well as he might otherwise fare. The temptation to
account for the deception does not suggest that Tom’s life is bereft of welfare
value, or that his endorsement is not necessary for well-being. Rather, it may
suggest that we recognize the deception as an important axiological factor in the
assessment of his well-being. Experience may delineate the boundaries of Tom’s
well-being, but the quality of Tom’s experience may not be the only factor
relevant to his well-being.
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In effect, it is possible to defend the endorsement thesis without asserting
the agent sovereignty thesis. That is, we can hold that endorsement is necessary
for well-being without committing to the view that schedules of concern alone
determine one’s well-being. Other axiological factors matter too. We can capture
this judgment in two ways.
In the first, one’s endorsement counts toward one’s well-being, but the
state of affairs that comprises one’s endorsement alone constitutes a whole of
less welfare value than another possible state of affairs that contains one’s
endorsement and an independently valuable object. In Tom’s case, his
endorsement counts toward his well-being, but the state of affairs that comprises
his endorsement and the deception constitutes a whole of less welfare value than
another possible state of affairs in which Tom endorses the conditions of his life
and he is not deceived. The first explanation attaches welfare value to the state
of affairs as a whole, and adjusts the value to accommodate all the relevant
axiological factors.
In the second, one’s endorsement counts towards one’s well-being, but an
independently valuable object increases the welfare value of the endorsement
itself. In Tom’s case, his endorsement counts towards his well-being, but the
deception diminishes the welfare value of the endorsement itself. The second
explanation attaches welfare value to one’s endorsement, and applies a discount
rate to the value of the endorsement to account for other axiological factors.
In either case, endorsement is necessary to one’s well-being, but
properties of the state of affairs one endorses affect how well one fares as
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well.113 That is, in either case, endorsement is necessary to Tom’s well-being, but
properties of the state of affairs he endorses affect how well he fares overall.
Whichever explanation we choose to capture the judgment, Tom fares well, but
not as well as he would fare were he not deceived. Hence, it is possible to
defend the endorsement thesis without asserting the agent sovereignty thesis.
That is, it is possible to hold that endorsement is necessary for well-being in
central cases without holding that one’s schedule of concern alone determines
one’s well-being. We can have endorsement without sovereignty.
Accepting endorsement as favouring does not commit us to the view that
schedules of concern alone always determine one’s well-being. Other properties
of states of affairs may matter to one’s well-being. This limitation is necessary to
deal with the double bind problem. Subjects may fare well in states of affairs they
endorse, but unless the independent value of goods alone counts at least to
some extent, it will be impossible to account for some difficult cases. Given the
choice of two states of affairs, both of which one fails to endorse, it must be the
case that one fares better in the state of affairs in which one relates to
independently valuable objects than in the one in which one does not.
We have not yet shown that the endorsement thesis is true; that is, we
have not yet shown that endorsement is necessary for well-being in central
cases, a claim on which a solution to the problem of authority hinges. What we
need to capture the latter is an argument that establishes that, in central cases,
endorsed experience is necessary for well-being.
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3.3 Agent-Relativity
In this section, I argue that endorsed experience is a constitutive part of
well-being. Endorsement as favouring is a collection of sensory, attitudinal, and
dispositional orientations to states of affairs that affect the welfare subject. We
can say that one endorses an object when one favours it under suitable
conditions; that is, when one is positively oriented towards it in feeling, thought,
and action; or when one anticipates it enthusiastically and is disposed to pursue
it; or when one is pleased when it obtains and one is disposed to continue the
experience or maintain the state of affairs; or when one has pleasant thoughts
about it after it obtains. When subjects experience endorsement, they recognize
that it is constitutive of states of affairs that contribute to well-being. That is, one
cannot knowingly favour an object without recognizing that such experiences in
part constitute what it is to fare well.
Endorsement as favouring is an epistemic and not a metaphysical claim.
Puppies and toddlers are positively oriented toward a great many states of
affairs, though they are unable to reflect philosophically on the welfare value of
that orientation. For reflective human adults, however, the evaluation is an
integral part of the experience. This is not simply the claim that welfare subjects
value well-being because part of what constitutes welfare states is that they
endorse them. The latter can only establish that welfare subjects value states of
affairs that they endorse; it does not yet establish that these states of affairs are
good for them. The necessary connection between endorsement and well-being
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derives from the agent-relativity of well-being, the intuitive claim that one’s wellbeing generates reasons for acting. Subjective theories of well-being seem
intuitive largely because the endorsement thesis makes clear the relation
between one’s well-being and the agent-relativity of well-being.
Consider how Parfit deploys the agent-relativity of well-being against the
moral sceptic. Parfit asks whether we have good reason to believe that the
question of the objectivity of ethics remains open, and notices that most moral
sceptics are not sceptics about rationality. If we accept that there are reasons for
acting, then it is an open question whether some reasons for acting are moral
reasons. Parfit suggests that we already accept that one has an agent-relative
reason to promote one’s own well-being. “Suppose that, unless I move, I shall be
killed by a falling rock, and that what I now most want is to survive. Do I have a
reason to move? It is undeniable that I do.” The claim that one has such a
reason, he asserts, “would have been accepted in all civilizations, at all times.
This claim is true.” 114 Well-being has agent-relative normativity in the sense that
the claim that a state of affairs is good for someone generates a reason for that
person to bring it into being. In a word, our personal well-being should matter to
us. It is no accident that we often focus on the role that well-being plays in selfinterested decisions. The agent-relativity of well-being explains the place we give
to well-being in decision-making that involves only our personal interests. It also
explains why we take the well-being of others into consideration. The agentrelative normativity of well-being justifies our concern for the well-being of our
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intimates, and the moral consideration we give to the well-being of strangers. A
person’s well-being should matter to us because it should matter to them (and it
usually does).
Recognizing that endorsement is necessary for well-being spells out the
agent-relativity of well-being: if S endorses x, then S is good for x and S has a
reason to bring x into being. Objective theories that include endorsement as one
good among others fail to capture this relation. We can see the truth of this claim
if we return to the case of Richard.
Richard experiences many goods, but tragically, he fails to endorse them.
His work with the Smithsonian is drudgery, an activity in which he takes no
enjoyment and from which he takes no satisfaction.115 What matters to Richard’s
well-being is not only that he experience the goods in his life but also that he be
positively oriented towards them. The constitutive part that endorsement plays in
Richard’s well-being makes a stronger claim than merely that suffering and regret
mar his life, that these features make his life worse for him on the face of it. If
Richard’s well-being were merely an objective matter, then the positive
contributions that other goods make to his life could outweigh these negative
consequences. However, the presence of other goods does not outweigh the fact
that he does not endorse the conditions of his life, or that his schedule of
concerns is frustrated.
If they fail to affirm the endorsement thesis, the best that theories of wellbeing can do is provide an agent-neutral account of the normativity of well-being.
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Since objective accounts do not tie benefits to a particular perspective, the claim
that a person would relate to objects of value in a given state of affairs generates
a reason for anyone to bring it into being. This misrepresents the nature of wellbeing and its role in practical reasoning. A formal example should help illustrate
this idea.
First, assume that the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral
reasons follows Nagel’s distinction between subjective and objective reasons.116
According to Nagel, reasons are universal; that is, for every token reason, there
is a predicate R, which figures in the following universally quantified proposition:
Every reason is a predicate R such that for all persons p and events A, if
R is true of A, then p has prima facie reason to promote A.117
Nagel defines a subjective reason as one “whose defining predicate R contains a
free occurrence of the variable p,” where p is a member of the set of free
agents.118 All reasons either contain a free-agent variable or they do not. The
former reasons are subjective; the latter are objective.
Now, suppose there is a reason for Richard to restore art because doing
so would be good for Richard. This suggests a principle of action corresponding
to Richard’s reason:
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For any person p and any action A, if A would be good for p, then p has
reason to promote A.
This first principle of action captures the agent-relativity of well-being: it says that
if an action contributes to one’s well-being, then one has reason to promote the
action. Parfit asserts boldly that all civilizations have accepted this principle in all
times.
Conversely, suppose that we express Richard’s reason to restore art as
follows: there is a reason for Richard to restore art because doing so would be
good for someone. In the second case, the fact that the person benefitted is
Richard is incidental. If restoring art were good for Richard’s neighbor, then
Richard would have just as much reason to restore art. This suggests a principle
of action corresponding to this reason:
For any person p and any action A, if A is good for someone, then p has
reason to promote A.
This second principle of action is agent-neutral: it says that if an action
contributes to anyone’s well-being, then one has reason to promote the action.
The second principle raises two difficulties.
First, the claim that we already accept that one has an agent-neutral
reason to promote someone else’s well-being is difficult to accept. Suppose that,
contra Parfit, someone will be killed by a falling rock, and that what they now
most want is to survive. It is far from undeniable that the moral sceptic has a
reason to do anything at all. Even if they accept that there are reasons for acting,
it is an open question whether there are moral reasons, that is, whether there are
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agent-neutral reasons that motivate an action that would prevent the falling rock
from killing someone, especially when doing so will put the rescuer’s own wellbeing at risk. The point is not that no moral reasons can be given to motivate a
duty of rescue, but only that those reasons are open to doubt in the way that
agent-relative reasons to promote one’s well-being are not.
The second difficulty is that the agent-neutral principle effaces the
relevance of the identity of the agent who stands to benefit from the action one
promotes. On the second account, the fact that Richard is the agent having a
negative experience, and that Richard is the agent whose schedule of concerns
is frustrated, is not germane to the judgment that one has reason to promote an
action addressing his plight, even if one is Richard himself. To paraphrase Parfit,
this hardly seems like a claim that all civilizations, at all times, would have
accepted. It seems incredible to claim that a welfare judgment that disregards
Richard’s identity so completely has anything to do with him at all. The second,
agent-neutral principle risks reducing the welfare subject to a bare person of a
Rawlsian kind, an abstraction that is “ready to consider any new convictions and
aims, and even to abandon attachments and loyalties, when doing this promises
a life with greater overall…well-being, as specified by a public ranking.”119
Whether the life of a bare person is good for that person seems to have nothing
to do with the person who actually lives that life or their schedule of concerns.
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Instead, it has everything to do with the agent-neutral reasons moving one to
action, and the good one can promote from an agent-neutral standpoint.
On the second account of prudential reasons, then, well-being is divorced
entirely from the person whose well-being is at issue, reduced to one value
among others that one might promote for the sake of increasing the world’s total
stock of value. One can imagine Richard considering whether to sacrifice his
schedule of concern for the sake of the value his work creates without giving a
second thought to the fact that the schedule of concerns sacrificed will be his.
This misrepresents the nature of well-being and its role in practical reasoning.
Without affirming the endorsement thesis, we lack an argument to bring out the
agent-relativity of well-being. Once we grant that endorsement plays a
constitutive role in the nature of well-being, however, the agent-relative
normativity of well-being stems plainly from schedules concerns.

3.4 Objections
One might object to making any value, even welfare value, conditional on
endorsement. In Virtue, Vice and Value, for instance, Hurka considers the
endorsement thesis in the context of a general thesis about the nature of value.
According to the conditionality view, suggests Hurka, we can say that an object’s
intrinsic value is conditional on the love, desire, or pleasure one takes in an
object. Like the endorsement thesis, the conditionality view makes the value of
an object provisional on one’s attitude: “the love of x is in some cases not an
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additional good to x but a condition on x’s having value.”120 Hurka ascribes the
conditionality view to political philosophers who defend an endorsement
constraint on perfectionist goods.121
The defining feature of the conditionality view is that it denies that
perfectionist states such as knowledge and achievement have value in the
absence of an appropriate response on the part of the subject. If the subject does
not believe that knowledge or achievement are intrinsically good, or if they are
not the object of a generic positive attitude on the part of the subject, then
perfectionist states are worthless. Hurka argues that this denial is
counterintuitive, a point he presses by imagining an artist who creates
exceptional works of art, but whose performance hinges on setting exacting
standards for her work. Regrettably, her standards take their toll and she
gradually becomes dissatisfied until she no longer loves her work either
intellectually or emotionally. “It is uncontroversial that her inability to value her
work for itself is a loss,” suggests Hurka, “but to say it deprives her highly skillful
activity of all worth is going too far.”122
A second related objection to making any value, even welfare value,
conditional on endorsement is that one can endorse the conditions of one’s life
for superficial reasons. The endorsement thesis holds welfare value hostage to
the whims of the subject’s responses, which can be weak, impulsive, and
confused. Richard Arneson makes this case most forcefully. He imagines the
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case of a brilliant writer who fails to endorse the quality of her work on the ground
of an aesthetic theory she has foolishly embraced.123 Surely, her achievement is
good for her despite the fact that she fails to endorse it intellectually.
Where the first objection insists on the perfectionist value of objects one
fails to endorse, the second insists on their welfare value. The trouble is that both
objections lead inexorably to the problem of authority. If we deny that
endorsement is necessary for well-being, then we risk alienating subjects from
their own well-being. We can grant the two objections without jeopardising the
endorsement thesis, however. We can do so in two ways.
First, we can restrict the scope of the endorsement thesis explicitly to
welfare value. Much like our Richard, the disillusioned artist toils at her art but
she does not endorse the conditions of her life. She endorses neither the process
nor the product, yet she creates striking works of art that add to the world’s store
of objective goods. One can hold that the art she produces has great value, as
Hurka does, yet deny that it has welfare value. That is, we can hold that the state
of affairs is good simpliciter without holding that it is good for her. The art she
produce may have a great deal of value in a perfectionist sense, but she does
not fare much better from her standpoint for all that. Hurka can resist the
restricted application of the conditionality view to welfare, but only at the cost of
identifying welfare value with perfectionist value.124 Unfortunately, this response
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not only generates the problem of authority, alienating the welfare subject from
her well-being, but it also reduces welfare value to a rival dimension of value.125
Second, we can question whether the artist’s endorsement occurs under
suitable conditions. If more information about the independent value of her work
would change her evaluative criteria or her grasp of the state of affairs under
evaluation, then her endorsement is suspect. We can draw a similar conclusion if
there is reason to believe that the life of the struggling artist has eroded her
capacity to reflect critically on her values, standards, and expectations. One can
hold that the actual endorsements of welfare subjects are sometimes weak,
impulsive and confused, as Arneson holds, yet insist that endorsements under
suitable conditions are necessary for well-being. Again, to insist otherwise invites
the kind of alienation from her well-being that generates the problem of authority.
Arneson is willing to take the objection further. Imagine that the struggling
artist attains all the goods listed on the most promising objective theory of wellbeing but that by some quirk of her psychology, she fails to respond positively to
them. For good measure, we can imagine that she responds to this axiological
bounty under suitable conditions. Given that she has every good but the good of
endorsement, it seems incredible to claim that this single character trait reduces
her well-being to nothing.126 Surely, the independent value of the state of affairs
she fails to endorse contributes to her well-being at least to some extent. This
more ambitious objection resonates with the objectivist’s concern with informed
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desire accounts.127 It is difficult to imagine recommending the life of the grasscounter to others because of a nagging sense that the grass-counter does not
fare as well as he could fare. These three objections suggest that the agent
sovereignty thesis is false: our concerns are not all that matters to our well-being.
In some cases, the worth of the object of those concerns also matters.
In effect, Arneson’s objection raises the double bind problem under a
slightly different guise. Moore’s method of isolation can guide our intuitions in this
case.128 Consider two nearly identical states of affairs, each of which the
disillusioned artist equally fails to endorse. The only relevant difference between
the two worlds is that one contains objective goods and the other does not.
Which state of affairs does she have most reason to pursue for her own sake,
and which one do others have most reason to promote for the sake of another?
The intuition that objective goods matter at least to some extent seems correct. It
seems unreasonable to claim that objective goods by themselves fail to count
towards the disillusioned artist’s well-being. One might be tempted to reply that
the disillusioned artist should be indifferent between the two worlds insofar as her
welfare is concerned, but it is difficult to accept this response from the third
person standpoint of someone who cares for her. When I think about which state
of affairs I would promote for my own child, each of which he fails to endorse, I
estimate that I would have most reason to promote for his own sake the state of
affairs that contained objective goods over another that contained none.
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Arneson concludes that endorsement is not necessary for well-being,
which invites the kind of alienation that generates the problem of authority. This
will not do. As I argued in section 3.3, agent-relativity is an essential feature of
welfare value. If there really is no endorsement, then there is no welfare value.
This does not imply that the lives under examination are worthless. In the case of
the disillusioned artist, as in the case of Richard, there are plenty of other kinds
of goods present. Our disillusioned artist is involved in the creation of beauty, and
her activity displays excellence appropriate to the kind of activity in which she
engages. Moreover, it is plausible to suppose that the art she creates is useful to
others, and that the activity in which she engages has a kind of moral value. The
presence of these other kinds of value might explain our hesitation when faced
with a Moorean choice. If I had to choose between two equally unendorsed
states of affairs on behalf of someone for whom I cared, I might promote a
valuable state of affairs over a worthless one. I could take comfort in knowing
that they would at least lead valuable lives, even if they failed to endorse them.
However, an unendorsed state of affairs has no welfare value. This analysis
explains our reaction to the double bind problem without claiming that goods
have value by themselves. It implies that, given two states of affairs, each of
which one equally fails to endorse, it makes sense to promote the state of affairs
that contains independently valuable goods than over another that does not.
What are we to do with the grass-counter? It is difficult to imagine
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others because of a nagging sense
that the grass-counter does not fare as well as he could fare. Our concerns are
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not all that matters to our well-being. In some cases, the worth of the object of
those concerns also matters. We can explain our reaction to the case of the
grass-counter if we accept that a discontinuity in welfare value between what I
call “low fare” and “full fare.” A discontinuity in value is a sharp break between the
welfare contributions of different kinds of welfare goods such that no amount of
one good can ever be more valuable than some finite amount of another good. In
the central case, faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great
contribution that endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true
that endorsement on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less
than the unity. Call the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own
“low fare.” This discontinuity is necessary to deal with the double bind problem
without abandoning the endorsement thesis. On this view, the grass-counter
fares well since we are supposing that he endorses his worthless activity, but he
experiences a relatively low amount of welfare. The discontinuity in welfare value
not only explains why the disillusioned artist fares much better in any state of
affairs she does endorse; it also explains why it is difficult to imagine
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others. However well he fares, he
would fare much better if he endorsed a more worthy state of affairs.
Hence, in standard cases, endorsement is necessary for well-being. In
cases when endorsement is not in the offing, one has most reason to choose for
oneself or for someone for whom one cares the state of affairs with independent
value, though an endorsed state of affairs would still be for the best.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that addressing the problem of authority requires
that we recognize that endorsement is necessary for well-being in central cases.
A descriptively adequate theory of well-being should incorporate the
endorsement thesis: that is, it should grant that, in most cases and under suitable
conditions, the possession of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if
one endorses it. However, it should also grant that objective goods on their own
make at least some welfare contributions.
I formulated a pluralistic model of endorsement according to which one
endorses an object when one favours it. The favouring relation situates the
subject’s orientation toward a state of affairs along an evaluative dimension. We
can say that one endorses an object when one favours it under suitable
conditions; that is, when one is positively oriented towards it in feeling, thought,
and action; one anticipates it enthusiastically and is disposed to pursue it; one is
pleased when it obtains and one is disposed to continue the experience or
maintain the state of affairs; and one has pleasant thoughts about it after it
obtains. I committed to a number of claims.
First, this account of endorsement at a time identifies two relevant
evaluative dimensions, but it is not a conjunctive account of the subjective part of
well-being. Insisting on describing favouring as a single distinctive evaluative
state or a necessary conjunction of such states would be misleading. In some
cases, the obtaining of a single dimension will be sufficient to warrant the claim

107

that a subject favours a state of affairs; in most cases, several conditions will be
jointly sufficient.
Second, the experience requirement, properly understood, commits us to
the view that the welfare value of a state of affairs derives in part from its effect,
actual or possible, on human experience and its quality.
Third, the requirement that favouring occur under suitable conditions
concedes that some favourings are susceptible to procedural mistakes. The
upshot is a descriptively adequate account of endorsement that can capture the
wide range of evaluative states characteristic of different welfare subjects from
the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. A full discussion of the
descriptive adequacy of my considered view must wait for the fifth chapter, where
I defend a hybrid view of well-being according to which one fares well at a time
when one endorses goods worthy of concern.
Finally, I argued that what best explains the agreement that endorsement
matters to well-being is that experiences of endorsement are constituted in part
by a distinctive evaluative attitude that captures the intrinsic importance of such
experiences to one’s well-being. This evaluative attitude is consistent with the
agent-relativity of welfare claims.
I then considered three objections to making welfare value depend on the
subject’s endorsement. The first two objections resist making value conditional
on endorsement or weak endorsement. I argued that we can grant both
objections by restricting the scope of the endorsement thesis and insisting that

108

endorsement occur under suitable conditions. The third objection is a
restatement of the double bind problem. I argued that endorsement is necessary
for welfare in central cases, and that objectively good states of affairs one does
not endorse do not contribute to one’s welfare. The trouble with our intuitions
surrounding tortured artists objections is that it is difficult to tell whether they
capture welfare value or a rival dimension of value. I argued that it still made
sense to hope that the grass-counter would opt to endorse worthy goods. I
suggested that this commits us to a discontinuity in welfare value between low
fare and full fare.
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Chapter 4: Well-Being and Worth
“It is surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say that our
admiring an action either is, or is what necessitates its being good. We think of its
goodness as what we admire in it, and as something it would have even if no one
admired it, something it has in itself.”
~ W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good

4.1 Introduction
We now turn to the problem of worth. The greatest obstacle for
subjectivists is their reluctance to introduce an independent value requirement
that bears on one’s well-being. Critics of subjective theories object that not all the
objects in one’s schedule of concerns are on equal axiological footing. Some
objects have more worth than other objects. In fact, some objects are so
worthless that they seem not to have any welfare value at all, whatever one’s
schedule of concerns. It is difficult to imagine recommending the life of the grasscounter to others because of a nagging feeling that the grass-counter is pursuing
a worthless object. To deal with the problem of worth, we need an account that
explains the sense in which the objects of one’s concerns have value
independently of the fact that they engage one’s active interest, attention, and
care. The account must address the problem of worth without sacrificing fidelity
to generality, and it must accommodate the intuition that endorsement counts
toward well-being to some extent even in the absence of objective goods.
In chapter four, I argue that we can explain the sense in which objects are
independently valuable without rejecting the endorsement thesis, but it requires
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that we abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. That is, in most cases and under
suitable conditions, endorsement is necessary for well-being, but one’s schedule
of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. Other things matter. In
most cases, welfare subjects fare well over time when they endorse objects of
greater worth. An object has independent value if its value is not entirely
determined by one’s actual schedule of concern. One object has greater worth
than another object if it has greater independent value than that object. I argue
that these claims are consistent with the previous chapter’s conclusions. Under
suitable conditions, endorsement remains necessary for well-being in central
cases, worthy goods on their own contribute to well-being at least to some
extent, and one fares better in states of affairs one endorses than in states of
affairs one does not endorse.
I make this case in the following way. In section 4.2, I argue that we
should abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. I analyse the welfare judgments
that we make from the first-person and the third-person standpoint. I argue that
some welfare judgments presuppose that some objects are more worthy of
concern than other objects, and that we have good reason to accept this
characterisation of welfare judgments. Endorsement figures prominently in
welfare judgments, but so do questions concerning the worth of the objects one
endorses.
In section 4.3, I argue that we can explain the sense in which certain
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without denying the
endorsement thesis I defend in chapter three. The skillful pursuit of welfare is an
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expertise that one acquires and develops over time. The endorsements that
subjects make under suitable conditions situate them as epistemic authorities in
a community of knowers who share an interest in faring well. On this view,
judgments of worth are intersubjective ideals that play a crucial role in developing
expertise in the pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare value. By
the practice of welfare, I mean the norms, activities, and institutions that guide
human behaviour in determining what well-being consists in and how best to
achieve it. Specifically, judgments of worth guide welfare subjects toward
authentic standards and reliable sources of well-being. My view is not that appeal
to the community assists us in determining the means to well-being. Rather
appeal to the community assists us in determining the nature of welfare.
Communal norms determine in part what welfare consists in. Faring well over
time consists in endorsing objects worthy in this sense.
In section 4.4, I consider objections to this characterization of worth. First,
I suggest that judgments of worth do not figure to the same extent in all welfare
judgments. The extent to which a particular welfare judgment emphasizes the
worth of the objects in a given schedule of concerns reflects in part the authority
of the welfare subject, which is a function of their expertise in the pursuit of
welfare. This conclusion is consistent with an intuition I discuss in section 4.2,
namely, that judgments of worth arise naturally when one considers what it
makes sense to want for a child for whom one cares. I then argue that judgments
concerning the worth of an object must be defeasible. Some communal ideals
represent the wisdom of the age, others, its prejudice. The soundness of a
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judgment of worth is conditional on the most reliable empirical evidence
concerning the standards and objects that are likely to constitute the well-being
of welfare subjects over time. I grant that the resulting account of worth remains
tied to schedules of concerns at least in an intersubjective sense, but I suggest
that this is an asset rather than a liability of the account.

4.2 Worth
In this section, I analyse the welfare judgments that we make from the
first-person and the third-person standpoint, and I argue that we should reject the
agent sovereignty thesis. One’s schedule of concerns alone does not determine
one’s well-being. Other things matter.
We make welfare judgments from a first-person and a third-person
standpoint.129 From a first-person standpoint, welfare judgments are the
foundation for rational decisions in which only one’s interests are concerned. One
has reason to be concerned with what makes one’s life go well for one’s own
sake: if a state of affairs is good for me, then I have a prima facie reason to want
that state of affairs to obtain.130 First-person welfare judgments are the intuitive
heartland of subjective accounts of well-being, the logical space in which one’s
evaluative perspective has pride of place. Surely, the argument goes, one’s own
schedule of concern is the most relevant consideration when determining what is

See “Value, Desire and the Quality of Life.” The Quality of Life. Edited by Martha Nussbaum
and Amartya Sen. 185-200. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1993; “The Status of
Well-Being.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 1996: 93-143; What We Owe Each Other.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997: chapter 2.
130 On the agent-relativity of welfare judgments, see Section 3.3.
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113

in one’s best interest, or what one has most reason to do for one’s own sake.131
Provided one forms one’s schedule of concerns under suitable conditions, no
other reference group is more authoritative to establish whether one fares well.
When we frame the subjectivity of well-being as a matter of self-ownership in this
way, an independent value requirement readily becomes a paternalistic
infringement on one’s individual sovereignty.132
The plausibility of this subjective account of first-person welfare judgments
relies in part on unassuming examples that analogize reasons to matters of taste.
For example, if one favours ice cream and one prefers strawberry to rocky road,
one will fare better to the extent that others respect one’s favouring of strawberry
ice cream and the state of affairs one prefers obtains. On this view, one’s
endorsements provide agent-relative reasons to pursue a given state of affairs.
Provided one forms one’s endorsement of strawberry ice cream under suitable
conditions, no other consideration is relevant to one’s judgment, no other reason
more authoritative than the mere fact that one endorses it. In such cases, it
makes sense to conclude that one’s endorsement is the sole consideration
relevant to whether one fares well at a time, and that endorsement by itself
contributes to one’s well-being. After all, there are no arbiters of taste.
One can make a case for the claim that the taste model satisfies the
generality criterion for descriptive adequacy. The model seems to capture the full
range of welfare judgments we make, and to fit all core welfare subjects. It tells
us what it is for a person to fare well or poorly at a time and over a period, and for
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a person to gain or lose over time. It captures what it is for sentient entities to
fare well, from the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. However, we
must be careful lest we purchase generality at the expense of fidelity. If the taste
model cannot explain our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, then we have
reason to revise it. As it stands, the taste model gives a lucid account of welfare
judgments involving simple cases. However, there is reason to believe that it fails
to explain cases that are more complex.
Many reasons motivate the endorsements we make, only some of which
are analogous to taste. Barring trivial choices of the kinds of ice cream one
favours, mere endorsement is seldom the sole reason motivating our pursuits.
Suppose there are states of affairs that Derek wants to experience, goals that he
wants to achieve, and relationships that he wants to nurture. He wants to enjoy
espresso on the Canal Grande, he wants to save Venice from the hungry
Mediterranean, he wants others to remember him as the Saviour of Venice, and
he wants to be a successful parent. Beyond these projects, Derek also wants to
be a certain kind of person. He wants to be a diligent colleague, a considerate
friend, and a caring partner. These goods form a more or less unified schedule of
concerns, a loose program that specifies the objects that engage his active
interest, attention, and care.133 He may have developed some goods in detail,
reflected carefully on his motivation for pursuing them, and given loose priority to
them in a way that provides a general structure in which to situate other goods.
He need not have organized this loose program very carefully, however. To
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constitute a schedule of concerns, it is sufficient that these objects engage his
interest, attention, and care.
Now, we may reduce the reason for Derek’s desire to enjoy espresso on
the Canal Grande to mere endorsement without misrepresenting its justification.
If one were to ask him why he wanted to enjoy espresso on the popular Venetian
thoroughfare, he might credibly respond because I want to do it or because I
enjoy it. If one were to press him further, he might describe the experience in
detail, the flavor of espresso, the Venetian vista, the history of the Canal, but his
justification could stand on his endorsement alone. Like my simple endorsement
of strawberry ice cream, Derek’s desire to enjoy espresso on the Canal may be
simply a matter of taste. Moreover, under this description, it makes sense to
conclude that Derek’s endorsement is the sole consideration relevant to whether
he benefits from enjoying his espresso. It is enough that he favours it, that he is
positively oriented towards it in thought, feeling, and action, that he is motivated
to pursue it, that he is pleased when it obtains, and that he has pleasant thoughts
about it once it obtains. If he formed his endorsement under suitable conditions,
then it is sufficient for his well-being.
As one moves to the more complex goods on his schedule of concerns,
the claim that endorsement is the sole justification for his pursuit becomes less
credible. His decision to pursue an important project certainly reveals a
preference for its completion, but endorsement may not be the exclusive or even
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the most important reason for his pursuit.134 The justification of Derek’s desire to
restore Venice hinges not only on his endorsement but also on his judgment that
the end itself is worth endorsing. The precise nature of the judgment Derek
makes certainly needs an explanation. However, our direct experiences of wellbeing seem to warrant the claim that worth plays a role in justifying his interests
in the goods he pursues. One wants to complete a difficult project, to be a
successful parent, a diligent colleague, a considerate friend, and a caring partner
because one believes that these states of affairs matter for reasons other than
the mere fact that one wants them to obtain. Mere endorsement does not
exhaust the justification of our pursuit of these goods. One endorses them
because one believes they are worthy of endorsement.
The attitudes one takes in practice toward practical reasoning are
evidence that such considerations are pervasive in welfare judgments. It would
not be at all strange for Derek to confess that he had reflected carefully about the
worth of his goals before leaving for Venice, revising some, rejecting others, and
adopting new ones. All the while, Derek acted as if there was actually something
to discover beyond what he wanted, some fact about the worth of restoration
work or parenthood that might weigh in their favour against other considerations.
Even in cases in which only his interests are concerned, he worried about which
state of affairs he had most reason to pursue, whether he was in fact making the
right decisions, and whether his endorsement would ultimately be for the best.
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Moreover, while we are imagining a case in which Derek’s endorsement
ultimately tracked the worth of his goals, such convergence was hardly a forgone
conclusion. We can imagine a slightly different case in which Derek concluded
that restoring Venice and becoming a successful parent were indeed worthy and
achievable goals he endorsed, but he found that he had difficulty mustering the
energy to act on his endorsement. Part of the knotty problem Aristotle calls
akrasia or weakness of will stems from not pursuing states of affairs one
endorses as worthy of concern.135 In this case, Derek might settle for a less
worthy goal against his better judgment and regret that he would not fare as well
overall, or he might decide to cultivate his determination to pursue his goals
despite his ambivalence. One might explain away the akratic conflict as a clash
between Derek’s current tastes and his considered tastes. Yet appealing to what
Derek deems worthy of concern captures the intuition that the relevant standard
is not entirely up to him. Under the second description, the akratic Derek believes
restoring Venice and becoming a successful parent and partner are worthy ends,
even if he fails to pursue them.
If my argument for the persistence of worth in first-person welfare
judgments is correct, then the agent sovereignty thesis is false. One’s schedule
of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being.
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My argument is most directly indebted to Adams’ discussion of well-being
as enjoying the excellent.136 Adams proposes a hybrid theory of well-being
according to which one’s well-being depends on the excellence of the states of
affairs one enjoys. He suggests that the fact that we could not enjoy the goods
we do if we thought that valuing them was mistaken commits us to the claim that
our valuation to some extent captures the worth of the object we enjoy. He
writes:
It is important to our good to enjoy things that we think are in some degree
excellent, so if we think we would not be fortunate to be deluded in such
matters, we should think it important to our good to enjoy things that really
are in some degree excellent.137
For Adams, one’s attitude to the objects one values and enjoys is evidence that
one’s valuation extends to the importance or significance of the objects one
enjoys.
It is worth noting that the resulting account of well-being need not have
anti-hedonistic implications. For instance, if we grant (reasonably, I think) that
enjoyment itself is in some degree worthy of concern, enjoying seemingly neutral
or worthless objects will contribute to one’s well-being. I might think that comic
books are nearly worthless objects of concern yet fare well to the extent that I
enjoy them with relish. Denying the welfare value of the enjoyment of so-called
worthless objects implies that the subjective part of well-being on its own does
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not contribute to one’s well-being, which is counter-intuitive. I first discuss this
double bind problem with regard to subjective theories in section 2.3. Subjects
may fare well when independently valuable goods figure on their schedule of
concerns, but why not think endorsements alone count at least to some extent
toward their well-being? Given the choice of two states of affairs in which one
fails to concern oneself with a valuable object, it must be the case that one fares
better in the state of affairs one endorses than the one that one does not.
The view I discuss in the previous paragraph is not Adam’s view, which is
enmeshed in a view of enjoyment that presupposes “a life somewhat structured
by purposes and valuings.”138 For Adams, enjoying the excellent seems to occur
in the context of a rational plan of life. Such views lend themselves best to the
assessment of well-being over a complete life. In contrast, well-being as
endorsing worthy goods, the considered view I defend in chapter five, is an
account of faring well at a time and over a period.
In sum, the justification of Adams’ account of well-being as enjoying the
good parallels those cited in the case of Tom. If Tom would not be fortunate to
find out that he was radically deceived about the conditions of his life, then other
things matter than mental states. Adams’ position takes the argument further,
however: on his view, Tom can also be mistaken about the worth of the objects
that he pursues. Faring well is not only a matter of endorsement; one’s
endorsements must also align with worthy objects or states of affairs.

138

Idem.

120

Other writers have made similar connections between the axiological
assumptions we make in practice and the nature of value. In Meaning in Life and
Why it Matters, Wolf argues that meaningfulness is an essential evaluative
standard for human beings. “Meaning in life arises,” she writes, “when subjective
attraction meets objective attractiveness, and one is able to do something about
it.”139 Her approach to meaningfulness, which she identifies as a dimension of
value distinct from well-being as I define it here, takes seriously the importance
that human beings place in living meaningful lives. Like Adams, she asks which
conditions must be satisfied to vindicate this kind of human striving, and finds
that it is important that we think the things we find appealing are objectively
attractive in some sense. Adams and Wolf share an appetite for transcendental
arguments. They resist purely subjective readings of value by asking what
conditions must be in place for widely held assumptions about human lives to be
true. By their lights, excellence and attractiveness underwrite judgments
concerning enjoyment and meaningfulness respectively, at least in the case of
individuals capable of such judgements. One can argue that a yet unspecified
notion of worth underwrites welfare judgments in the same way.
We might be tempted to argue that dispensing with the notion of worth is
necessary to simplify the measurement and interpersonal comparison of wellbeing. We must proceed carefully, however. While one cannot pursue an account
of the nature of well-being in isolation from concerns about its measurement and
interpersonal comparison, dispensing with worth for the sake of these practical
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matters risks misrepresenting the nature of well-being. Models of well-being that
eschew judgments of worth are not mere proxies that we construct for the sake
of convenience but rival accounts of what faring well consists in.
Specifically, abandoning worth for the sake of convenience risks idealizing
the concept of well-being in a way that permanently removes the possibility that
the properties of the object of one’s concerns constitute part of what faring well
consists in, and no set of assumptions will once again restore a full description of
the concept’s intension.140 Not all idealizations are permanent in this way. If I
want to predict the speed at which a mass will slide down an inclined plane, I
may choose to work from an ideal case that discounts friction for the sake of
convenience. This common idealization is reversible, however. I can later add a
coefficient of friction to the model without compromising its integrity. This is not
the case with purely subjective accounts of well-being. Once we preclude worth
from welfare judgments, we permanently limit the information to which one can
appeal in considering the nature of well-being to formal, procedural
considerations, and abandon the assessment of the worth of the objects of our
concerns. All ends are equally worthy, none intrinsically better than another end.
If subjectivists are to reconcile judgments of worth with the claim that Derek’s
endorsements are necessary for his well-being, they must find a way to capture
worth in subjective terms without misrepresenting the nature of well-being.
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The claim that considerations of worth are prevalent in welfare judgments
becomes even more credible when we shift from a first-person to a third-person
standpoint. Third-person welfare judgments capture what one has most reason to
promote for the sake of another as a benefactor or as an agent. When one
reflects on which gift to select for a friend, or on what it makes sense to want for
the sake of a child, one has reason to be concerned with what will benefit the
interested party for their own sake. The common view is that the first-person
standpoint has pride of place in discussions of well-being: well-being matters to
benefactors and agents because of its importance to the welfare subject.141 Not
everyone is willing to give first-person judgments priority, however. Some writers
have thought that the third-person standpoint is more representative of well-being
than the standpoint of a person striving to promote their own well-being.
Adams’ writings are a case in point. “The question, what would be best for
a given person,” he writes, “is less characteristic of that person’s own point of
view…than of the point of view of someone who loves [them].”142 Likewise, in
Welfare and Rational Care, Darwall suggests that “a person’s good is
constituted, not by what that person values, prefers or wants (or should value),
but by what one (perhaps she) should want insofar as one cares about her.” 143
Darwall takes his view to be a metaethical account of the concept of welfare, but
he suggests that it goes hand in hand with the so-called Aristotelian thesis, a
substantive account of well-being according to which what is best for someone is
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a life of “significant engagement in activities through which one comes into
appreciative rapport with agent-neutral values.”144 Such “valuing activity” is
sensitive to the independent value of the objects of one’s concerns.145 It is
noteworthy that both Adams and Darwall hold that the attitudes and practices
surrounding first-person judgments are less typical of the nature of well-being
than those surrounding appropriate third-person judgments.
The shift away from the first-person standpoint broadens the set of
considerations relevant to well-being in a way that reflects the welfare judgments
we actually make. When one considers what it makes sense to want for
someone for whom one cares, especially in the case of a child, questions
concerning the worth of the objects one has most reason to choose enter quite
naturally into one’s considerations. “Few parents would desire for their children a
lifetime of narcotic highs, or a life of devotion to wealth or power or fame,” writes
Adams, “no matter how much they would be enjoyed.”146 Even if the lover or
caregiver is the person whose well-being is in question, they are less likely to
limit the considerations relevant to welfare judgments to mere endorsement when
reasoning from the third person standpoint. The properties of the states of affairs
one endorses matter.
The broadening of the set of considerations relevant to well-being does
not preclude the possibility that, in many cases, one will want the person one
cares about to get what they most desire, or what they most enjoy. It will depend
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on the object of the enjoyment or desire. Nor does it imply that the relation
between the nature of well-being and the judgments we make from the third
person standpoint is one of straightforward identity. As Feldman suggests, there
is plenty of room for healthy skepticism concerning whether the third-person
standpoint is entirely definitive of well-being. Writes Feldman,
Suppose a religious fanatic looks into his child’s crib… suppose he thinks
the best imaginable life for the child is one in which the child becomes a
martyr for God... [I]t is not clear that he is expressing a hope about what
we would normally think of as the child’s well-being.147
This seems right. Still, I hope to show in what follows that, in contrast to firstperson welfare judgments, the claim that welfare judgments should aim solely to
respect the welfare subject’s schedule of concerns is less plausible in the welfare
judgments we make from the third-person standpoint.
When reflecting on what is in the best interest of their beneficiary or
principal, it is legitimate in all but the most trivial cases for a benefactor or an
agent to consider the worth of the object of one’s concerns. Of course, when one
considers what is best for someone else, one must take into account his or her
settled standards and dispositions, and their considered expectations. One may
select a gift for family and friends with an eye to please them or satisfy their
preferences. Likewise, one may have separate ethical or legal reasons to respect
the preferences of healthy, autonomous adults, or the preferences of those on
whose behalf one is acting as an agent. In most cases, beneficiaries and
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principals will retain a large measure of ownership over their well-being. Yet one
is not always bound to take another’s concerns as definitive of their well-being.
Only rarely is choosing what is best for another simply a matter of determining
what they prefer.
It is worth noting that purely subjective theories of well-being can
accommodate this claim. For instance, when acting on another’s behalf, one
might choose to disregard uninformed or heteronomous preferences, or
disregard an intense but short-lived preference in favour of a slightly weaker but
long-standing preference. The outcome of the subjectivist’s analysis will depend
on the factors at a play in the given case. Still, when advising someone on what
they have most reason to do for their own sake, or when choosing on behalf of
someone for whom one cares, one expects to share and sometimes act on one’s
judgment about what is good for them. Beyond simple cases, one is often
justified in appealing to worth in one’s considerations.
The prevalence of worth in welfare judgments is most stark in third-person
judgments involving the well-being of children. Unlike adult beneficiaries, children
have few settled dispositions, and the choices of caregivers have a large part to
play in settling their future character. This process of education is necessary and
appropriate, for the dispositions they would have in the absence of such
influence would hardly constitute anything that one could equate with their wellbeing. Even sensory hedonists will want to shape the dispositions of the children
in their care to impart to them the capacity to defer gratification, and desires
theorists, the capacity to correct mistaken desires. The caregiver’s tastes may
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play some role in generating a set of options from which to choose, as will the
emerging tastes of the child. However, the criterion guiding one’s judgments in
choosing among options in this context cannot be merely a matter of taste.
Writes Adams:
In thinking about what would be good for a child, we must think about what
interests and habits of choice to encourage and foster in her, and cannot
presuppose a system of preference and volitional tendencies already in
her as defining the good that we intend for her.148
The point is that, barring simple cases, endorsement is unlikely to be the sole
reason for the goods one pursues for the sake of someone else. One has reason
to be concerned with what will benefit the person for whom one cares at a
moment and over a period. What matters is not that one gets what one wants, or
that the child does, but that the child fare well. One might have ethical reasons to
avoid choices that would compromise the child’s capacity to choose for him or
herself in the future, but to the extent that one chooses on their behalf, one
cannot avoid judgments of worth.149 This does not rule out the possibility that
experiencing surplus pleasure and satisfying desires formed under suitable
conditions will constitute an important part of a child’s well-being. Endorsement
still matters. Enjoyment too can be worthy of concern.
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And so the case for worth largely rests on the fidelity criterion for
descriptive adequacy. Accounts of well-being that take into consideration the
worth of the objects of one’s concerns cohere better with some of our preanalytic beliefs about well-being. The taste model gives a lucid account of
welfare judgments involving simple cases; however, it fails to explain the welfare
judgments we make in cases that are more complex. Some of these judgments
presuppose that some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects. If
this argument correct, then the agent sovereignty thesis is false: one's schedule
of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. Still, the conclusion of
the argument is consistent with the claim that the endorsement thesis is true.
Endorsement remains necessary for well-being at a time in central cases, and
well-being remains agent-relative. I have shown in chapter three that it is
possible to defend the endorsement thesis without asserting the agent
sovereignty thesis. That is, we can hold that endorsement is necessary for wellbeing in central cases without committing to the view that schedules of concern
alone determine one’s well-being. Other axiological factors matter too.150
Finally, admitting that schedules of concerns alone do not determine wellbeing violates strong neutrality, but this is not a mark against the account. As
agent sovereignty goes, so goes strong neutrality. Here is how the argument
works. In chapter one, I suggested that strong neutrality disqualifies accounts of
well-being that violate the welfare subject’s evaluative perspective. 151
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On this view, descriptively adequate theories of well-being should be entirely
indifferent to the choices of welfare subjects, since the evaluation of welfare
goods squarely rests on a welfare subject’s concerns. For better or worse, wellbeing is a function of choice. I argued then that strong neutrality is an overly
demanding criterion for descriptive adequacy. Some welfare judgments seem
consistent with the claim that the nature of well-being is not entirely up to the
welfare subject. We cannot rule against these accounts of well-being before we
set out on our inquiry, especially since we do not yet have reason to believe that
the concerns of welfare subjects alone determine the nature of well-being. In this
section, I argued that addressing the problem of the worth requires that we
abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. Since we have good reason to believe
that the evaluation of an object does not squarely rest on schedules of concerns,
we cannot expect descriptively adequate accounts of well-being to be completely
indifferent to the choices of welfare subjects. This gives us another reason to
abandon strong neutrality as a criterion for descriptive adequacy.

4.3 Expertise
In this section, I argue that we can explain the sense in which certain
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without denying the
endorsement thesis. The skillful pursuit of welfare is an expertise that one
acquires and develops over time. The endorsements that subjects make under
suitable conditions situate them as epistemic authorities in a community of
knowers who share an interest in faring well. On this view, judgments of worth
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are not objective. They are intersubjective ideals that play a crucial role in
developing expertise in the pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare
value. Specifically, judgments of worth guide welfare subjects toward authentic
standards and reliable sources of well-being. Faring well over time consists in
endorsing objects worthy in this sense.
The story of well-being tends to describe the practice of welfare in largely
individualistic terms that abstract from the accidental features of welfare subjects
and their context. By the practice of welfare, I mean the norms, activities, and
institutions that guide human behaviour in determining what well-being consists
in and how best to achieve it.152 I argued that one model, which likens the
practice of welfare to taste, is overly simplistic.153 The second model likens the
practice of welfare to perception. On this view, to recognize the welfare value
inherent in a state of affairs is to perceive the good-making properties that would
lead anyone to adopt the state of affairs as a goal. The perception model is
perhaps sharpest in Griffin’s work on well-being. In Value Judgment, for instance,
Griffin stipulates that only desires “formed by appreciation of the nature of [their]
object” count towards one’s well-being, a process that “includes anything
necessary to achieve it.”154 Likewise, Darwall describes his own account of what
is best for humans as a “quasi-perceptual, felt relation between the person and
merit-making values that such activities usually involve.”155 On both the taste and
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the perception models, the practice of welfare is largely a solitary matter, the
purview of self-governing, self-sufficient individuals functioning at the height of
their capacities. The story of well-being that I rehearsed in section 2.1 tends to
characterize well-being in these terms.
On the view I develop in section 3.2, if one endorses an object, then one
favours it, one is positively oriented towards it in thought, feeling, and action, one
is motivated to bring it into being, one is pleased when it obtains, and one has
pleasant thoughts about it once it has obtained.156 Richard spends his days
working at the Smithsonian cleaning and stabilizing works of arts. In the possible
world where Richard endorses his work, he is motivated to start work in the
morning, he is pleased when he is working and finds it difficult to leave work at
the end of the day, perhaps remembering it fondly now and again when he is
away from it. In this first case, my view implies that he is faring well, at least
when he is at work. However, in the possible world where Richard does not
endorse his work, he finds it difficult to start work in the morning, grumbles as he
struggles through his day, and looks forward to stop working as soon as he can
at the end of each day. If he happens to remember his work when he is away
from it, he finds the memory distasteful. In this second case, my view implies that
he is not faring very well. Given two states of affairs he fails to endorse, it may be
for the best if he found himself relating to independently valuable objects.
However, he would fare much better in a possible world he endorsed.157
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Call this view narrow endorsement. The problem of authority arises when
one ignores the bearing of narrow endorsement on well-being. The case of
Richard is tragic because he does not endorse the worthy objects in his life.
Objective theories fail to capture this judgment because they do not count
endorsement as a necessary condition of well-being. In their view, endorsement
is at best one good among others. I argued in section 3.3 that what is needed is
an account of well-being in which schedules of concern operate as a creative
constraint restricting the sort of lives that count as good for Richard. We must
assert the endorsement thesis. Under suitable conditions, narrow endorsement
must be necessary for well-being in central cases. However, if narrow
endorsement were all that there was to the story of well-being, then one could
describe the practice of welfare as a solitary pursuit. Welfare subjects would
need only to exercise the designated faculties under suitable conditions to fare
well. We should not settle for this description of the practice of welfare.
If we model the practice of welfare as a solitary pursuit, we will miss the
social interactions that enable and influence practice. I argue in what follows that
the practice of welfare is not a solitary but a social enterprise, one that relies on
the shared understanding of others for its success. Specifically, welfare subjects
rely on others to develop expertise in recognizing good ways to direct one’s life
and to pursue these successfully. The reader should not take the reference to
good lives to indicate that welfare assessments are limited to complete lives.
Well-being as endorsing the good is an account of faring well at a time and over
a period.
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The practice of welfare relies on communities in various ways. Many
sources of welfare value would not exist in the absence of related social
practices. We could hardly say, for instance, that restoring Venice contributed to
Derek’s well-being in a possible world that did not contain the practices that
produce the related set of human activities. This suggestion amounts to more
than the trivial claim that espresso could not contribute to Derek’s welfare in a
world in which espresso did not exist, though that much is true. The status of
Derek’s ambition to restore Venice depends not only on The Floating City’s
existence, but also on the historical forces that brought it into being and
established its cultural importance. I have in mind the social practices associated
with architecture, art history, conservation, and restoration, and those that
influence the significance that Derek imparts to these activities. In the same way,
the status of the particular relationships that Derek wants to cultivate depend in
part on complex social practices around work, marriage, and friendship, practices
that influence not only which emotions and attitudes toward the other are fitting
but also the actions appropriate to them.158
Most of the ways that Derek relates to states of affairs, and the importance
that he accords to them in his schedule of concerns, depend critically on the
social practices embedded in culture. In this sense, culture is to community what
memory is to the individual. The social practices embedded within it are the tools
and ideas that the community amends, shares, and transmits to its members
because they once promoted their well-being, practices that constitute in part the
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nature of well-being.159 Derek shapes his understanding of welfare value in
concert with these communal tools and ideas, at once borrowing and contributing
to the conceptual resources that are available for thinking about good ways to
direct one’s life, authentic standards of self-assessment to adopt, and reliable
sources of well-being to pursue. Derek wants to do certain things, and to be a
certain kind of person, because he believes and feels that these ends are worthy
of concern. He may not be aware fully of the worth of a given goal or object, and
his understanding may be imperfect, as may be the understanding of others in
the community. Yet, the social practices that underwrite his judgments of worth,
however indeterminate, ground his belief and attitudes toward the objects he
deems worthy of concern, and his choices both contribute to and transform the
practices on which they rely.
Not all of Derek’s orientations to the states of affairs that affect him
depend on communal practices in this way. The sensory pleasure Derek
experiences as he sips his morning espresso on the Canal does not. It is true
that he could not enjoy a morning espresso in a world in which no one knew of
this simple pleasure, or in which the economic and political institutions supporting
the trade of espresso did not exist. It is also true that the judgment that sensory
pleasure is in some measure worthy of concern depends in part on social
practices. That is, the judgment that some amount of pleasure is likely to be a
reliable source of well-being over time depends on what we know about
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pleasure, human psychology, and human lives. However, the experience of
sensory pleasure that Derek has when sipping espresso does not depend on
social practices in the same way.
We can grasp the relevant sense in which welfare judgments rely on
social practices if we reflect on an ambiguity at the heart of the term
“endorsement.” On my view, narrow endorsement is a set of orientations to
states of affairs that affect welfare subjects. However, endorsement also has a
broad sense of confirming, sanctioning, or vouching for a person, an activity, or
an object, in a way that provides an opinion of its nature and value. The
judgments of worth that Derek makes are endorsement in a broad sense.
The friend who asks why Derek wants to have an espresso on the Canal
Grande, save Venice from the waves, or be a successful parent is not asking one
question too many. Rather, he is asking Derek to elaborate on the reasons that
justify his broad endorsement of these goods as worthy of concern. He does so
because he shares his interest in developing and sustaining the kind of expertise
necessary to recognize good ways to direct one’s life, authentic standards of selfassessment to adopt, and reliable sources of well-being to pursue. If one were to
ask Derek why he was pursuing the complex goods on his schedule of concerns,
the response “because I want to pursue them” would ring hollow, as if he had left
something unsaid. When Derek endorses a given end as worthy, he is
acknowledging tacitly his status as an epistemic agent in a community of actors
who share his interest in recognizing good ways to direct their lives. Derek’s
choices are broad endorsements in the sense of being actions that confirm,
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sanction, or vouch for an end as worthy of concern. Granted, one may not always
have reasons for what one does. Derek may not be able to justify why he wants
to be a successful parent or save Venice from the waves. He may even pursue
these goods for no reason or for bad reasons. However, when Derek does justify
his pursuits, he makes at least a tacit appeal to their worth as ends for himself
and for relevant others, one that relies on and contributes to communal practices
surrounding the recognition of good ways to direct one's life and the rest.
Communal norms determine in part the nature of welfare.
Derek is not required to answer his friend’s questions, of course; he may
insist on presenting his preferences as an end of the reason-giving process.
However, the legitimacy of even this final appeal relies on a tacit judgment that
preference satisfaction itself is an end worthy of concern, one likely to promote
one’s well-being over time. In individualistic cultures that advocate the primacy of
individual experience, for instance, internal psychological attributes are prevalent
as a basis of life satisfaction judgments. This is not the case in all cultures. Life
satisfaction judgments in collectivistic cultures that view individuals as
fundamentally interdependent and socially related are more likely to emphasize
external social cues, norms, and expectations.160 “Because I want to pursue
them” is a reasonable justification for one’s pursuits only if preference satisfaction
is itself worthy of concern, and the force of the justification changes from one
community to the next.
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Broad endorsements highlight the interdependence of welfare subjects as
epistemic agents concerned with developing expertise in choosing their goals,
and recognizing good ways to direct their lives. Inquiry into what constitutes a
worthy object is a collaborative project, one whose outcome rides largely on
one’s unavoidable reliance on the expertise and testimony of others.161
Specifically, welfare subjects rely on the testimony of others to develop expertise
in recognizing good ways to direct one’s life and to pursue them successfully.
This interdependence requires that theories of well-being account for the
dynamic relation between the welfare subject, the objects they pursue, and those
who share their epistemic labor. As Rawls concedes, welfare subjects appreciate
this capacity to stand apart from specific welfare judgments and question
whether the ends they pursue are really worth pursuing:
…citizens recognize one another as having the moral power to have a
conception of the good. This means that they do not view themselves as
inevitably tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good…they
espouse at any given time. Instead…they are...capable of revising and
changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds.162
Modelling judgments of worth as broad endorsements joins the nature of wellbeing to a relational account of the welfare subject. Welfare subjects emerge as
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individuals in communities who rely on others to develop the necessary
intellectual and affective capacities to recognize good ways to direct their lives.
Their axiological capacities honed, welfare subjects continue to rely on the
testimony of others to exercise them. They take a step back and question their
beliefs and dispositions in light of the information, experiences, and arguments
that others provide, and contribute their own considered judgments to the mix.
On this view, judgments of worth are intersubjective ideals that play a
crucial role in determining the nature of welfare, developing expertise in the
pursuit of welfare, and enabling its practice. Much like J.S. Mill’s competent
judges, welfare subjects who receive the right education and experiences
develop expertise in the skillful pursuit of welfare. They learn that there are better
or worse ways to live one’s life, more or less authentic standards of selfassessment to adopt, and more or less reliable sources of well-being over time.
Eventually, they become epistemic authorities in their own right, welfare subjects
whose judgments of worth contribute to their community’s knowledge about good
ways to direct human lives.163 Unlike Mill’s judges, however, epistemic authorities
make judgments of worth that guide others to authentic standards and reliable
sources of well-being rather than higher pleasures. This process is part of the
division of epistemic labor essential to the smooth functioning of complex
axiological communities. Welfare subjects cannot develop expertise in the pursuit
of welfare in isolation, nor can they acquire all the specialized knowledge they
need in order to avoid relying on someone else’s testimony as they reflect on the
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best course of action to pursue. It follows that welfare subjects who endorse
objects worthy of concern in this sense fare better over time than those who do
not.
In keeping with the distinction I introduce in section 2.1, the defining
feature of subjective theories is that they make well-being depend on the
subject’s concerns, whereas objective theories exclude all reference to attitudes
and concerns. The conception of worth I develop is intersubjective rather than
objective; that is, it is not entirely divorced from schedules of concerns.164 The
view is open to the objection that social forces might warp or corrupt worth such
that it no longer truly reflects what matters. I address this objection below. Still,
on this view, faring well over time is a function of communal ideals that track
authentic standards of self-assessment and reliable sources of well-being. Wellbeing remains a function of schedules of concerns, at least in an intersubjective
sense. Moreover, the account blurs the line between the nature of well-being and
the sources of well-being. This is not surprising given the hybrid nature of the
account. Subjective theories hold that well-being is a feature of one’s response to
the objects in one’s life; objective theories, a feature of one’s relation to
independently valuable objects. As a hybrid account, well-being as endorsing
worthy goods integrates features of the subject and the object into a single
account. The best empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that
are likely to ensure the well-being of the welfare subjects in a given community is
what singles out the relevant objects for consideration.
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The concession that worth is intersubjective rather than objective does not
undermine its significance as a solution to the problem of worth and the problem
of authority.165 Endorsement remains necessary for well-being in central cases:
Derek fares well at a time to the extent that he endorses the objects in his life.
The view does deny the agent sovereignty thesis: Derek’s schedule of concerns
alone does not entirely determine the nature of his well-being. Moreover, not all
objects are axiologically neutral: some objects remain more worthy of pursuit
than other objects, and Derek fares well over a period to the extent that he
endorses objects worthy of concern. What is critical to Derek’s well-being is that
he exercises expertise in choosing his goals and in recognizing good ways to
direct his life, an expertise he develops in community, one that ultimately
contributes to the axiological resources from which he benefits.
Well-being as endorsing worthy goods supplies what was missing from the
subjectivist’s assessment, namely, an appraisal of the object Derek endorses.
Return to the grass-counter example. Given what we know about human
psychology, Derek is unlikely to remain positively oriented over time toward grass
counting, and he would likely come to regret his decision to join John who is busy
at work on the university lawn. Grass counting, we can suppose, is generally not
a reliable source of well-being. If Derek abandoned the other items on his
schedule of concerns for grass counting, his friends would have good reason to
attempt to dissuade him. This judgment is conditional on the most reliable
empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that are likely to ensure
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the well-being of welfare subjects over time. That is not to say that this view is
about the means rather than the nature of welfare. Rather, the nature of wellbeing depends in part on facts about the conditions under which human beings
thrive. This condition is meant to address concerns about social forces that might
undermine the external norms that the concept of worth is meant to capture.
In sum, Derek’s narrow endorsement is necessary for well-being. His
orientation to the states of affairs that affect him places a creative constraint
restricting what counts as good for him at a time. However, it is not entirely up to
his schedule of concern which goods are worthy of his concern. Which goods are
likely to comprise reliable sources of well-being and sustain authentic standards
of self-assessment depends in part on the community. This part of well-being
depends on communal ideals, collective judgments conditional on the most
reliable empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that are likely to
ensure the well-being of welfare subjects over time. To paraphrase the chapter’s
epigraph, we can imagine that Derek thinks of worth as what he admires in his
pursuits, something his pursuits would have even if he did not admire them,
something they have in themselves. Unlike the narrow endorsements Derek
formed under suitable conditions, his broad endorsements can be mistaken. This
explains why he seeks evidence for his opinions about the best course to pursue;
why he acts as if there is something to discover; why he acts as if there is a fact
of the matter about what well-being consists in; and how we might talk of Derek
knowing the better course even while he pursues the worse. However, worth in
this sense is not generally something his pursuits would have if no one admired
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them. This part of well-being is not objective in this sense. Rather, well-being as
endorsing worthy goods is an intersubjective account of what faring well consists
in.

4.4 Objections
One might challenge the descriptive adequacy of the resulting account of
well-being. First, perhaps we can grant that welfare judgments involving children
presuppose that some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects.
After all, children are presumably in greater need of normative guidance, and it is
fitting that someone who cares for them safeguard their well-being. However,
what reason do we have to accept that the model extends to adults? We must
take care lest well-being as endorsing worthy goods sacrifice fidelity for
generality in the same way as other accounts of well-being seemingly do.
Second, one might worry that the resulting account of well-being violates the
weak neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy. That is, one might worry that it
advances unfounded critiques of a welfare subject’s concerns. What happens to
welfare subjects immersed in racist or sexist societies? If well-being as endorsing
worthy goods assigns lexical priority to intersubjective ideals embedded in the
community, then so much the worse for the account. The objections identify
legitimate concerns; however, I believe the response below highlights the
strengths of the account.
First, we can grant that judgments of worth do not fulfil the same function
in all welfare judgments. The extent to which one relies on worth in assessing
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one’s well-being in part reflects the epistemic authority of the welfare subject.
Epistemic authority represents one’s skill in the pursuit of welfare, one’s expertise
in choosing one’s goals and recognizing good ways to direct one’s life.
Schedules of concerns are more likely to promote one’s well-being over time if
the goods one pursues are worthy of concern, that is, if they reflect the most
reliable empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that are likely to
ensure the well-being of welfare subjects over time. Questions of worth arise
naturally when one considers what it makes sense to want for children for whom
one cares because one cannot presuppose that their schedule of concerns is
likely to ensure their well-being over time. Worthy goods help welfare subjects
develop epistemic authority in the pursuit of well-being, that is, the expertise to
recognize good ways to organize their lives. This process of education is
necessary and appropriate, since the dispositions of subjects do not always track
their well-being over time.
The function of judgments of worth changes when subjects attain some
measure of epistemic authority. In normal circumstances, most adults have a
sufficient measure of epistemic authority, which explains in part the reluctance to
interfere with the schedule of concerns of others. His capacities honed, Derek
continues to draw on the epistemic resources embedded in the community, but
his relationship to them changes. He continues to use them to shape his
schedule of concerns toward authentic standards of self-assessment and reliable
sources of well-being. However, he now shapes his understanding of welfare
value in concert with his community, at once borrowing and contributing to the
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conceptual resources that are available for thinking about good ways to direct his
life. He remains open to persuasion, of course. Unless there is reason to believe
that his epistemic authority has been undermined, however, it is perhaps best to
leave well enough alone.
Next, anxieties concerning weak neutrality misconstrue the social
dimensions of welfare judgments. Characterising welfare value as broad
endorsements does not assume a right answer about every question concerning
welfare value, nor does it assume that community ideals are infallible. The worry
seems to assume that broad endorsements accumulate in communal networks,
determined and infallible, like entries in a navigation table guiding welfare
subjects as they set sail for worthy shores. Certainly, communal ideals will often
be determined enough to establish reliably that some goods are more worthy of
concern than other goods, and these ideals may conflict with the schedule of
concerns of some welfare subjects. However, broad endorsement enables rather
than jeopardises the autonomy and the authority of welfare subject.
Communal interactions not only generate and reinforce common values,
but they challenge them as well, revising old judgments of worth and extending
them to new circumstances. In giving substantive reasons for his choices, Derek
asserts his epistemic authority to recommend an object as worthy of concern to
others in similar circumstances, and to participate in this process of review and
reconsideration. The reason-giving process not only enables his participation in
established social practices, but also challenges them, and in time, creates new
ones. Ultimately, judgments of worth are defeasible. Some will capture the
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wisdom of the age, others, its prejudice. The soundness of a particular judgment
of worth is conditional on the most reliable empirical evidence concerning the
standards and objects that are likely to constitute the well-being of welfare
subjects.166

4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that we could explain the sense in which some
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without rejecting the
endorsement thesis. First, I argued that some welfare judgments presuppose that
some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects, and that we have
good reason to accept this characterisation of welfare judgments. Endorsement
figures prominently in welfare judgments, but so do questions concerning the
worth of the objects one endorses. Next, I argued that what grounds judgments
of worth are intersubjective ideals about faring well over time. The skillful pursuit
of welfare is an expertise that one acquires and develops over time. The broad
endorsements subjects make under suitable conditions situate them as epistemic
authorities in a community of knowers who share an interest in faring well. On
this view, judgments of worth play a crucial role in developing expertise in the
pursuit of welfare and enabling its practice. Specifically, judgments of worth guide
welfare subjects toward authentic standards and reliable sources of well-being.
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This is a view about the nature of well-being and not merely the means to attain
it.
Hence, in most cases, welfare subjects fare well over time when they
endorse worthy objects. This claim is consistent with the previous chapter’s
conclusions. The endorsement thesis is true; the agent sovereignty thesis, false.
Under suitable conditions and in central cases, endorsement remains necessary
for well-being, and a person’s evaluative perspective alone does not determine
what is good for that person. Finally, we fare better if we endorse the states of
affairs we experience.
If the grass-counter invited me to join him on the lawn of the local
university, then, I would politely decline, except out of curiosity, perhaps, and I
would try to discover the reasons that motivated my friend’s unusual life project.
Finding none, I suppose, I would try to empower him to discover worthier pursuits
towards which to direct his considerable talents. However well Derek would fare
counting grass with John, he would likely fare better if he endorsed a worthier
object.
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Chapter 5: Endorsing Worthy Goods
5.1 Introduction
My considered view is that we can address the problem of authority and
the problem of worth by defending an eirenic view of well-being according to
which one fares well at a time and over a period when one endorses goods
worthy of concern. This is a hybrid theory of well-being. It provides an account of
well-being at a time that strives to bridge the gap between objective and
subjective theories.
The second section of the chapter examines the most important current
hybrid theories of well-being. I argue that the three theories examined are not
theories of well-being at a time. Two are theories about what it is to fare best or
what it is to live a successful life, and a third is a theory about the structure of the
greatest source of well-being. Moreover, either the theories imply the contentious
claim that endorsement and worth have no welfare value on their own, or they
provide little guidance on how to deal with the difficult cases that arise from the
problem of authority and the problem of worth.
The third section draws on the analysis of previous chapters to summarize
an alternate hybrid account of well-being at a time. I describe faring well at a time
as endorsing worthy goods. Endorsement and objective value each count toward
well-being on their own at least to some extent. However, one generally fares
well over time if one endorses worthy goods. I then show that the account can
deal with the problem of authority and the problem of worth without
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compromising its descriptive adequacy. I close the chapter by discussing some
puzzles that the account leaves unresolved.

5.2 Three Hybrid Theories
Others have provided hybrid theories of well-being. Parfit’s account is
perhaps the most familiar. He relates well-being to both subjective endorsement
and objective “facts about [the] value” of the states of affairs one endorses. What
is good for someone is “to have knowledge, to be engaged in rational activity, to
experience mutual love, and to be aware of beauty, while strongly wanting just
these things.” 167 According to this view, both endorsements and objective goods
are necessary but not sufficient for well-being. This conjunctive account entails
that subjective endorsements and objective goods on their own are prudentially
worthless. Suppose that reading poetry is objectively valuable; and reading
doggerel, worthless. A person who gets no satisfaction from reading poetry does
not benefit from the activity, nor does a person who prefers to read doggerel.
Parfit’s hybrid account generates a solution to the problem of authority and
the problem of worth. Since wanting objective goods is necessary for well-being,
it is not possible to fare well and fail to endorse the conditions of one’s life. One
cannot become alienated from one’s well-being. Likewise, one’s schedule of
concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. The objective value of the
objects one endorses matters to one’s well-being. However, as I mentioned, the
claim that one part of well-being has no welfare value without the other is difficult
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to accept168 This is the double bind problem. Unendorsed objective goods might
not count for much, but why not think they count for a bit? Meanwhile, subjects
may fare well when they endorse objective goods, but why not think their
concerns alone counts on their own at least to some extent? Surely, I must
benefit at least a bit from the reading of doggerel I strongly prefer despite its low
objective value, and from the reading of more sophisticated poetry despite my
aversion to it.
One might concede that each part of well-being has a bit of value, but that
I would fare better if I preferred objectively valuable goods. On this moderate
view, I benefit at least to some extent from my unappreciated encounter with
poetry and my misguided endorsement of doggerel, but I would have been better
off had I preferred Robert Frost over Ogden Nash. Endorsement and objective
value on their own count toward my well-being to some extent, but I would fare
better if I endorsed goods of greater objective value. Parfit’s account precludes
this moderate view, however.
The trouble is that the account constructs welfare value exclusively in
intentional terms. That is, the only states of affairs that have welfare value are
wholes in which one endorses an objectively good object. The account produces
a reasonable explanation in the case of Richard, the depressed artist whose
tragic life illustrates the problem of authority. Richard relates suitably to
objectively valuable objects, remember, but fails to enjoy these goods. The
trouble with Richard is that without making his endorsement a necessary
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condition of his well-being, his schedule of concerns does not yet restrict the sort
of lives that count as good for him. Parfit’s account suggests that Richard fares
well only if he takes pleasure or satisfaction in the objective goods in his life. We
do not do away with the tragic conditions of his life by plugging him into a
pleasure machine for an hour at the end of each day. This seems right. However,
Parfit’s insistence on the intentional structure of well-being deprives its
constitutive parts of any welfare value. Endorsement and objective goodness do
not matter on their own. This unhappy conclusion would deny the welfare value
of the unsophisticated toddler’s simple pleasures, and the welfare value of
Richard’s unendorsed but objectively valuable work.
We can rescue Parfit from the unhappy conclusion if we shift the
evaluative focal point of his account from moments to lives, and narrow its scope
from what is good for a person to what makes a life go best. Parfit’s account
vacillates between these two accounts of well-being; however, his endorsement
of global theories of well-being suggests that he means his hybrid theory to be an
account of the latter.169 Global theories hold that what matters to one’s well-being
are the desires one has about some part of one’s life considered as a whole, or
about one’s whole life.170 Conversely, local theories hold that what matters to
one’s well-being is the greatest total net sum of subjective fulfilment. As Parfit
well knows, local theories are vulnerable to an analogue of the Repugnant
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Conclusion.171 On local theories, an indefinitely long life that is barely worth living
would trump a short life of an extremely high quality since it would produce the
greatest total sum of subjective fulfilment. Parfit believes, rightly, I think, that
most people would choose a short life of high quality over an indefinitely long life
that is barely worth living. Since global theories imply that the short life would be
better, Parfit believes that global theories are more plausible. Global theories
also produce intuitive results in the case of addiction. Even if addiction to a
particular substance would have no harmful side effects and I provided you with
a ready supply, I do not make your life better by making you an addict, though I
do increase the sum-total of your desire satisfaction.172 Once again, Parfit
believes that most people would not welcome this kind of addiction. Endorsing
global theories commits Parfit to abandoning the notion that the welfare value of
a life is entirely determined by the welfare value of the moments contained in that
life. The global features of a life are what matters.
The concession has important implications. A descriptively adequate
theory of well-being should account for how the contributions of particular welfare
goods combine to determine one’s overall level of well-being at a time, over a
period, and over one’s life. Abandoning this requirement limits the account’s
ability to reconcile the various evaluative focal points we take when making
judgments about what is good for someone. We are not exactly limited to making
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rough comparisons between lives; we can still assess whether someone fares
well over a period as a whole. However, we have little guidance on how to
assess welfare at a time, or how to reconcile periods and lives. Surely, a theory
of well-being can do better.
Narrowing the scope of Parfit’s account to what makes a complete life go
best weakens the strength of this objection. If the intended explanadum is the set
of conditions that constitute an optimum human life as a whole, then it is less
important that his account capture the instant welfare contributions of the
toddler’s simple pleasures. One could make the case that, however good simple
pleasures are at a time for those who experience them, wanting objective goods
is what makes a complete life go best. Perhaps the global welfare contributions
of a lifetime spent wanting and pursuing objectively valuable objects are so great
that they dwarf the relative welfare contributions of simple pleasure. In this way,
Parfit can resist both the unhappy and the Repugnant Conclusion. However, the
victory comes at the cost of abandoning a description of faring well simpliciter.
Finally, the account is susceptible to an objection from weak neutrality.
The weak neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy requires that judgments of
worth be justified and impartial.173 The intent of weak neutrality is to guard
against poorly justified and biased accounts of well-being that support
unwarranted intrusions in the schedule of concerns of welfare subjects, and
impose, dogmatically, a standard discount rate on subjective reports of wellbeing. Parfit is coy about describing the ground of objective value, content to

173

I first discuss weak neutrality in section 1.3, 21.

152

suggest how the subjective and the objective parts of well-being might interact in
a single account. Without a more substantial description of facts about value,
however, the account is reasonably open to doubt. A functioning hybrid account
must not only enable judgments of worth but also safeguard schedules of
concerns from unwarranted intrusions.
In Welfare and Rational Care, Darwall develops a hybrid account of wellbeing that goes further in describing what facts about value might consist in. On
this account, the concept of welfare consists in what one should want for that
person insofar as one cares for them. Darwall suggests that the nature of welfare
that best defines the intension of this concept is the so-called Aristotelian thesis,
according to which what is best for someone is a life of “significant engagement
in activities through which one comes into appreciative rapport with agent-neutral
values.”174 Such “valuing activity” is “the most important source of welfare,” and a
life of such activity, “the most beneficial human life.”175
Valuing activity involves two agent-neutral values distinct from welfare
value. Merit is a kind of value that persons and actions have in virtue of relating
to objects that are intrinsically worthy of esteem, emulation, admiration, and
praise. Hence, it bears an essential connection to distinctive evaluative attitudes,
such as respecting, appreciating, promoting, honoring, or cherishing. We can
grasp the evaluative dimension of merit if we contrast it with other states of
affairs we deem intrinsically valuable. Most pluralistic accounts of welfare would
count the pleasure one gets from a warm shower on a cold morning and the
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pleasure one gets from a creative undertaking as intrinsically valuable. However,
the pleasure one gets from writing a play has a kind of value that the pleasure of
a warm shower lacks. Only the former is intrinsically estimable, an enviable
status it derives from its relation to a more fundamental value, namely, the value
of worth. Darwall’s conception of worth involves a kind of significance or
importance that something has in virtue of being valued, for example, as an
appropriate object of care, a characteristic shared by persons, music, and merit,
among other things.
The upshot of Darwall’s account is an axiology that identifies two kinds of
intrinsically valuable objects: a basic class of worthy objects; and a second class
of meritorious persons or actions properly oriented to or guided by the first.176
Unlike welfare value, which Darwall ties to the perspective of someone who
cares for the person, merit and worth correspond to no particular perspective.
These are agent-neutral values. Insofar as they are normative for distinctive
evaluative attitudes, they are normative for such attitudes from anyone’s
perspective.177 Much like the goods of objectivists, merit and worth are valuable
regardless of one’s concerns.178 Thus, merit and worth enjoy the special status of
common values. Since they correspond to no particular perspective, communities
can share the recognition and appreciation of these values. For example,
parenting has merit because it responds appropriately to the worth of children.

Darwall’s account of welfare is structurally similar to Hurka’s recursive theory of virtue, which
starts with a base-clause affirming a set of intrinsic goods, then adds a recursion-clause about the
intrinsic goodness of a certain attitude to what is good. See Hurka, Vice, Virtue and Value.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, chapter 1.
177 Darwall (2006): 98.
178 Section 2.2, page 34.
176
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Since merit also has worth, parents whose actions appropriately respond to the
importance of their children as worthy of care also have worth as such, as do
those who appreciate the merit of good parenting. In this way, the appreciation of
merit and worth tends to create “coherent structures of mutually supporting
prudential values.”179
Like Parfit, Darwall suggests that the most important sources of well-being
have an intentional structure, though his account is more complex. Valuing
activity involves a preference for worthy activities, an appropriate evaluative
response to their worth, and a correct belief about their worth.180 Hence, the
account generates a Parfit-style solution to the problem of authority and the
problem of worth. Since valuing activity includes a robust endorsement of worthy
states of affairs, it is not possible for one to live the best kind of life yet fail to
endorse the conditions of one’s life. Likewise, one’s schedule of concerns alone
does not determine one’s well-being. The worth of the states of affairs one
endorses matters. However, valuing activity does not deny the intrinsic welfare
value of less intricate states of affairs. Strictly speaking, only the most important
sources of welfare have a hybrid structure. Neither endorsement nor worth are
necessary for well-being simpliciter.
The qualification allows Darwall to reach for the more moderate view that
Parfit’s account precludes. Darwall can deal with the double bind problem. One
can benefit if one never endorses the goods in one’s life, if one endorses
unworthy goods, or if one’s endorsement falls short of the robust intellectual and
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emotional conditions that characterise valuing activity. Happy toddlers benefit
from simple pleasures; Tom, from illusory satisfaction; Richard, from the
unappreciated yet worthy goods in his life; and I, from my passion for doggerel.
The concessions are consistent with the claim that welfare subjects fare best
when they endorse more worthy states of affairs. The most important benefits are
organic unities consisting of worthy activities and an appreciation of their relation
to worth, “a quasi-perceptual, felt relation between the person and the meritmaking values that such activities involve.”181
Unfortunately, the qualification also limits the account’s capacity to
address controversial cases involving merely faring well at a time. For instance,
the claim that illusory satisfaction has welfare value is consistent with the
assertion of the endorsement and agent sovereignty theses; the claim that one
benefits from unappreciated worthy activities, with their denial. Once again,
narrowing the account’s intended explanandum from faring well to faring best
diminishes the force of this objection. Darwall’s account is perhaps best
understood as an account of what constitutes the most important sources of wellbeing, a concession that limits its descriptive adequacy as an account of faring
well at a time. Moreover, the account fits some welfare subjects better than
others. Darwall presupposes a welfare subject clever enough to produce the
complex epistemic and evaluative states necessary for well-being, which limits
the generality of his account. We should strive to describe the relation between
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endorsed experience, worth, and well-being in a framework that captures their
relative importance at a time without limiting descriptive adequacy.
Finally, Darwall’s account is susceptible to an objection from weak
neutrality. Its merits notwithstanding, valuing activity takes the existence of worth
as given, and makes no attempt to ferret out its ground. We know that worth is a
kind of importance something has in virtue of being deemed intrinsically
significant, but we know little about who does the deeming, or how one should
address conflicts between one deeming and another. The omission impedes an
assessment of whether judgments of worth are warranted, or merely dogmatic
intrusions on schedules of concerns.
Dworkin’s model of challenge is more explicit about the communal ground
of the objective part of well-being. On this account, faring well consists in leading
a successful life, which exhibits the right mix of volitional and critical interests.
Volitional interests capture what one wants to do; critical interests, what one
should do in order to have the right kind of life.182 For Dworkin, the two parts of
well-being are axiomatic, and they intersect in various ways. Some measure of
success in what one happens to want very much is critically important, and what
one wants tends to track what one thinks reflects one’s critical interests. Acting
on present interest or desires does not always conflict with acting on one’s critical
interests, but the two can also conflict. In such cases, there is no higher standard
to decide between them. When the akratic is tempted to act against his critical
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interests, we can appeal to no higher-order concept to adjudicate between what
he wants to do and what he thinks he should do in order to have a successful life.
The model of challenge considers one’s life successful only if one’s performance
is skillful, that is, only if it displays the features characteristic of meeting the
challenge of living well under the circumstances. “Living a life is itself a
performance that demands skill,” Dworkin writes; “it is the most comprehensive
and important challenge we face, and…our critical interests consist in the
achievements, events, and experiences that mean that we have met the
challenge well.”183
No simple algorithm exists to determine the contribution of a given
performance to the success of a life, or the conditions for a performance’s
successful realisation, though culture will carry some of the discriminations
necessary to make the relevant distinctions. Relevant circumstances include
one’s health, physical power, length of life, material resources, friendships and
associations, commitments, family and communal traditions, the social, and the
legal and cultural system in which one lives.184 Circumstances both shape and
constrain what counts as a successful life in a particular case.
Though the model is relatively indeterminate, it allows for subtle
judgments in assessing the success of a life. For instance, the contribution of a
particular invention to a life’s success might include its degree of technical
difficulty, its originality, the degree to which it taxed the abilities of the inventor,
the intensity of her dedication, or the way in which the work connected to a
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particular community or tradition.185 In assessing a given performance, cultural
norms do not necessarily take lexical priority over individual schedules of
concerns. The considerations that go into the assessment of a life are indexed to
culture in some way, but they are open to revision. Pursuing one’s concerns in
the face of opposing cultural norms can generate an especially apt life
performance, one that changes the prevailing views of what constitutes a
successful life. Just as we expect artists to expand what the tradition counts as a
skillful performance, so too can we expect that some people’s lives will challenge
what a community counts as a successful life.
The upshot is a metaphysically modest account of the conditions that
govern more substantive judgments about the success of a life. The model of
challenge is not obviously partial to one form of life. Much like the worth condition
I describe in the fourth chapter, the parameters of a skillful performance are
intersubjective and dynamic: a particular performance can revise the rules that
govern what a successful performance consists in much an artist’s work can
change the parameters of artistic merit.186 Meanwhile, Dworkin insists that the
model need not have elitist or paternalistic implications – as if living well were
only possible for great souls – nor need it reduce prudential value to aesthetic
value. It takes seriously the idea that one should make of one’s life an original
work of art without assuming that less original lives must be less successful
ones.187
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Dworkin’s model generates a solution to the problem of authority. Its
support for the endorsement thesis is explicit: a good cannot make one’s life
better against one’s belief or feeling that it does not. This claim follows from the
analogy between living and performing. “Intention is part of performance,” writes
Dworkin, ”we do not give credit to a performer for some feature of his
performance that he was struggling to avoid, or would not recognize, even in
retrospect, as good or desirable.”188 Endorsement might take place
counterfactually or in hindsight, but it is necessary for one to fare well. It follows
that one cannot become alienated from one’s well-being.
Likewise, the model generates a solution to the problem of worth. One’s
schedule of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being; the source of
one’s well-being also matters. One might be mistaken in believing or feeling
one’s life is a good one, because either one mistakenly counts something as
good, or one fails to recognize and respond to contextual features that, if
recognized, would have made one’s life better. What matters is that one achieves
ethical integrity, that one lives out of the conviction that the central features of
one’s life are appropriate to one’s circumstances, that no other life one might live
would be a better response to those circumstances rightly judged.189
The performance analogy central to Dworkin’s model is at once an asset
and a liability. First, the analogy subtly shifts the evaluative focal point of welfare
assessments from moments to complete lives. As in previous hybrid accounts of
well-being, the greatest welfare comes from states of affairs in which the
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subjective coincides with the objective over time, that is, a life in which one’s
volitional interests coincide with one’s critical interests. This strengthens its
merits as an account of what the best kind of life consists in, but it limits its
descriptive adequacy as an account of faring well at a time. One wants to assess
the lives of existential heroes, who make the most of their circumstances and
secure achievements that meet and revise the standards by which one takes the
measure of a life. Yet one wants also to assess whether these heroes fared well
at a time, and determine the relation between their well-being at a time and over
a period. The account is less well suited for this second task.190
Moreover, like Darwall’s account of welfare as rational care, Dworkin’s
account of welfare as a successful performance is susceptible to the objection
that it fits some welfare subjects better than others. There is an implicit demand
that one shape, contour, and in some sense control one’s life according to some
plan or blueprint that makes the most of one’s circumstances. This limits the
account’s descriptive adequacy. A toddler snuggled under a warm blanket fares
well at a time despite the fact that the state of affairs does not figure in a rational
life plan. If we are to capture welfare judgments involving a variety of subjects,
we will need to escape from the tyranny of the well-planned life.
Next, the analogy allows Dworkin to reach for only a part of the moderate
view, according to which each part of well-being counts at least a bit without the
other. The double bind problem strikes again. Volitional interests matter to one’s
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well-being to some extent, but unendorsed critical interests do not. That is, some
measure of success in getting what one wants matters, but a successful
performance whose features one does not endorse does not matter. It follows
that the happy toddler’s simple pleasures make at least some contribution to his
well-being, but Richard’s unusually reluctant performance does not. Once again,
narrowing the account’s explanandum from faring well to faring best diminishes
the force of these objections. We can take seriously the suggestion that a
successful life is one in which no other life one might live would be a better
response to one’s circumstances rightly judged, but only at the cost of the
model’s descriptive adequacy as an account of faring well at a time.

5.3 Endorsing Worthy Goods
One way to understand where previous hybrid theories diverge from the
one I describe is to appeal to the formality criterion for descriptive adequacy. In
section 1.3, I argue with Sumner that a theory of well-being should meet a
formality criterion. That is, it should complete the following formula:
where S is the welfare subject and x is the object affording harm or
benefit, an account of well-being W must explain the property that makes
x good or bad for S at a time or interval t, and how the particular
contributions of a given object determines the overall level of well-being of
S over time.191
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Extant hybrid theories of well-being define a different relation. Parfit’s account
describes what it is to fare best over a life; Dworkin, what it is to lead a
successful life; Darwall’s, the property that makes x best for S at a time or
interval t. The first two are global relations that describe a view of the highest
well-being over a more or less complete life. The third is a description of the
structure of most important source of well-being. The accounts are important in
their own right, but their descriptive adequacy as accounts of well-being sans
phrase is limited.
Moreover, the welfare subject each account envisions limits its descriptive
adequacy. This difficulty is most noticeable in Dworkin. Welfare as skillful
performance applies best to adults with highly developed affective and cognitive
capacities and the inclination to shape the contours of their experience into a
well-planned life. Not all welfare subjects have these capacities or this inclination,
yet we can speak meaningfully of their welfare. A toddler snuggled safely under a
warm blanket is faring well at a time despite the fact that her affective and
cognitive capacities are relatively undeveloped and the shape of her life largely
undetermined. Finally, the record of each account on the problem of authority,
the problem of worth, and the double bind problem is mixed.
How well does well-being as endorsing worthy goods meet the analytic
criteria outlined in the first two chapters? Well-being as endorsing worthy goods
is not a view of the highest well-being, that is, it is not an account of what makes
a life go best. It is not an account of what counts as a successful life. It is an
account of what faring well-consists in at a time. This formulation meets the
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formality criterion for descriptive adequacy. It holds that x benefits S at t if x
stands in relation W to S at t, where W meets the following two conditions:
(1) S endorses x under suitable conditions, and
(2) x is worthy of S’s concern.
What is the relation between faring well at a time and faring well over a period or
over a life? On this account, the particular welfare contributions of moments
combine to determine the overall level of well-being of S in a particular domain,
over an extended period, and over the life of S. Whether we are satisfied with
mere summation will depend on how much weight we place on the problem of
aggregation. However, well-being as endorsing worthy goods allows for the
possibility that each part of well-being counts at least to some extent in the
absence of the other, and it defines the worth condition in a way that does not
warrant dogmatic intrusions on schedules of concerns. I describe each condition
briefly.
The first condition defines a pluralistic account of endorsement. If one
endorses an object, then one favours it, one is positively oriented towards it in
thought, feeling, and action, one is motivated to bring it into being, one is pleased
when it obtains, and one has pleasant thoughts about it.192 I argued that
endorsement in this sense requires that one experience a state of affairs in order
to benefit from it. The reason that I do not benefit from the satisfaction of my
desire that a stranger met briefly fare well is that it does not affect my experience.
In a limited sense, experience delineates the boundaries of well-being. This
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experience may be dispositional rather than occurrent. This caveat allows for
cases like flow states, in which subjects benefit from a mental state to which they
are positively oriented only in hindsight. The experience may also be
counterfactual. This allows for cases like Tom’s, in which more information would
change their assessment of the conditions of their lives. For instance, if learning
that his family and friends deceived him affects Tom’s experience of the
conditions of his life, then he does not fare well after all.
Endorsement as favouring is a pluralistic account of the subjective part of
well-being. It does not insist on describing favouring as a single distinctive
evaluative state or a necessary conjunction of such states. In some cases, the
obtaining of a single dimension will be sufficient to warrant the claim that a
subject favours a state of affairs; in most cases, several conditions will be jointly
sufficient. The upshot is a descriptively adequate account of endorsement that
can capture the wide range of evaluative states characteristic of different welfare
subjects from the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. The favourings of
children may be simpler than those that adults experience, but they are no less
significant. The dimension of favouring we emphasize will depend on the state of
affairs under consideration, and the purpose for which one is conducting the
analysis. The requirement that favouring occur under suitable conditions
concedes that some favourings are susceptible to procedural mistakes. The
upshot is an account of endorsement that makes the most of relevant differences
between welfare subjects without sacrificing generality for the sake of fidelity.
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The second condition defines worth in terms of an intersubjective ideal
independent from one’s actual endorsements. This ideal in part constitutes the
nature of welfare. It guides welfare subjects to authentic standards of selfassessment and reliable sources of well-being, and it plays a crucial role in
developing expertise in the pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare
value. One fares well over time when one endorses worthy goods. The concept
of worth reflects the point that the skillful pursuit of welfare is an expertise that
one acquires and develops over time, and that one practices in community. The
endorsements that subjects make under suitable conditions situate them as
epistemic authorities in a community of knowers who share an interest in faring
well. These are broad endorsements: they are actions that confirm, sanction, or
vouch for an end as likely to generate authentic standards of self-assessment
and lead to reliable sources of well-being.
Most of the ways that one relates to states of affairs, and the importance
that one accords to them in one’s schedule of concerns, depend critically on the
social practices embedded in culture. In this sense, culture is to community what
memory is to the individual. The social practices embedded within it are the tools
and ideas that the community amends, shares, and transmits to its members
because they once promoted their well-being.
How well does well-being as endorsing worthy goods meet the analytic
criteria I defend in the first two chapters? I will consider the three problems first
and the criteria for descriptive adequacy second.
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First, it deals with the problem of authority by recognizing that
endorsement is necessary for well-being in central cases. Next, it deals with the
problem of worth by recognizing that not all goods are on equal axiological
footing. Some goods have more worth than other goods; that is, some goods are
more likely to lead the welfare subject to authentic standards of self-assessment
and reliable sources of well-being. What is critical to one’s well-being is that one
exercises expertise in choosing one’s goals and in recognizing good ways to
direct one’s life, an expertise one develops in community. Judgments concerning
the worth of an object are defeasible. The soundness of a judgment of worth is
conditional on the most reliable empirical evidence concerning the standards and
objects that are likely to constitute the well-being of welfare subjects over time.
As one develops expertise in making judgments of worth, one ultimately
contributes to the axiological resources from which one benefits, confirming
some judgments, revising others.
Next, well-being as endorsing worthy goods deals with the double bind
problem in two ways. First, it accepts that independently valuable goods do not
count toward well-being in the absence of endorsement. Consider two nearly
identical states of affairs, each of which I equally fail to endorse. One contains
objective goods and the other does not. I have reason to pursue the objectively
good state of affairs, but only because it contains values other than welfare
values. This concession is necessary to secure the solution to the problem of
authority.
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Now, it is difficult to imagine recommending the life of the grass-counter to
others because of a nagging sense that the grass-counter does not fare as well
as he could fare. Our concerns are not all that matters to our well-being. In some
cases, the worth of the object of those concerns also matters. We can explain
our reaction to the case of the grass-counter if we accept a discontinuity in
welfare value between what I call “low fare” and “full fare.” In the central case,
faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great contribution that
endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true that endorsement
on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less than the unity. Call
the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own “low fare.” This
discontinuity is necessary to deal with the double bind problem without
abandoning the endorsement thesis. On this view, the grass-counter fares well
since we are supposing that he endorses his worthless activity, but he
experiences a relatively low amount of welfare. The discontinuity in welfare value
not only explains why the disillusioned artist fares much better in any state of
affairs she does endorse; it also explains why it is difficult to imagine
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others. However well he fares, he
would fare much better if he endorsed a more worthy state of affairs.
Second, well-being as endorsing worthy goods allows that endorsement
itself is in some degree worthy of concern. Enjoying seemingly neutral or
worthless objects will contribute to one’s well-being. I might think that comic
books are nearly worthless objects of concern, yet I might fare well to the extent
that I enjoy them with relish. Subjects may fare well when they endorse worthy
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goods, but their endorsements counts at least to some extent toward their wellbeing. Given the choice of two states of affairs in which one fails to concern
oneself with a valuable object, it must be the case that one fares better in the
state of affairs one endorses than the one that one does not.
The treatment of the double bind problem has an interesting implication.
The asymmetry in welfare contributions between unendorsed but worthy states of
affairs and endorsed states affairs implies that the disillusioned artist would fare
better reading comic books than engaging in drudgery work whose product she
does not endorse, however worthy it might be. This implication is necessary to
prevent a resurgence of the problem of authority. If the disillusioned artist would
fare better engaging in drudgery work whose product she did not endorse, she
would fare better if she remained alienated from her well-being than if she
endorsed worthless goods. Well-being as endorsing worthy goods is preoccupied
with ascribing worth to objects without alienating the subject from her well-being.
Given the agent-relativity of well-being, it must be the case that her well-being is
good for her.
I argued throughout that endorsing worthy goods is a descriptively
adequate theory of well-being. As an account of faring well at a time, it meets the
formality criterion: S fares well at a time if S endorses x under suitable
conditions, and x is worthy of S’s concern. As a pluralistic account of
endorsement, it acknowledges the diversity of subjective evaluative states that
welfare subjects experience. The upshot is a relatively general account of wellbeing that allows us to discuss a range of welfare judgments and capture the
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well-being of different kinds of sentient animals at different stages of life. Next,
the worth condition captures the intuition that not all objects are axiologically
neutral: some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects. I argued
that this intuition is more faithful to common intuitions about well-being. It is
important to note that well-being as endorsing worthy goods captures the idea
that each composite of endorsement and worthy goods is an organic unity that
contributes much more welfare value than endorsement alone. The value of the
two together is not just the sum of the parts such that the view reduces to a list
theory whose members can be combined in ways that are better or worse for the
welfare subject.
Finally, endorsing worthy goods does not obviously violate the weak
neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy; that is, it does not obviously favour a
given form of life. The concept of worth may be indexed to a given community,
but its details are defeasible and open to revision. Welfare subjects who have
attained a measure of epistemic authority can contribute to the community’s
knowledge about good ways to direct human lives. They can explore the ground
and implications of the claim that a given object is more worthy of concern than
another object, weigh it critically against the most reliable empirical evidence
concerning the standards and objects that are likely to ensure the well-being of
welfare subjects over time, and come to their own conclusions.
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